A critique of behaviorism by Pyle, Charles Bertram
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1927
A critique of behaviorism
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/5903
Boston University
o. c~l.-~v"~ 
~:ms OF :BEHAVIORISM AND· ~HEI:R~­
A 
by 
Charles :Bertram ~yle 
(A.:S. ,O. W.U. ,190l;S.T.:S. ,:Soston,l905; A. M. ,Harvard,l906) 
A Disserta tion 
submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
GRADUATE SCHOOL 
:BOSTON UNI VERSI'rY 
1927 
ON UNIVERSITY 
cet.LE.G E o>- LIBERAL ARTS 
;__ !S RARY 
"P.:O 
[ 9 27 
p 
0}-~ ·cr t 
CONTENTS 
I. HISTORY OF BEHAVIORISM 
1. Pre-behaviorism. 
2. Contemporaneous Behaviorism. 
II. TYPES OF BEHAVIORISM AND THEIR METAPHYSICAL IMPLI-
CATIONS. 
1. Modified Behaviorism. 
a. Psycho-physical Parallelism. 
b. Methodological Behaviorism. 
2. Metaphysical Behaviorism. 
a. The Behaviorism of Singer. 
( 1) Exposition. 
( 2) Metaphysical . Impli cB,tions. 
(a) Singer's Naturalism. 
(b) Idealistic Implic a tions. 
(3) Criticism. 
b. The Behaviorism of Watson ana of Other 
Page 
1 
23 
61 
61 
62 
?1 
?? 
?? 
?? 
83 
84 
91 
103 
Behaviorists most Closely Allied to Him. 116 
(.1) Exposition. 
(2) Metaphysical Implication. 
(3) Criticism~ Evaluation. 
c. The Behaviorism of John Dewey. 
116 
122 
125 
152 
0-) . Expositionarld.Naturalistic Implication. 152 
(2) Idealistic Implications. 155 
( 3 ) C ri ti C i BID • 161 
3. Logical Behaviorism. 1?4 
a. ~ Behaviorism of Perry. 
(1) Exposition and Naturalistic Impli-
cations. 
Page 
1'75 
1 '75 
(a) Criticism of Perry's Naturalism. 1'79 
(2) Exposition and Logical Implic a tions. 182 
(3) Cri t icism of Perry 's Doctrine a s a 
Whole. 
b. The Behavi ori sm of Holt. 
(1) Exposition and Metaphysical Impli-
cations. 
( 2) Cri ti ci sm. 
c. The Behaviorism of Bertrand Russell. 
(1) Exposition and Implic a tions. 
(2) Criticism. 
4. Evaluation of Behaviorism. 
185 
190 
190 
195 
198 
199 
211 
21 '7 
· a. Evaluation of Metaphysical Behaviorism. 21 '7 
b. Evaluation of I,ogic a l Behaviorism. 22'7 
III. SUMMARY 
IV. BI BLIOGRAPHY 
1 
I. HISTORY OF BEHAVIORISM 
1. Pre-behaviorism. Systems of thought that flower 
out today send their roots deep into the soil of the past. 
The scientific theory of atom and electron was forecast by 
Democritus, and Pathagoras presaged the precise formulae 
which govern matter. To see in perspective is to see more 
truly • . We view an organic development best from the roots 
upward. We shall understand behaviorism better by return-
ing to its origin. Behaviorism of recent bloom began to 
germinate in the thought of Aristotle. Several distin-
guished writers representing various brands of behaviorism 
trace its lineage directly to the great thinker of antiqui-
ty. Professor McDougall, who may be said to be the first 
that employed the term "behavior" with psychological pre-
cision, acknowledges his debt to Aristotle. Professor 
Singer, after a violent departure from well-trodden psy-
chological paths, asserts in his discussion of the '~Passive 
Thinker" that he is only trying to say what Aristotle said 
concerning the relation of mind and body. Professor Perry 
declares: "Behaviorism in a generalized sense is simply 
a return to the origina l Aristotelian view that mind and 
body are related as activity and organ. Expressed in more 
modern terms this means that the mental life consists of 
those performances of an organism that immediately involve 
the exercise of its n ervous system. 111 Professor Holt, in 
lttA Behavioristic View of Purpose," Journal of Philoso-
~. Volume XVIII, No. 4. 
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hie Freudian !l!h· imagines that he is pursuing Aristotle's 
conception of the relation of "soul" and "body"; for he says, 
"If, now, the wishes are the soul, then we can understand 
in all literalness Aristotle's dictum, that the soul is the 
form of the natural body endowed with the capacity of life, 
soul is indeed the entelechy."! He comes to nominal agree-
ment with Aristotle when he says, "Unquestionably the mind 
is somehow 'embodied' in the body •••• In living human 
beings, certainly, the spirit is embodied." But Holt immedi-
ately abandons the high position of Aristotle, for he tones 
down "mind" and "spirit" until they have no part in shaping 
the action of the body. They are only like the "spirit 
of any piece of machinery," which "lies in what it can do." 
Holt begins ''i th "capacity" as Ari etotl e did, but he fai 1 s 
to carry along with it the "energy" which precedes all 
"potentiality" and which is ultimately responsible for the 
development that leads "capacity" into "actuality." Mind 
evaporates into nervous stress, muscular tonicity, and bod-
ily attitudes, aimed at a definite part of the environment. 
Doubtless, with significant modifications, the behavior-
ists have carved their doctrines from Aristotelian "timber" 
and are at one with him in respect to development by an 
inner urge through natural causes and steadfast laws. Goal-
striving, purpose, potentiality, development, and even 
despised teleology, which lie embedded in Aristotle's funda-
lFreudian Wish, p. 49. 
mental conceptions, become major considerations for the 
leaders of the new psychology. It is worth while to tarry 
long enough to see in brief perspective what of Aristotle 
.has been carried forward, and what has been left behind 
because incompatible with present psychological and philo-
sophical tendencies. 
First, Aristotle's conc eption of development is woven 
into the fabric of behavioristic thought. The most signif-
icant portion of Aristotle's philosophy which has been re-
vived in behaviorism is the theory of continuous progress 
from potentiality to actuality, from capacity to energy. The 
energy that lies back of all specific movement is God, whose 
essence is mind. This is the metaphysical si d e of Aristotle's 
great idealism. God is pu re i dea, and as final cause coaxes 
the world into realization by the pathway of allurement. 
Behaviorism rejects Aristotle's God as pure idea, yet accepts 
potentiality in the sense of physical potential energy, and 
actuality in the sense of kinet i c energy set free by a stim-
ulating environment. The behaviorist.s assu1ne that matter is 
potent with future diver s ity and that the energy that drives 
c apacity forward into realization is self-generative and 
called forth by sp e cific situat ions. For Aristotle, form 
constructs matter while matter is recalcitrant. It lag s 
behind a nd hinders form, giving rise to the defects of na-
t ure. Form is the shaping force of matter, which, as poten-
tiality, finds its ground and justification in mental energy. 
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For behaviorism, potentiality becomes, as Singer says, the 
"expectation of future behavior." Aristotle's form is 
cancelled or taken over into the physical organism, which 
for Watson and others, possesses inherent powers of opera-
tion. 
Secondly,, nature can be unders~ood only from the stand-
point of teleol ogy . The physicist, in Aristotle's thinking, 
holds an important truth; but the philosopher, with superior 
insight, adds the fact that the last in realization is the 
first in form in relation to the nature of a thing. Nature 
works toward an end, which is not alone the last stage of 
the development, but a spread in concentric waves of growth 
from a central core of reality. Perfection is the goal 
sought; and purpose, determined by the final cause, is pro-
gressively realized in the development. In the main, behavior-
ism has adopted this goal-striving process. Nature bears 
within its own bosom the power to advance to t he goal; it 
dieplays · an energy which is expended and re-directed at 
each stage of progress. It is not designed by any external 
agency, not even by the Creator himself; for this would 
reduce nature to a mere mechanical contrivance. The goal is 
amended by experience, in a step-by-step process of striving, 
of perpetual adjustment and risk, which constitutes the very 
essence of life itself. Many of the behaviorists of the 
more refined type have become exceedi ngly charitable toward 
the notion of teleology of a certain kind, and have made 
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purpose a significant principle of interpretation. 
Einally, :thereis a likeness discoverable between Aristotle 
and the behavio r ists in the application of the principle of 
development and teleology relative to the soul-body problem. 
While behaviorism has strong philosophical allies, its chief 
concern is psychological. It seeks to ignore metaphysics 
altogether by restricting its science to the study of the 
behavior of lower and hi gher animal organisms. This may be 
called methodological behaviorism. While the behaviorists 
discard Aristotle's application of his metaphysical doctrine 
to the soul-body problem ~ they welcome his biological doc-
trine of development. The phase of Aristotle's conception 
which rega rd.s the soul as a function of the body, as "cutting 
to the axe;~ is acceptable to the behaviorists, but they 
repudiate the soul of transcendent affiliations. According 
to Aristotle the active element of the soul is reason, which 
is free and universal, concerned with the abstract and 
ideal , as contrasted with sense , which is limited to the 
individual, and deals with the concrete and material. The 
passive reason receives; the active creates. The latter 
unifies the world of thought by conferring upon the materi-
als of knowledge order and meaning. As the rays of the 
candle, falling with peculiar, transforming selection over 
the surface of polished steel marked by multitudinous and 
irregular scratches, presents the magical effect of an 
ordered series of concentric circles round that central 
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sun, so the active soul is the center and sun of illumi-
nation of experience whereby colors emerge and objects 
receive clear outline and the world is rendered intelli-
gible. The world is but potentiality until mind appears to 
bring it into actuality, tha t is, into existence. It is 
this active element of the soul, as an efficient moulder of 
the material, that behaviorism casts out. Only the emascu-
lated "form'' of Aristotle has been retained by a few behav-
iorists. Even the soul as vital energy of the body is ob-
noxious to the majority, because this conception is too 
closely allied with vitalism, which in biology has been 
superseded; while the assumption of form or energy beyond 
the complex functioning of the organism is an offense to 
natural law. 
Thus we see, in three important respects, similarities 
and differences between the behaviorists and Aristotle. For 
one, matter is potentiality, and needs the pure idea, God, 
whose essence is mind, to bring it into actuality and 
fruition; for the other, matter is potential, the ground of 
all future development under the stimulation of environment. 
Teleology means, for one, perfection of form; it means, for 
the other, tropistic, reflexive, instinctive, and conscious 
or unconscious striving of the organism toward a goal or 
end within and in response to its environment. For one, 
the soul is the informi ng principle of the body; for the 
other, consciousness is the accompaniment of neural processes 
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and nothing efficient, or it is just matter in motion. What 
Aristotle affirmed with all confidence is precisely what the 
behaviorists take great pains to deny, namely, that the soul 
is the organizing unity of the body, and that mind, as regnant 
in the cosmic order, fashions the material world. Inasmuch 
as the behaviorists despoil the universe of everything 
resembling an efficient mind, spirit, or "form," and rob the 
body of the semblance of a soul or consciousness the least 
degree informing, they have presented us, by stressing the 
physical organism as all sufficient, with a pale and sickly 
reversal of the Aristotelian creed. They have dichotomized 
the universe and cast the better half away. Nevertheless, 
from the matrix of Aristotle's thought, behaviorism has 
issued with modified conceptions of matter, potentiality, 
and teleology. 
Behaviorism gathers momentum under the inspiration of 
the materialistic philosophy of Hobbes, which it resembles 
in three respects. First, motion in the outer object, which 
corresponds to the stimulus, causes motion in the sense 
organs. This causes sense perceptions, which in turn cause 
conceptions ("inward endeavor"). Secondl~, a. response is set 
up ("outward endeavor"), and the result of these opposing 
motions is the "eeemings," or "phantasms," which are brain 
motions objectified as outer objects.l A motion of objects 
as an external stimulus encounters the resistance of an 
lPhilosophy of Hobbes, Woodbridge Edition, 1903, pp. 
99-100. 
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opposite and internal endeavor, with the result that not 
only phantasms of sense but also images and ideas in the 
mind arise as motions. 1 He thus reduces the mental to motion 
and anticipates Professor Singer's conception of conscious-
ness as "moving atoms."' Fit:Ial·ly, there is but a thin parti-
tion between Hobbes' notion th~t fear, love, anger, etc., 
are motions of the mind and are subject to physical contem-
plation, and the method of observation adopted almost ex-
clusively by the behaviorists. Hobbes could have suggested 
to Singer his thesis, "Mind as an Observable Object." 
Descartes rejected the vitalism of Aristotle. In his 
"Tract on Man," he gave us the con ception of the body as a 
mere machine, whose life can be accounted for by the mechan-
ical movements of its parts, operating under purely natural 
law. This gives comfort to some behaviorists, who refer to 
Descates' conception of the body as a natural machine as the 
correct notion for behaviorism to adopt. In this sense, 
Descartes has · made a cont ribution to behaviorism. His after-
thought that the mind influences the body through the pineal 
gland, and the body the mind, the behaviorists reject, as 
Descartes himself would be compelled to do were he entirely 
consistent with his major propositions. 
Upon the authority of Roback, Titchener's strictures of 
behaviorism as represented by Watson reveal. a striking kin-
ship between the psychological attitudes of Watson and Cournot 
1Hobbes' Works, Molesworth Edition, Volume I, pp. ?2-?3. 
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and Comte. Roback adds that there is a close resemblance 
between the introductory pages of Watson's Behavior and Comte's 
Cours .9J! Philoso;ehie Positive.l Comte's positivistic philoso-
phy and behaviorism have several things in common. They 
are both systems of phenomenal! ty, eschewing all metaphysics. 
They are interested in the actions of organisms in society 
and in the laws t hat govern them. In his classification of 
the sp~cial sciences, Comte found no place for psychology; 
because ita subject matter was soul or mind, and these are 
too metaphysical to be in.cluded in his system. Conscious-
ness, in a metaphysical sense, is also repugnant to the 
behaviorist. Both, as a rule, make an onslaught on intros-
pection, decrying it as an altogether subjective and un-
trustworthy method. Both stress the objective and scien-
tific method as the only reliable and fruitful one. Comte 
makes psychology partly a biological and partly a sociologi-
cal subject; some behaviorists stress the sociological 
aspect, but most stress the biological; and some make more of 
the physical and chemical aspects of the science. Kantor, 
De Laguna, and Tolman combine the physical and societary 
aspects to the neglect of t he physiological. 
With the dawn of the twentieth century, the way was 
speedily prepared for coming behaviorism. Attempts to 
dismantle idealism, bringing new conceptions of conscious-
ness, must first subordinate mind by showing that conscious-
lBehaviorism ~ Psxcholo~, p. 32. 
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ness is not the whole of reality, that reality is not even 
dependent on the mental, and that mind grows up within real-
ity itself. Somehow, also, the cleavage between the psychi-
cal and physical, which had long been sharply drawn in 
conventional psychology , must be closed. The way was pro-
posed by Professor H. B. Alexander in his conception of 
"experience" or final "seeming'' which embraces both psychi-
cal and physical qualities without distinguishing them as 
such. 1 Since the days of Locke, the empiricists have been 
drawing as much of the world as possible out of the mind; the 
idealists have been drawing it within. After the process 
is completed, says Alexander , the two worlds coalesce and 
are one. Content is placed in environment; ideas and things 
are identified, and consciousness becomes an objective 
relation--a thing among other things. The ground is now 
laid for New Realism, which affords strong support for 
behaviorism. The objectivication of consciousness was an 
important step toward its exclusion from the central place 
in psychology. This must occur before behaviorism could 
really get under way. 
In December, 1903, Professor Perry denied to conscious-
ness a metaphysical character and intimated that it can be 
known only objectively, thus striking a blow at introspection, 
and paving the way for the objective method of observation in 
the treatment of mind. "The first intent or bearing of experi-
1
"The Concept of Consciousness," Journal .2.£ Philosophy, 
Volume I (1904), pp. 118-124. 
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ence is objective," he says. I can become aware of "my 
stat e" only by going beyond it to objective experience. 
"I can introspect my state only as in retrospect I surround 
my former limited experience with my present objective ex-
perience and so discredit the former; my waking experience 
corrects my dream and goes beyond it, is more objective ; 
nature intervenes to correct dreams and illusions and 
others correct me."l This is to define consciousness in 
terms of relativity. Perry has thus given impetus to the 
objective metho d and undermined the dignity of conscious-
ness. 
Perry carried the mind a step f :urther toward the outer 
world. While he recognized that ide as and perceptions are 
in a certain sense private, they are not exclusively one's 
own. He opposed the "private" mind with the conception that 
a "thing's relation to me as my idea may enter into another 
such relation to you and become your idea."2 His conclusion 
is that mind is not private, as the idealist supposes, but 
is open to the inspection of others. Seldom ·does the mind 
escape observation because it is revealed in the "motor 
action , in the motions of my body as a whole." Here behavior-
ism finds a chief cornerstone. 
From 1903 to 1909 Perry grew so rapidly toward behavior-
ism that his whole insistence now is that mind "within" and 
lnconceptions and Misconceptions of Consciousness," 
Philosophical Review, Volume II (1904). 
2"The Hiddenness of Mind," Journal .2f. Philosophl, 
Volume VI (1909). 
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mind "without" are one. 1 He is gradually approaching his 
point of view, as it is expressed in New Realism, that con-
tent and object are identical. It is with this ambiguity of 
content and object that Perry is able apparently to pull 
his theory of the independence of reality through.2 He 
admits feelings and images but would not place them in the 
environment. 'rhey constitute the mind "within" which is a 
diminishing consideration. Introspection dwindles accord-
ingly. It "tends to be distributive and so useless because 
merely repetitive."3 This view is contrary to that held by 
most behaviorists, who say introspection is not repetitive 
and, therefore, not reli able. Introspection congeals direct 
experience of reality, "knowledge of first intent" and 
ruffles the "that" into "whats. •• It breaks experience into 
fragments and presents them merely in juxtaposition '.IIlith the 
dynamic relations of the "object-manifold" wanting, while the 
_principle which defines the group is known only by "object-
ive behavior." "In short we can tell the content of mind 
only by watching behavior and the content is found in the 
nat ural environment as the organism selects it."4 Just 
here Perry drags the nmind within," without. He goes beyond 
most behaviorists who identify mind with bodily behavior of 
some sort--nervous, muscular-glandular, or total, and links 
l 11Mind Within and Mind Without," Journal of Philosoi?hY, 
Volume VI (1909), pp. 169-175. 
2nA Realistic Theory of Independence," New Realism, pp. 99ff. 
3"Mind Within and Mind Without," Journal .2£ Philoso:ghy, 
Volumi VI, p. 1?1. 
Ibid., pp. 169-1?5. 
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mind indissolubly with the environment. Mind embraces the 
aspects of interest which means organic need, the body, and 
the objects selected from the environment. This is mind 
completely objectified so that Perry can truly say, "Mind 
lies in the open field of experience as free to all comers 
as the motions of the stars or the civilizations of cities."l 
Despite the balanced judgment of Roback that Professor 
.Tames "was possessed of a alight behavioristic tendency" and 
"that he bears only a tangential reYation" to behaviorism, 
when we consider the immense weight of his authority, his 
rich veins of thought from which the behaviorists have so 
freely mined, his insatiable appetite for physiology, his 
eagerness to find physiological bases for psychological 
states, his stress upon motor responses, we must give to 
.Tames an important role in the early formulation of behavior-
istic doctrine, so important that we may believe .Tames did 
more unconsciously to shape the behavioristic tendency than 
any other writer has done consciously to that end • 
.Tames was greatly impressed by Baldwin, Ward, Bawden, 
King, Alexander, and Perry, whom he regarded as "frankly 
over the border" in the denial that consciousness is an 
entity. These writer~ in the opinion of James, had reduced 
consciousness to a "thoroughly ghostly condition." "I 
believe," says .Tames, "that consciousness, when once it is 
evaporated to this state of pure diaphaneity is on the point 
1Present thi~osoEhical Tendencies, p. 273. 
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of disappearing altogether. It is the name of a nonentity, 
and has no right to a place among first principles. Those 
who still cling to it are clingi ng to a mere echo, the faint 
rumor left behind by the disappearing soul upon the air of 
philosophy •••• It seems to me that the hour is ripe for it 
to be openly and universally discarded."l This sounds very 
much like Watson's iconoclastic utterances a decade later. 
As we now discern, the history of behaviorism discloses 
a tendency to interpret consciousness objectively or to 
banish it altogether. The soul-substance of Locke which 
provided an unknowable back-ground for "qualitiea" _has long 
since disappeared. James' negative answer to his own ques-
tion "Does Consciousness Exist?" means that consciousness is 
no receptacle for thoughts; no basket filled with apples; no 
sky filled with clouds which scud across it. He knocked the 
permanent sky out, leaving but the scudding clouds. There is 
no longer any metaphysical "self," "soul," or "mind," only 
passing thoughts remain. The ."thoughts are the thinkers." 
Consciousness becomes a "function of knowing" by which "pure 
experience" is dirempted into "knower" and "thing known" with 
their relation which is objective and real. And finally, 
consciousness is transformed into relations among things with 
only a 'feeling" of physical activity (mostly located in the 
n ead) left to represent the mental. Perry complains because 
James does not advance to the behavioristic position by 
lnnoes Consciousness Exist?" Journal .2.f. Philosophy, 
Volume I (1904), pp. 4??M478. 
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substituting bodily activity for "feeling." When he recalls 
that .James actually identifies "the stream of thinking" with 
"the stream of breathing, 11 Perry would have less reason to 
complain. 
All these interpretations and tendencies, which we have 
mentioned, signify a strong drift toward the empirical, the 
experimental, and the naturalistic point of view. Comparative 
psychology with its method of objective observation, exper-
imental psychology, physiological psychology with its stress 
upon the neural processes, the prestige of the physical and 
social sciences, the dominant interests in the biological 
organism, and the philosophic revolt agai n st idealism· have 
conspired to create a suitable en vir onmen t for behaviorism. 
With such favorable conditions at the outset of the 
twentieth century, we should expect psyc h ology to be influ-
enced by the newer concep tions in other fields. In order to 
render their subject matter scientific, psychologists would 
be interested in makin g use of scientific method. This tends 
to reduce the subject matter of psychology to the physical 
category, and thus to provide a basis for behaviorism. 
Accordingly, we find that Professor W. M. Cattell shows a 
decidedly behavioristic bent.l He condemns introspection, 
and enters a plea for a scientific and objective method in 
the study of psychology. Professor .John Dewey also lends 
strong support to behaviorism. Though his Essays in Exper-
iment~l Logic were written from 1900, 1903, and onward 
111Conception a n d Methods of Psychology," Congress of~ 
and Sciences, Volume V (1904), pp. 597-598. 
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(several of them before behaviorism became a psychological 
by-word), their psychological aspects are saturated with 
behavioristic interpretations, Dewey tells us in his "Prefa-
tory Note." His general position is realistic and pr~gmatic, 
and looks to the interests of the biological organism. 
Consciousness and thinking spring up only at the instance of 
the organism's needs. While they are devoid of the "psychi-
cal," they are instrumental in the control of environment. 
The entire naturalistic back-ground with the natural organism 
in responsive action to a highly complex order of stimulation 
provide conditions for the growth of behaviorism. 
Woodbridge gives support to behaviorism in his conclu-
sion inconsistently drawn from his major premise.l Like 
James, he rejects the conception of consciousness as a recep-
tacle, and he conceives it as a continuum like space, time, 
or species. Objects are in the continuum as in a light. 
Consciousness illuminates them but never reveals thei.r na-
ture. The objects themselves do this. Woodbridge begins 
with consciousness as a closed system, as individual, and 
even "private"; he ends by placing it among objects, a rela-
tion between them. Here he strengthens behaviorism; here 
also lies his inconsistency. 
In attempting "An Empirical Definition of Conscious-
ness," Professor Bush strikes a stiff blow at idealism.2 
l"Nature of Consciousness," Journal 2! Philoeophl, 
Volume II (1905). 
2Journal of Philosoph~, Volume II (1905), pp. 561-568. 
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With some modification, he accepts the clues offered by 
Woodbridge, Perry, and James. ~specially is he impressed by 
James whose "function of knowing" he retains under the 
simple caption of "knowing." Consciousness means our private 
mental state which can not be observed by anyone but ourselves. 
However, this becom~ s error or "idiosyncracy" as Perry in-. 
timates, unless it falls in with the judgments of others. 
In order to be reliable, our subjective experiences must 
await empirical verification. To be scientific, our exper-
ience must agree with the observations of others. But the 
fact that "our mental states are incapable of observation 
by anybody but ourselves," woUld convert the judgments of 
others into possible idiosyncracies and Bush would have 
scientific verity by the multiplication of idiosyncracies. 
On the whole, his intense realism, his presentative theory 
of knowledge, and his tendency to the relational view of 
consciousness place Bush among the supporters of behavior-
ism. 
Professor Santayana has also made a contribution to 
behaviorism. For he considers psychology in its scientific 
aspects a matter of physiology. The soul functions in its 
biological and environmental setting.l The naturalism of 
Santayana, which amounts to complete phenomenality, provides 
a fine soil for behaviorism, though he is not conscious of 
such orientation. His rebuke to Aristotle for employing the 
lReason ~ Science, 1906, pp. 140ff. 
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soul as an efficient cause was gentle because it was not 
then clear that "dynamic p r inciples are mechanical and that 
mechanism can obtain only among objects." The business of 
scientific psychology is to ''develop physiology and anthropol-
ogy until the mechanism of life becomes clear. 11 Mind, if 
i t is to be made known, must be discovered through its practi-
cal, environmental attachments. 
Behaviorism takes more definite form with the defini-
tion given by Professor McDougall : "Psychology may be 
best and most comprehensively defined as the positive science 
of the conduct of living creatures."l He defines conduct 
as the "sum of activi ties by which any creature maintains its 
relatione with other= creatures and with the world of phy-
sical things." These activities include both conscious and 
unconscious facto r s, the latter lying b eyond introspection. 
His definition, after eighteen ye e; rs, ha.s changed but little; 
for he still defines psychology as "the science of the human 
mind, n2 and mind expresses itself in experience and in be-
havior--the former, discoverable by introspection; the latter, 
by observation of activities. Both definitions reveal a 
double aspect; neither is a thorough-going behavioristic 
formulation. McDougall did something for the development 
of behaviorism, even sprinkling the pages of his Outline 
freely with behavioristic terms; but he has always appeared 
lintroduction 1£ Physiological Psychology, 1905, p. 1. 
2outline of Psychology, 1923, pp. 3?-38. 
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half-hearted in the matter, and, when Watson presented 
behaviorism in a "raw" form, he clung closer to the older 
way. 
Kirkpatrick offers a strange sort of behaviorism of 
some merit. He represents the genetic point of view. He 
recognizes the need of "a science of behavior of organisms 
and organst' which he calls "organosis." His science would 
embrace all processes of living organisms down to the vege-
tative and up to the most abstract thinking. Al l are 
"intelligent," whether conscious or unconscious, because 
they are striving toward preservative ends of life. This 
entire realm of behavior is a concern of biology, physiology, 
and psychology. Consciousness presides over and influences 
(most behaviorists would not admit this much)- the function-
ing of the organism as a railroad president presides over 
the vast details of a "great railroad system,"--rather · 
loosely. "There is no more reason to doubt that conscious-
ness influences behavior than the r e is reason to doubt the 
influence of ~he railroad president."! 
Angellallowe but little of behavioristic tendency to . 
disturb the placid surface of his conventional psychology.2 
He does adopt the biological viewpoint that was the fashion 
of the day, and he even approaches the behavioristic con-
ception in the statement: "We shall regard all the operations 
1 
"Broader Basis for Psychology, tt iJournal .2! Phil oso;phy, 
Volume IV (190?). 
2General Psychology, 1904; lt,ourth Edition, Revised, 190a 
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of consciousness as so many expressions of organic adapta-
tions to our environments •••. An organism represents, among 
other things, a device for executing movements in response 
to the stimul a tions and demands of the environment,"l These 
expressions, join ed to the fact that he developed a warm 
s ympathy for behaviorism a :few years later, indicate an 
i ncipient behaviorism, 
By 1910, Angell scents the coming storm, as shown in 
his declara tion at Minneapolis, that a shift to "some term 
like behavior will be made, which affords a mor~ useful 
clue." He goes so far with behaviorism as to accept its 
stimulus-response formula; while he, at the same time, 
insists that the study of conscious activities by the in-
trospective method is necessary to fill in the "intercalary 
processes" between stimulus and response, or else all would 
be dark within the "hiatus." He also accepts "objective 
observation" as a supplementary method, Angell cites the 
fact tha t conventional psychology is crumbling before forces 
more subtle than the criticisms of the militant new realists 
who volunte ered to purge and redeem. .Among these are a few 
of more or less historical i mport: The revolt against 
introspection, the interpretation of much social and racial 
psychology as well as economics and history by group action 
without reference to consciousness, and functional psychology, 
which regards the organism as unitary. These provide a 
lrbid., p. a. 
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convenient behavioristic mould. The "conscious-attitudes" 
psychology, as represented by Miss Calkins1 and by Professor 
Judd 2 provides suitable foundation fdr behavioristic theory. 
All these influenc es have helped to shape the early program 
of behaviorism. 
One of the most immedi a te causes of behaviorism, and 
most potent, is the comparative psychologist's violent re-
jection of consciousness because he can not employ it in his 
study of animal behavior. It is unscientific to guess what 
may occur in the mind of the animal. To be consistent, one 
must drop consciousness altogether in his investigation of 
the lower animals. The behaviorist is primarily interested 
in animal psychology and its objective method. He carries 
the method of the comparative psychologist higher and applies 
it to the study of man. Hence, Watson. one of the most con-
sistent of the behaviorists, has pushed behaviorism to its 
logical conclusion. He studies the activities of the animal 
organism as a whole, and insists that the human organism 
must be studied as a whole, and objectively, without any 
reference to consciousness whatever. Considering the pre-
paratory forces as setting the stage, behaviorism issue d 
directly from the matrix of comparative psychology. As 
Watson says, it is an American product. At least this is 
true in its extreme form, and on its psychological side. 
It is philosophically allied with the materialism of Hobbes 
lrntroduction 1£ Psychology, 1901 • 
2Genera1 Introduction, 190?. 
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(through Singer especially); and, as Titchener points out, 
it is allied with Comte and Cournot. Perry, Singer, Holt, 
and McDougall are doubtl e ss correct when they claim its 
kinship with Aristotle. But in its recent manifestation, 
which is real behaviorism, it is indigenous. Even Roback 
admits tha t "behaviori am, as a thorough-going system, did 
not take root either in the British Isles or on the con-
tinent."l Despite the f act that McDougall "defined psycholo-
gy behavioristically," he will not now own the American 
child. 
On July 21, 1910 , "The F :r;ogram and First Platform of 
- Six Realists" was sketchily presented in an article in the 
Journal ~ Philosophy, Volume VII, and further elaborated 
in New Realism (1912). New realism and behaviorism are not 
identical, by any means; but the fact that some prominent 
new realists have strongly supported beha viorism indicates 
a common cause. Its opposition to idealism and to dualism 
in psychology, its subjugation of mind to matter, and its 
c a sting of the organism in t o the give and take of a re alis-
tic environment mark new r ealism a s a strong fortress of 
behaviorism. 
We shall now summarize the results reve aled in t h is 
brief history. The behaviorists have appropriated important 
features of Aristotle 1 s philoso:phy such as the conceptions of 
"potentiality," "development," "teleology," and especially 
lBehaviorism and Psychology, p. 39. 
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the conception of the soul as a function of the active or-
ganism. But they have omitted the "form," the idea of God 
which, for Aristotle, made all activities efficient. The 
development of physiological psychology gave impetus to the 
interpretation of the mental in terms of the nervous system 
and brain action. Experimental and comparative psychology 
encouraged the method of objective observation. Behavior-
ism issues directly from comparative psychology. The methods 
and triumphs in the biological field were extended to the 
psychological, and psychology passed from a philosophical to 
a biological subject. The objective methods of other sciences 
were applied to the study of consciousness which prepared the 
way for its final departure. Organic activity was at length 
substituted for the mental and behaviorism was on in full 
force. Working through it all was a tendency away from the 
mystical and "supernatural" toward the empirical and natural, 
d ue to the splendid achievements of the special sbiences, 
and consequently to a disposition to extend to all realms 
the reign of natural law. These are the most sign i ficant 
influences that have ripened into the behavioristic tenden-
cies of the day. 
2. Contemporaneous Behaviorism. Among the most 
trenchant articles which have set the current of behaviorism 
in definite, clear-cut channel, are those of Professor 
Singer on the subjects, "Mind as an Observable Object" and 
"On Mind as an Observable Object"--B,rticles which were pre-
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pared for the Association in 1910 and 1911, and which appeared 
in the Journal of Philosophy (1911 and 1912). They were 
afterwards published, with other essays in Mind M Behavior 
(1924). Professor Singer is the Moses of behaviorism on the 
philosophical side as Watson is the Aaron on the psychologi-
cal. Singer and Watson are the creators of behaviorism in 
the extreme form. Singer sets forth that mind is but moving 
atoms; consciousness is behavior of the organism. Mind is 
completely objective, and is known through social contacts 
and social judgments. One can not know his mind by introspec-
tion, but each "knows himseif through others." Mind is to be 
known through the observation of behavior. Provoked by the 
question of Miss Washburn, "What is to be done with the 
thinker who exhibits no behavior, for the reason that he 
is thinking?" Singer resorted to Aristotle's notion of 
potentiality (minus the form) in his discussion of the 
"Passive Thinker." Miss Washburn's question compels Singer, 
after some evasion, to begin his search for behavior "by 
looking for such movements of atoms as actually moved too 
slightly for us to observe." He would look chiefly at the 
tongue and strained ey e-muscles. The challenge flung out by 
Singer to the compara tive psychologist to solve the problem 
of the "Passive Thinker," combined with his suggestion that 
light might be found by observation of the tbngue, eyes, or 
muscles strained in inhibition, prov ed the starting point of 
V!atson' s development. 
25 
With the mention of Singer and Watson, we h ave intro-
duced contemporaneous behaviorism. There are still other 
varieties of behaviorism, which we need to examine before we 
undertake to develo p the type s of behaviorism and their meta-
physic_al implications. It will help to clarify our subject 
t6 group the different behaviorists according to their simi-
larities of treatment of consciousness and subject matter, 
eo far as we are able to do so. Roback discovered forty-one 
different brands of behaviorism, one for each behaviorist. 
Doubtless, there are many divergent points of view. It is 
impossible to group the behaviorists under strictly uniform 
classes because few of them completely agree. But many of 
them may be grouped relative to significant aspects; in some 
respects they all agree. 
The extreme group of behaviorists to which Singer belongs 
wish to banish consciousness altogether. Weiss and Watson 
are among the most violent in this respect. This is pro-
bably one reason Professor Hunter claimed, erroneously, that 
they are the only two behaviorists, Watson representing the 
only true behaviorism. Professor Hunter had a better reason 
for his citation in the f act that both Weiss and Watson 
repudiate consciousness as the subject matter of psychology 
and include the organism in stimulus-response relationships 
to the environment. 1 The efforts of Weiss are directed 
against all systems of psychology that recognize the physical 
1Journal £!Philosophy, Volume XIX (1922). 
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and psychical series, that is, that admit a dualistic concep-
tion. He points out that behaviorism is monistic. He turns 
the "mental states" of orthodox psychology into "neural 
pro~esses." Therefore consciousness has no existence. 
Weiss and Watson agree in renouncing consciousness, both 
by insisting on the method of observation and in the selection 
of subject matter. Weiss treats it as a "mechanical function 
of the environment and the reactin g system. nl He stresses 
the neural, while Watson stresses muscles and glands. Weiss 
agrees with Watson in adopting the "total response 11 · of the 
organism as the factor of resp onse to stimulus. 
Bawden in his behavioristic venture belongs to the same 
category as .Watson and Weiss. We see the same stress on the 
objective method; the same dismissal of consciou sness; the 
s ame stress on unity; and the same interpretation in purely 
natural terms by which the mental is reduced to a supposed 
scientific formula.2 He . strengthens our conviction, as we 
read behavioristic literature, that behaviorism is primarily 
an interpretation of the human organism from the natural 
science point of view. To this entirely, it owes its method, 
which, most behaviorists agree, is as objective as that em-
ployed in any of the natural sciences. To this mainly, it 
owes the assumption that the mental, which once was thought 
1
"The Relation between Phys iological Psychology and 
Behavior Psychology," Journal£! Philosophy, Volume XVI 
(1922), p. 634. . 
2
"The Pre~uppositions of a Behaviorist Psychology," 
Psychological Review, Volume XXVI (1918). 
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to belong to a spiritual order--and is still thought to be so 
by the majority--pe r haps, is, after all, only some form of 
the physical and natural. It must be, in fact, because the 
natural constitutes the full round of reality. The soul had 
a chance so long as we conceived the universe as composed 
of two worlds--the spiritual, or psychical; and the natural, 
or physical. To the former, the soul belonged; to the latter, 
the body. But evidence is accumulating to support the view 
that no sharp cleavages are to be found in nature--that there 
is no sundering of mind and matter in the matrix of world 
formation, nor in the human mind and body. The gulf between 
reflex and instinct, and between instinct and intelligence 
must at length close "before a more adequate analysis." 
The evolution of consciousness can not be understood until 
the act of a snail, which learns by association to open its 
mouth to receiv~ a portion of lettuce leaf as a response to 
the stimulation of its toes by a glass rod in the hand of the 
experimenter, is identified with the cogitations of a Glad-
stone, who walks up and down the pathway of his garden by the 
snail as it crawls upon the green border of that pathway on 
s orne dewy morn. 
Bawden would place man among other objects in space and 
time, just a thing in a world of things, "including stones 
and stars and atoms and electrons." We are machines, only 
more delicately constructed than some other things. We 
"behave as persons 11 to whom we ascribe "mind, sou l, spirit, 
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consciousness, feeling, sensation, memory, etc." These 
same characteristics "may be latent even in atoms, and 
stones and stars." Here he takes an abrupt departure from 
Weiss and Watson. Bawden reverses the procedure of Singer, 
who sinks the genius of man into the sea of atoms; while the 
former lifts the feebleness of the clod into the human realm, 
and thus finds continuity and uniformity. 
Roback, in his "Chart of Behaviorism," assigns Bawden 
and Bode to the same category, partly, no doubt, because they 
are philosophical pragmatists, and partly because of their 
similarity of language in the description of stimulus and 
response. This likeness is more superficial than real; for, 
whereas Bode institutes a sharp division between the mechan-
ical behavior and "conscious" behavior, Bawden wishes to 
obliterate all distinctions. "What we observe in so-called 
introspection is usually but the inner bodily beginnings 
(Watson's "implicit processes"), hidden from outer view, of 
the same behavior which in its overt manifestations is des-
cribed by external obse!vation." "There is no difference 
in the nature of the facts, but only in their accessibility." 
"A nascent response is just as truly an objective datum as a 
completed performance."l This conception is fundamental in 
his behaviorism, and this is Watsonian. Bawden do e s not lift 
his behaviorism above the realm of the mechanical, although 
he defines psychology 11 as the science of the behavior of 
l"The Pre suppositions of a Behavi. orist Psychology," 
Philosophi cal Review, Volume XXVI (1918). 
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organisms in so far as they exhibit mentality." His "mental-
ity" is reduced to the capacity of the organism to use _one 
part of its experience to control another (this shows Dewey's 
influence), and with this definition disappears the last 
vestige of "mentality" or "consciousness" believed in by the 
conventionalist. The chief contentions of Bawden on the 
psychological side, would rank him with Watson and Weiss; his 
philosophical sallies would bring him nearer to Singer's 
atomistic energism. 
K. s. Lashley must be given a place among the most 
thoroughgoing behaviorists. A collaborator with Watson, he 
indorses his most extreme position that all psychology must 
be amenable to physical and physiological interpretations. 
He challenges the conventionalist to bring any subject matter 
of psychology that behaviorism can not explain. He grants 
that b ehaviorism h a s not explained introspective phenomena, 
and chides it because · it has ignored it, and further says 
that behaviorism will never have the psychological field for 
its own until it does meet psychological dualism on its own 
ground. He is confident tha t the categories of physics, 
chemistry, and physiology will prove sufficient for p sycholo-
gy also. At any rate, psychology must be freed from all 
metaphysical entities and brought within the bounds of a 
purely natural science. Dewey also in one phase of his 
philosophy, as we shall show later, is a metaphysical behav-
iorist. 
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The members of another outstanding group of behav-
iorists present striking similarities. They are the nee-
realists. Foremost in this group are Perry, Holt, and 
Bertrand Russell, the English nee-realist. All are real-
ists. Each tries to confine his thought to the natural or-
ganism and envirornnent, but he ends with the acknowledgement 
of a world beyond the natural. Each makes purpose and teleology 
a significant feature of his system. They precisely agree that 
matter in the lump is nothing "purposive"; but matter organ-
ized toward an end or responding to a definite portion of the 
environment in a series of acts, is purposive, and when behav-
ing thus, might be said to be "conscious" and "intelligent." 
We must thin~ of Bertrand Russell as ~elonging to this 
group of realists, though he disavows strict realism.· In 
the first place, Russell is "The Other Wise Man" to the group 
of American ne w realists. He sustains close kinship to mem-
bers of this group on the epistemological and metaphysical 
side and shows a strong bias toward Watson (there is not 
complete agreement) on the psychological side. 
Though Russell playfully criticized Watson's form of 
behaviorism earlier (~Propositions lli:e~), his behavioris-
tic bias is clearly revealed in his Analysis £! Mind. Here 
he attemp t s to reconcile the materialistic tendency of psychol-
ogy and the idealistic tendency of physics. Russell seeks to 
deliver behaviorism from a materialistic ultimate, on the 
ground that the behaviorists regard physics as the most 
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fundamental of all the sciences , and that phys ic s does not 
ass'LUl'le the existence of matter. Therefore, the "neutral 
stuff, " suggested by James a nd adopted by the new realists, 
of whom Rus sell professes to be enamored, is also acceptable 
to the latter, who finds it a'~oint of reconciliation of the 
materialistic tendency of psychology and t h e anti-materialis-
tic tendency of physics.u To this end, Russell devotes 
fifteen most interesting chapters, with an ardor and insight 
truly remarkable.! 
Another group wish to make more of the psychical, while 
they also stress t h e biological. They are the psycho-
~b i ological behav-iorists. Knight Dunlap, Abbott, and Kempf 
ma y be placed in this gro up. Roback thinks that Dunl a p is 
a "behaviorist in disguise"2 despite his more recent attack 
on behaviorism. Dunlap deni e s emphatically that introspec-
tion is possible. 3 Upon t h i s poin t he is in practical 
agreement with most behaviorists, who either minimize the 
i mportance of introspection or deny it altogether. Dunlap 
also rejects representative k nowledge as set forth by James 
and Stout, and he makes this scathing characterization of 
the system: "The ghostly world of representational 'ide a s' 
or 'states' of consciousness, dim shadows through which we 
look at the real objects casting them, or on which alone we 
may fasten our gaze, attracts no longer faith nor interest."4 
1~ Anallsis of Mind. 
2Behaviorism ~ Psy££ology, p. 55, footnote. 
3"The Case Against Introspection," Psychologica~ Review, 
Volume XIX (1912), pp. 404-413. 
4rbid., p. 410. 
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He seems to have been caugh t in the tide setting in toward 
behaviorism at the time, but his System of I)sycholo~ admits 
sufficient conscious content to satisfy any conventionalist. 
He admits a "self" which is the content of experience, and 
he a ssumes a real wo_rld to be experienced which also becomes 
c ont ent when experienced. Psychology is not concerned with 
a transcendental self or not-self, though it denies neither. 
Dunlap is certainly not empha tically behavioristic, though 
in some respects he supports behaviorism. 
Abbott and Kempf are also psycho-biologists, but they 
place great stress on the emotion a l and dynamic aspects of 
personality. Both are psychiatrists. Kempf joins psycho-
analysis to the physiological integrations of the autonomic 
nervous system, which resemble Holt's integrated reflexes 
as represen ted i n his F r eudian Wish . Doubtless for this 
reason, Roback pl aced Kempf and Holt in the same category. 
For Abbott, the organism adapts itself to its environment 
by self-directive activities, mostly psycholo gical. Uni-
cellular organisms may be said to possess psychic reaction s, 
T • l • l as uenn1ngs c a1ms. Mi n d is the abstract term we apply to 
psychic reactions. The mind is n ot opp osed · to the body, 
nor does it possess a stru cture as McDougall contends.2 The 
mind is the function of the individual with the brain as the 
means, just as the respiration is a function of the individual 
with the l ungs as a means. We do not identify r e spirati on and 
1Behavior of the Lower Organ isms. 
2uind ~ Body. 
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lungs, neither should we identify mind and brain or body.l 
Consciousness is defined by Kempf as a reaction of the 
whole body .to the sense activity of its parts.2 The au-
tonomic system integrates the parts of the organism and 
employs the central nervous system to relate the organism 
as a whole to ita environment. He conceives the emotions 
which are wrung out of the organism by automatic tensions as 
constituting the dominating force of the organism. f his he 
calls a "dynamic personality." If t h is is so, Kempf belongs 
with Kanto~, where Roback places him. It seems, however, 
that the integrations of the ''autonomic apparatus" subordinate 
the affective elements, making the process entirely mechan-
ical. He should, the r efore, be rank ed with Abbott. First, 
because they are ~nclined to recognize the psychical or 
consciousness, even though they make it a f unc tion of the 
organism. "Consciousness of self is too omnipresent a .fact 
to be disreg arded," says Kempf.3 "The discu ssion of the au-
tonomic functions and the i r fundament al law is naturally 
divi d ed into its three manifestations--(a) structural, 
(b) physiological, and (c) psychological"--which shows 
that somewhere he tries to mruce room for the psychical. 
Plainly, Abbott atempts to exalt the psychical by making it 
the principal factor of the inner ·activities of a self-
directive organism. Secondl.y, .bo~h .l>.elieve they are offering 
a dynamic view, but as a matter of -fact, both are purely 
l"The Biologi cal Point of View in Psychology and Psychi-
atry," Psych ological. Review, Volume XXIII (1916). 
2Autonomic ~unctions and the Personality, p. 151. 
3. --Ibld., Ch&p. II. 
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mechanical. Thi·i-.d-ly, both assume the biological view-point • 
.l:f'or Abbott, "man i s a biological unit reacting as well as he 
can to his environment, by ' means of internal self-direc t ive 
activities which determine his outward acts." For Kempf , 
"man is a vast community of cells (biological unit) working 
in systems which are integrated into a unity to further the 
biological interests of the cellular community as a whole" 
(i.e., organism). They interpret the personality from the 
standpoint of the action of a biological organism as a whole. 
The neurological group represented by Max Meyer, s. Bent 
Russell, Frost, and, in one aspect of his philosophy, by 
Weiss, interpret consciousness in t e rms of neural currents 
and pathways. Meyer's first attempt was mo derate. He did 
not disturb consciousness much, and employed the knowledg e 
gain~d by introspection to aid in the discqvery of the neural 
processes uhderlying human behavior.l Subjective psychology 
was not altogether distasteful to him as late as the appearance 
of "The Present Status of the Problem of the Relation between 
Mind and Body. "2 Later on, he wages a fiercer battle a gainst 
Self, Soul, Mind, and Consciousness, leaving them all in the 
private possession of all the Fridays whom they may concern. 
He excludes from his scientific psychology all subject matter 
that can not come within the range of the sense life. He 
refuses to mix his scientific psychological adventures with 
1Fundamental Laws of Human Behavior. 
~Jo£r11:~ of PhllOsQPhy, Volume IX (1912). 
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his "endeavors in religion, poetry a nd art ."l 
It is obvious that Bent Russell's attempt to account 
for the image of an object by the incipient utterance of the 
word referring to the object in conjunction with the ki naesthe-
tic impulses from the eye muscles and from throat and lips, 
is a combination of Watson's i mpl icit processes and co-
ordinate movements of neural impulses.2 He also attempts 
to define the higher ranges of intelligent behavior by neural 
mechanisms in order to "break a way from the methods of sub-
jective psychology • .,3 
Inclining to the conclusions of the physiologists--
von Uexkuell, Bethe, Beer, Ziegler, Nuel, and others--
Professor Frost decides that biology and physiology can "dis-
pense with con s ciousness." He quotes the first named auth ority 
to the effect that "before - objective investigation, the sen-
sations, the memory, and thoughts of animals disappeared 
like fluttering fonns of vapor." 4 These writers have tremen~ 
dously impressed Frost, and h ave helped to shape his parti-
cular brand of behaviorism. But when Miss Washburn tries to 
connect behaviorism with the "objectivism of Beer, Bethe, 
von Uexkuell, Nuel, and other continental writers, Watson 
objects that they are "perfectly orthodox para llelists. " 5 
lThe Psychology of the Other One, 1921-22 • 
. 2"The Function of Incipient Motor Processes," Psychologi-
cal Review, Volume XXII (1915). 
3 11 The Effect of High Resistance in Common Nerve J:laths , " 
Psychological Review, Velum~ XXIII p916). . . 
4"Can Biology and Phys~ology D1spense w1th Consc~ous­
ness?11 Psychological Review, Volume XIX (1912). 5
"Preface, 11 Psycholo~;z, From the Standpoint of ~ Behaviorist. 
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While the "objective school" may not have influenc ed Watson 
much, it has modified the whole situation by stressing the 
physiological and objective phases. Frost does not . stand 
alone in the respect paid to these physiologists. 
While Professor Frost concludes that consciousness is 
a "Begeiterscheinung" (epiphenomenon), which biology can 
easily part with, he retains it in the sense in which 
Titchener defines it, that is; as a process. Instead of 
consciousness, he employs the strange term "consciousizing 
process" which means that a nervous change can become aware 
of a preceding one, even project it into the outer world to 
create the world of nature. Thus Frost loses consciousness 
entirely in the tortuous arcs of nerve pathways. This 
affords a splendid ill u stration of the desperate plight a 
behaviorist finds himself in when h e attempts to explain 
knowledge without the assumption of a conscious individual. 
Weiss also reduces conscious phenomena to neural prpcesse s, 
but his is stratified neurology integrated as a whole. There-
~ore, his major interests lie with the extreme group. 
The title of Colvin and Bagley's Human Behavior, suggests 
more behaviorism than we find in the book. "Psychology the 
Science of Consciousness" is the fi r st topic in the first 
paragraph.l "Psychology is the study of the mind" is the 
first statement therein. A dominant place is given to mind 
in "directing movements an d controlling b ehavior." They 
lHtiman Behavior, p. 1. 
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approach the behavioristic category in their treatment of 
attention. We "interpret attention in others through their 
behavior." The bodily attitudes are stressed as important. 
In their treatment of perc~ption, the pragmatic trend, as 
well as the behavioristic, is to be noted. Behavior is the 
criterion of the true and false. If my perception will 
"work" in my behavior, it is true; if it will not work, it 
is false. Colvin's The Learning Process also bears out this 
same conception. Bode, and Bawden and Dewey in part, repre-
sent the pragmatic attitude. 
Professor Bode has given a different turn to the con-
ception of consciousness. 1 He emphasizes control by the fu-
ture, by which he means that the organism reacts to the 
future consequences as though the future were moved down to 
the present, and it served as a stimulus. He adopts the 
view of all behaviorists w-hen he says, ••The situation and the 
motor activity fit together like the sections of a broken 
bowl. " 
Bode's peculiar contribution to the subject is to be 
found in the distinction he draws between mechanical and 
conscious behavior. In one, the stimulus sets off the re-
sponse "like pulling the hair-trigger of a gun." 2 In the 
other, consciousness intervenes when there is a dead-lock 
among reflexive and instinctive responses, and guides the behav-
ior from within. "This selective or teleological character is 
luconaciousness and Psychology," Creative Intelligence, 
pp. 2~8 - 281. 
Fundamentals of Education, p. 207. 
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the fundamental and differentiating trait of conscious be-
havior." The most important addendum is that stimulus and 
res~ onse mutually push each other forward. This is Dewey's 
conception which is one of the first contributions to be-
h a viorism.l ·Movements are first and sensations follow. 
Bode adopts this view in the sta. tement, "The real beginning 
is the act of seeing; it is looking, not a sensation." Sen-
sory stimulus and centraJ connections and motor responses 
are not separate entities, but functioning elements withi n 
the whole. "Conscious behavior" means bodily integrations 
moving in ever larger co-ordinations. The b ehaviorist is thus 
ever faithful to his creed which is: Reduce the p s ychical 
to the physical.· 
Parmelee, in his The Science of Human Behavior, does not 
restrict his subject to psychology, but defines it so as to 
include biological and sociological aspects of behavior. 
He combines the results of recent investigations in biology, 
zoBlogy, neurology, comparative psychology, and anthropology; 
and he shows the bearin~ of these investigations on "the 
science of behavior." He takes the standpoint of t he com-
parative psychologist, who studies the animal by observing 
its behavior; but he recognizes the subjective in a sense, and gives 
it a part in detennining behavior. Mind may be "reduced to 
a certain extent, if not entirely, to tenns of behavior. n2 
For Parmelee, the basis of ,behavior is reflex action, 
111 Tbe Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology, " P~Ychological 
Revi ew , Voltime III (1896), pp. 35?-3?0. 
2The Science £f Human Behavior, p. 423. 
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which is witnessed only in organisms that have a central 
nervous system. He differs from Loeb, who identifies tropisms, 
reflexes, and instincts, in that he appli e s the term instinct 
to integrated reflexes which work toward a definite end.l 
Ins,tincti ve behavior is not a1 ways marked by the mental or 
conscious element, but by the fact that the behavior is 
partly determined by the external, selective forces. In-
telligent behavior is a more comp rehensive integration of 
reflexes, and instincts, and tropisms (all lower forms), 
which have been combined in novel ways by and in experience, 
"so as to constitute ne w forms of behavior. n In short, 
intellig ence is no extra-natural "entity" or organ which can··· 
affect the body, but a term applied to the highly integrated 
activities of the organism. Mental processes depend upon 
physiological changes of the central nervous system.2 Mind 
serves in between the stimulus and motor discharge, which 
causes the beh avior. On the subjective side, the mental is 
experienced "in the form of images, ideas, feelings, emotions, 
etc., while its presence is made known to the observer by 
means of certain kinds of variations of behavior." The 
psychic phenomena arise from the physical and. in turn "pull 
the trigger" that releases physiological movementa . which 
can not be described fully in terms of purely mechanical reflexe~ 
We may sum up the position of Parmelee by saying that 
there are three planes of behavior: biological, psychological 
!Ibid., p. 208. 
2rbid., p. 322. 
40 
which involves the psychic, and sociological. The psychologi-
ca.l comprehends the tropistic, reflex, and instinctive; while 
the social behavior comprehends these with the intelligent, 
and is, therefore, the highest form of behavior, expressing 
itself in aesthetic, moral, religious, economic, and political 
phenomena. 
Paton conceives consciousness as no entity, but as a 
process of dynamic movement. He makes no distinction between 
the conscious and uncon s cious, and mind and body; but they 
constitute a "unity of personality. nl The personality em-
braces two distinct functions: the selective processes or 
intelligence, and the energizing, driving powers, which he 
calls character. 2 The organism is biologically related to 
a remote ancestral past; sociologically, it is adjusted to 
the customs, institutions, and morals of society by "psychic" 
and "symbolic" adjustments. Pannelee and Paton are bio-
sociological behaviorists. 
Another group represent the anti-physiologists. They 
labor to save the mental, yet make no distinction between the 
physical and psychical. They reg a rd both as involved in the 
res p onse of the individual. "A thought process is not only 
mental, but also physical, social, and human", says Kantor. 3 
"Every fact of consciousness is a con s cious behavior, a com-
plex action always involving, besides the mental factors, 
lHuman Behavior, p. 56. 
2Ibid. ,· p. 9 5. 
3"Psychology as a Science of Critical Evaluation," 
Psychological Review, Volume XXVI (1919), p. 14. 
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organic, muscular, and glandular processes." It seems in-
credible to Kantor that Watson should attempt to reduce 
"conscious" behavior, as exhibited in higher animals or human 
being s, to reflexes and motor babi ts, or emotion to "muscle-
twitching" and glandul a r secretion, or language to mere motor 
habits. Taking his cue from Dewey, Kantor emphasizes the 
horizontal series of attitudes, relative to the setting of the 
organism in human situations, as the substance of psychologi-
cal behavior. "States of consciousness" and "muscle-twitch-
ing" are alike distasteful to him. Conscious behavior must 
be described as organic events, which are in relation to 
circumstances necessary for their production, and which have 
other events following as consequences.~ 
"Organismic" psychology is an inquiry into the causes of 
the reactions of the psychological organism to its environ-
mentcli stimulations, a description of what occurs, and an 
interpretati on of what has been observed. While previously 
Kantor made a plea to retain introspection, he closes 
definitely against it in his Principles of Psychology (1924). 
He spurns stimulus-response. The behaviorist only ostensibly 
surrenders the wrong attitudes of the structuralist. "He 
demolishe s mental states, but wishes to substitute just as 
vicious a formalism in terms of stimulus and response."2 
Tawney's concep'tion of psychology as a science of or-
ganic behavior, including the mental and physical without 
lse e Dewey's Democracy and Education. 
2"Psychology on a Science of Critical Evaluation," 
Psychological Review, Volume XXXI (1909), p. 6. 
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division, lies very close, in this respect, to Kantor. Both 
strive to avoid a mechanical interpretation of the mental in 
physiological terms. "The tendency of psychic organisms first 
to select and then to keep within their control whatever is 
necessary to their life,"l states the essence of "aesimation" 
--a life urg e, an "elan vi tal," which unfolds, b y its selection 
and control, into intelligence, character, and, modified by 
the social enviromnent, personality. Psychology is not 
primarily concerned with "intelligence," "character," or "per-
sonali ty," but with the kind of behavior of the organism 
whic h selects and controls environment in its own interests, 
and thus results in these social products. Tawney agrees with 
Kantor that psychology shouJd not encroach upon physiology. 
The only claim Tolman can make for a · place in this group 
is that we must have a behaviorism which is not "mere physi-
ology. 11 He a g rees with Holt in this respect, and feels that 
Kantor and Perry are of this persuasion. He quotes Grace 
A. De Laguna approvingly, who also wishes a behaviorism which 
is not physiology.2 Though his thesis urges that a non-
physiological behaviorism is possible, he parallels very 
closely physiological psychology witb his (a) stimulating 
agency, (b) behavioristic-cue, (c) behavior-object, and (d) 
behavior-act. The new formula for behaviorism would embrace 
behaviorism proper and all the good of introspective psy-
chology; and t h us the wolf and the lamb shall dwell peace-
1"~Nhat is Behavior? 11 . Journal .21 Philosophy, Volume XII (1915~ 
"A New Formula for Behaviorism, 11 Psychological Review, 
Volume XIX (1922), p. 45. 
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fully tog ether , and the "leopard shall lie down with the 
kid." (Isa. 11:6 ). 
Grace A. De Laguna also seeks to refute dualism b y con-
ceiving the organism as a total natural unit, reacting to a 
physical and social enviro nment. She deserves this classi-
fication because she will not allow behavior to descend to 
the physiological category. Chemical processes, reflexes, 
and physiological f actors generally are given a subordinate 
place, if a necess ary one, while behavior resolves the psychi-
cal into a function of the natura l organi sm as a whole. 
The s c ientific method of observation is the only r eliable 
one; for how c an privat e knowledg e have any scientific. value?l 
Professor Mursell belongs pr ope r ly to t h is cate gory 
s ince he adopts quite whole - he a rtedly the organismic behav-
iorism of Kantor. To this, he adds the principle of mnemic 
c a usation, which Russell makes so much of in h is Anal_ysis 
of Mi nd, and whi ch b oth ad op t from Semon. Thi s means that 
t he present act is not explained by the immediately preceding 
stimulation, nor yet by a lon g mechanical chain of c auses 
a nd effects, but by the total p a st event s of the org anism, 
borne alo ng by the developing individual, like Bergs o n 1 s 
rol l ing snow ball, and, now, dynamic ally ready for some n ew • 
departure in behavior. Mnemic causation is the "princ i ple 
of integration that is required by obj ecti·ve psychology. 11 
l"Duali~ and Animal Psychology, A Rejoiner," Journal of 
Philo s ophy, Volume XVI (1919); "Dualism in Animal. Psychology ," 
Journal of Philosophy, Volume XV (1918); and "The E:mpirical 
Correlation of Mental and Bodily Phenomena," Journal of Phi l-
osophy, Volume XV (1918). - -
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It is broad enough to include both individual and social 
behavior, and circumscribes all partial integrations of the 
organism. It merges the "mental" and "physical" into a 
unitary, organic response; it synthesizes the behavior, 
and characterizes it as a distinctive variety.I 
What is reputed to be a new variety of behaviorism may 
be called a compromise-psychology. It is an attemp t to 
unite the strong features of conventional psychology and 
behaviorism. Since we are grouping the behavi orists relative 
to their attitude toward consciousness and s ubject matter, 
we shall include in this group tho s e who wish to retain 
consciousness, and also embrace the contributions of be-
haviorism . Warren, Seashore, Pillsbury, and Woodworth b elong 
to this class; and p ossibly Allport and Hunter, though they 
assign to consciousness a more subo.rdinate role. Warren's 
definition of psychology indicates that he is greatly im-
pressed with the claims of behaviorism, though he presents 
it in a diluted form. From this point of view, psychology 
is the "s cience with investi gates the responses of livi n g 
creature s to the stimuli that effect them. It includes the 
study of the entire chain of events beginn ing with stimula-
tion and ending with responsive activity . These processes 
are carried out by means of the nervous system, and the 
receptors and effectors which lie at either end of t he ner-
vous arc. The whole series of events makes up our mental 
111 The Principle of Integration in Objective P s ychology," 
American .Journal .Qf. Psychology, Volume XXXV (1924),p. 14. 
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life. ttl 
It will be seen from this comprehensive formulation that 
Warren draws within his spacious conception both behaviorism 
of the e x treme form, and the "consciousness" psychology, 
thus filling the gap between · stimulus and response left open 
by Watson. Roback classes Warren as a "mild" behaviorist 
which is probably true. He may be sai d to be a mild con-
ventionalist also, for he thins his '~ental" by distributing 
it throughout the cycle of muscles, glands, nervous a rcs, 
and cunscdphsnesa; bht be threatens in the end, as Miss 
Calkins shows, to allow "consc i ou sness" to slip back into 
the physi cal circuits and be lost.2 While Warren seems 
an x ious to avoid tying psychology to any particular theory of 
the relat ion of the brain to consciousnes s , he inclines rather 
to what he feels is the 11 newer" theory "that thought and 
brain activity are really the same event." The "thought 
series" and the "neura l series 11 are but aspects of a singl e 
event, like the two si d es of the same penny. "Our thoughts 
never for an instant proceed without brain activity. n3 
This statement is compatible with "parallelism," "interaction," 
or the "single-process theory." Doubtless, Warren is gre a tly 
influenced by Weiss whom he honors in the preface, and the 
latter has no hesitancy, a s we have s een, in declaring that, 
what is ordina rily called the mental series, is but another 
neural series. The aim of Warren, however, is to allow the 
lHuman Psychology, p. 121. 
2•• The Truly Psychologic a1 Behaviorism, " P sychol ogi cal 
Review, Volume XXVIII (1921). 
3H'uman Psychology, .p. 124. 
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physical and mental to move upon even keel. 
Professor Seashore, though more conventional than 
Warren, belongs to the same class in respect to the "mind-
body" problem. The "double-aspect" theory advocated by 
Warren, Seashore names specifically as the theory that 
"best fits our view in this book. 111 He is aware that he · is 
using behavioristic method at least, for he says, "The 
behavioristic method has the advantage of not stopping to 
differentiate what is mental and what is physical."2 In 
discussing the physical basis of association, he says it may 
be "described from either the mental or the neural side. 
The two are, as it were, aspects of the same whole!13 For 
Seashore, psychology is a "science of experience and behav-
ior of the organism. "4 11 There are two fund.:.unental approaches 
to the study of the mental life. One is introspection •••• ; 
the other is behaviorism. 115 From these quotation s , we can 
readily see that Seashore has much sympathy with behaviorism; 
but for the most part he is a conventionalist. 
While Woodworth defines psychology as a 11 science of the 
conscious and near-conscious activities of living indivi-
duals, •• 6 or ''the science of mental life, 11 his "mental 11 life, 
like Seashore' a, covers a multi tude of psychological and 
theoretical sins. It, supJi OSedly, does a way with the problem 
of "mental" and 11physical" and their relationship, by placing 
the best fruits of e a ch under a si ngle rubric. This is one 
~Introduction to Psychology, 
3Ibid., p. 198. Ibid. , p. 162. 
6! Study of the Mental Life, 
1923. 
4Ibid., p. 
5Ibid., p. 
p. 1 '7. 
1. 
196. 
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of the first signs of behaviorism. Woodworth early shows 
this symp t om. "It would be hard," says Woodworth, "to men-
tion a ny activity tha t i s mental without being physical at . 
the same time. Even thinking, which seems as purely ment al 
a s any, requires brain action; and the brain is just as 
truly a bodily organ as the he a rt or stomach. "1 He takes 
his ''cue" from the behaviorists and begins to build his 
psychology on reflexes, rather tpan upon sensations as the 
conventionalists are accustomed to do. He defines a sen-
sation as an act which is aroused by a stimulus.2 He 
adopts the pet formula of behavior i sm--"stimulus a n d r e sponse" 
--in the treatment of such ment a l activities as reco g n i tion, 
imagination, etc. , bringing the whole range of his subject 
within t h e behavioristic creed. Yet his leaning toward 
conventional psychology may be seen in his admission that 
a thought may be a stimulus to another thought which is a 
res p onse to a previous t h ought-stimulus. However, all thought 
begins by a "thing-stimulus" in its initial movement. Wood-
worth has placed the content of conventional psychology 
entirely withirt the frame of behaviorism. 
Pillsbury also represents a compromise--psychology, in 
word if not in deed. He has the same care to preserve the 
conventional content. Though he defines psychology as a 
science of behavior,3 he is confessedly not always consistent 
wi·th the definition.4 His viewpoint of f unctional psychology 
----~1~. ------------------- 2 Ibid., p. 6. Ibid., p. 187. 
3Essentials. 4The Fundamentals of 
Psychology. 
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leads him to interpret all actions in behavioristic terms, 
but his convictions lie chiefly with con s ciousness and knowl-
edge. Pillsbury seizes behaviorism, which threatens to run 
away with psychology, as though clutching the reins of 
"runaway " steeds already at full gallop, and i n cJ.udes it in 
his system, lest something good should escape and leave him 
behind the times. 
Some compromise behaviorists pl a ce the main emphasis 
on the conventional side of psychology and then attach 
enough behaviorism to appear up to date. But F. H. Allport 
reverses this procedure and defines psychology a s a "science 
which studies behavior and consc iousnesa."l "The phenomena 
we shall study in this book", says Allport, "comprise both 
behavior and consciousness with emphasis upo n the former 
because it holds the key to explanation. 112 He regards con-
sciousness as a mere epiphenomenon. 
Allport joins Hunte r3 in denying all efficiency to 
consciousness. For them, consciousness is never a c ause of 
behavi or, nor a link in a chain of causes le ad i ng to bodily 
re a ctions. It may accompany these reactions, but they 
could be equally well explained if the sub ject had no con-
sciousness wh a tsoever. 4 A cha ritable temper to ward consc ious-
ness is shown in the declaration that it is a "serious mistake 
for some psychologi st-s to rule out consciousness from their 
1Social Psychol q_~, 1924 ., p. 1. 
Ibid., p. 3. ~~ener~l .J?~;t?h~l ogy, . 19 ~ 9. , . 
AllP<?~t, , F. H..,~ .Qll• :£.!!., p. Z, · f ·O<>tnote. 
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science because it does not explain events. nl "N~ scientist 
can afford to ignore the circumstances attendant upon the 
events he is observing." Introspection is an aid in our in-
terpre tation s, and it will help to rend er the acco unt complete. 
· Then, , there are the purposive behaviorists represented 
by McDougall and Yerkes. Roback calls them nominal behavior-
ists. We have surely re a ched the twilight of behaviorism 
when we find McDougall disavowing that he is a behaviorist, 
while Yerkes seems glad to claim that he, himself, is a 
behaviorist; yet both stand very close together in their 
thought. Roback has classed the latter under the ''Methodologic. 11 
The former, too, relies upon the "great method common to all 
natu ral sciences."2 If Yerkes' hearty approval of Hobhouse's 
Mind in Evolution3 provides any clue, we must conclude that 
he accepts the suggestion of Hobhouse that the living being 
is a ctive, th a t mind is the driving force in evolutionary 
change, and that it descends into t h e organic realm further 
than is commonlY suppose d . The efficient mental factor is 
conation which is the drive that rises to the surface in 
con s cious form. This seems to be precisely what McDougall 
means by the "hormic theory. 11 4 They agree tha t all mental 
life, however lowly, struggles toward a goal--that goal 
more or less clearly previs i oned. 
1 Ibid. • p. 3. 2outline of Psycho~. p. 38. 
3
"Behaviorism and Genetic Psychology," Journal .2.f. 
Philosophy, Volume XIV (1917). 
4outline of Psychology, pp. 71-73. 
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Yerkes favors the view o f Vfueeler, Y/asmann, Forel, and 
others, that even insects possess f e elings and impulses. 
He quotes McDougall approvi n glyl to the effect tha t we must 
recognize symptoms of emotion such a s fear, anger, tender 
feeling, etc., as when a cat, which a street-car almost 
runs down, turns and "spi ts 11 at the car in anger; or, as 
when a hen tenderly broods her young .2 Both b elieve t hat 
cons ciousness accomp anies i nstinctive behavior, and t h a t 
a n i mals employ imagi nation. Profe ssor McDougall cit e s 
Hunter's i n ve sti gations3 to supp ort his contention tha t 
the r e is imagination i n h i g her ani ma ls. Yerkes joins in 
t h e s ame con tention--if we may t rust t h e press reports of 
h i s utterances at the con vent i on (The American Association 
of Sc i ence, December, 1924 ) at Washi n gton, D.C., whe re he 
is reputed to have sai d that "chimpan zees not only ap pe a r 
to t h i nk but actually do t h ink .... The great apes a r e 
intellectually closer to men than we have hitherto i ma g ined •••• 
The evi d en c e for their solution of problems ideationally is 
now abund ant and convinc ing ." Th ese compatibilities between 
McDougall a n d Yerkes are not all behavi oristic. Their 
belief in the i mpulsive, in s tincti ve, and cona tive ur~e 
whi c h drives ever forwa r d , wi th an increasing exp anse and 
control of the mental in the vast upward swee p of evo lu t i on, 
and which is devoid of all provi denti a l or ext ernal orienta-
IAn Introduction .!:.£ Soc i al Psl_chology, pp. 26-29. -
~traduction .!:.£ Psy cholo gy , p. 375. 3
"The Delayed Reactions in Animals and Children," 
Behav ior Mono g r a phs, 2, I, 1913. 
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tion, reveals their close kinship with e ach other, and 
a lso (the psychical omi t ted) with t h e concep tion of the 
basal physical ene rgies . of behaviorism. 
McDougall's psychol ·::>gy is an emphatic protest aga.inst 
all forms of ttstatic" men tali sm . The mind as constituted 
of "sensations," "ideas," or a ny other discrete units like 
"states of consciousness," McDougall peremptorialy sets 
aside in the interests of a "purposive psychology." Pur-
posiveness in the sense or the prevision of the effects of 
the activity nseems !.2_ ~of the essence of mental activity. "l 
Six characteristics have been selected to serve as criteria 
of mind: spontaneity, persistence, variation, cessation of 
activity when a change in the situation has been effected, 
preparation for further action, and i mprovement in behavior 
by reason of previous experience • . vVhen the first five marks 
of behavior are obvious, v.re may say that the behavior is 
purposive, that it seeks an end, and that such end is more 
o r less clearly foreseen. "We may ascribe to an animal 
whose a ction exhibits the fir·st five marks of behavior t h e 
same kind of vague· anticipation of the goal. 112 In the animal 
realm, there is no well-defined lower limit to purposive 
behavior. McDo ugall hesitates to say that plants behav~ and, 
·therefore, have minds; while Yerkes gr ants the existence of 
mind in plants where their behavior warrants it. 3 The latter 
~Outline of Psychology, p. 49.. 
Ibid., p. 48. 
3rntroduction to Psychology, p. 232. 
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makes the ment al co-extensive with life. 
McDougall's psychology demand s a "subject," "person," 
or "organism" that experiences something. ~ ~ experi-
ences ~ thing . Experience is not an aggreg ate of "states 
of consciousness, n or a thing; it is a process, a dynamic 
activity moving to a goal. He does say: "This ~ ~. this 
subject, is al ' rays a material or gan ism, or is embodied in, 
and manifests itself to us only in and through the medium of, 
a material organism. 111 Had McDougall said no more than 
"this subject is always a ma terial organism," he would have 
desc e nded to materialistic behaviorism. But he goes on to 
say that the "subject" is 11 embodied in, and manifests itself 
to us only in and t h rough the medium o f , a ma terial organ ism." 
I take this to mean that there is a men tal reality which 
can not be identified wit h t he physic a l organism. An imma nent 
philoso phy is implied. The mind manifests itself through 
expe r ience which can b e k n own intros pectively and through 
behavior which can be obs erved objectively. The nature of 
the mind is t h e same whe ther found in the fool or t h e wise 
man, in the brute kingdom or in ~an. But its structure 
vari e s, and may be inferred from the fac t s of introspection 
and facts of behavior.2 
According to McDougall, all mental activity is purp osive. 
And all animal and human behavior is purposive. 
1 outline 2f Psy c h ology, p. 40 
2rbid. , PP. 41-42. 
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say, then, that all purposive activity is mental? Or is the 
mental only manifest in the activity in which there is a 
consciousness of the end, however vagu e and lowly? If we 
may ass-U!ne tha t McDougall acepts fully the position of 
Prof essor Nunn, 1 the purposive proces s es are the 11 hormic 
processes." The latter emb race the unconscio u s activities, 
and the conscious which are t b e conative. Since purp osive-
ness is t he essence of mental activity, we should expect 
to find the mental wherever we find the purposive, that is, 
throughout the animal kingdom. On the other hand, McDougall 
seems to limit the expressions of Ivi ind to those activities 
tha t bear unmistakably the "marks of behavior" which we 
have previously enumerated. Purposive behavior is the ac tion 
which is g overned by prevision of its effects. There may 
be some activity, then, that is not mental or purposive, 
that is, which does not bear the first five marks of be-
havior. However, we are certain of this much that the 
"life urge," or "drive" pushes upward through blind impuls e 
to ever higher levels of consci ous st r uggle toward immedi-
ate ends and even to distant, ideal goals. The evolutionary 
struggle is an advancing proce ss in which Mind comes to 
ever-widening dominion. The "process" is the all-inclus ive 
reality, wh ile the Mind is a phase (' though a signific a nt one) 
which serves as a guid e, rather than a constitutive principl e, 
of the evolutionary movement. 'rhe natural conditions over 
which JH nd gains increasing sway are not the creat ion of 
1
r b i&., pp. 72-73. 
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conscious purpose. The concli ti ons rather create the conscious 
:purpose whi ch is the outcome of natural development. Taken as 
a whole, this is a form of evolutionary naturalism. 
Purposive striving is distinct from the mechanical 
activity of the purely physical. It uses the mechanical to 
achieve its ends; it controls it to its own interests. These 
two k inds of action must never be identified or confused. 
The purposive str i_ ving in human being s a nd lower animals is 
mental. But McDougall also speaks of Mind, spelled with a 
capit a l, as a higher phase of the evolutionary movement. 
He does not tell us how t h e mind o f the individual animal or 
human being is related to the general "Mind" or the evol u tionary 
process. Mi nd in this general sense is an abstrac tion from 
the purrJosi ve striving or mind :3 of animals and men arrived 
at after the manner of Comte's "Humanity" which was an ab-
strac tion from the individual s of the race. McDougall will 
not accept "teleolog ical" i n the sense tha t a n imal behavior 
or life in general is adjusted to the accomplishment of a 
goal desi gned by a Creator, for s u ch a view would i mpl ,y- that 
all animals are mere machines. His "te leological," or "pur-
posive," means that "in the process of organic evolution 
the g oal of t he process is progressively created a nd define d , 
as evolution advances and as Nii nd becomes increasingly capagle 
of conceiving the future in terms of alternatives between 
which it chooses. nl Is this liiind the aggregate or sum of the 
1
outline of Psychology, p . 72. 
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several organic minds, or is it a "ge neral" mind indepen-
dent of the particular minds of the behaving organisms? In 
McDougall's discussions, we find no clear answers to the s e 
questions. While his conception is a refined naturalism, 
it is open to idealistic interpretations. With some modi-
fication, Mind as an emergent phase of the evolutionary 
process might be converted into a creative principle. An 
evolutionary piocess desi g ned and executed by a "Creator" 
working with steadfast purpose with this method of accom-
plishment would not necessarily r educe the finite to a 
ma chine, provided a margin of self-direction is reserved. 
We have note d some ag reements of }.ii cDo u gall and Yerkes. 
For both , the instinctive activity is mental or it provides 
a b as is for the mental; it is non-mechanical and in con tra st 
'Ni t h reflex action which is me chanical. The instinctive and 
intelligent factors are a like in man and brute. The f a cts of 
introspection are pl a ced on an equality with the facts of 
observation. Introspection is even given primacy over the 
objective metho d s of p sychology, b ecause the latter presuppose 
t h e r e sults of the former. The objecti ve method does not 
supplant introspection; it suppl ements it~ So far McDougall 
and Yerkes proceed together. But there is some divergence 
of views on the psychological side. McDougall attempts to 
unify his psychology by the principle of instinctive activity 
without raising the mind-body problem. Yerkes is more inter-
ested in keeping the psychical aloof from the physical. 
lrntroduct i on .1£ Psychology, p. 328; quotation from 
McDougall, \~Tm: Physiological Psychology, pp . 12,13. 
56 
According to Yerkes the facts or events of psychic 
life may be observed and described in the same manner as the 
physic a l f a cts. 'Ne may observe the conditions under which a 
certain physical event occurs. We ' knotv the "how" of an 
occurrence, but we can never know the "why" of it. Y...re deal 
with phenomena only, whether physical or psych ical. There is 
a psychical in the se~e sense as there is a physical causation. 1 
There is the same lawful sequence among mental events as 
among the physical. We should avo id all theories of the 
relation of the mental and physical series. We shoul d make 
our study of each separately, then correlate the two series 
of events. The proper t ask of psychology is the . study of 
ment al events and their relations. We do not know t hat the 
mind causes the body or that the bod y caus es t he mind. An 
"a ttitude of intere s ted i gnorance '' is "most favorable to the 
discovery of the real rel a tion between mind and body. 112 This 
attitude disclose s Yerk es ' methodology. 
Since Yerk es refuse s to go beyo nd t he phenomena, we 
might say t hat sensat i on and atom are ultimates. Howev e r , 
there is no denial of re ality beyond phenomena. The r e is 
evi dent an agnostic attitude toward such reality. Yerkes 
d i scove r s many evidences of correlation between the men tal and 
phy sical serie·s. He insists upon reaching his conclusions 
by the method of ob serva tion rather than by t h e assistance of 
dogmat i c theory. Through obj ec tive methods, we find t hat 
1 I b id.' p. 318. 
2Ibid., p. 340. 
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con s ciousness is always connected with bodies. It seems to 
be associated with the nervous system. There are certain 
special structures that accompany special sense capacities, 
such as a large olfactory lobe in animals that possess a keen 
sense of smell, The cortex is likely to be accompanied by 
a highly complex ideational life. It is true that the struc-
ture is but a crude indics.tion of the mental processes. For 
that reason we must not only observe the presence of a par-
ticular organ but also observe intimate changes within the 
ore an, if we hope to correlate the mental and physica~. so 
that when we observe t h e condition of one we may predic ·t 
the condition of the other. 
The correlation of mind and body may be illustra ted 
b e s t in connection with emotions. The clenched fists, set 
jaw, flashing eyes, and labored breathing serve as signs 
to the observer of t h e emotion of anger. Though we can not 
sa.y that the body changes c a use the mental, nor that the 
mental changes cause the bodily, yet we may observe their 
correlati on. ·while we can not state the causal relation, 
our observation is not altogether valueless. It is scientific 
ina smuch as it has a practical bearing. For if one displays 
physi c al signs of a..nger, we decide as to the ment a l state 
and ei t :t er prepare for t h e encounter or hasten away from 
danger. In all this, there is implied (though not explicitly 
stated: a psycho-physi cal parallelism with an inevitable 
metaphysical dualism. This conclusion rests upon Yerkes' 
58 
:position as set forth in his Introduction. The me taphysical 
im:pli cations of his later thoughtl seem to incline more 
toward the conclusions of Hobhouse, that is, toward evolu-
tionary naturalism. 
' Hoernl e probab ly represents a distinct variety of be-
haviorism, th.o ugh he cl aims close alliance with Holt . From 
his synoptic viewpoint, he would fuse the agent ' s and the 
observer ' s standpoint, holding that the knowledge one a c-
quires througl1 the experience of direct action supplements 
the knowledge of behavior gained fro m the observer's stand-
point. Just here he diff ers from Holt, who always keeps 
the objective viewpoint when discussing human activity. 
Hoernl~ ag rees with Holt in con ceiving mind as a "cro ss-
section" of the world to which on e makes r e s ponse. The meta-
physical background is very similar to Holt's conception of 
"Pure ~xperience." Hoernl~ ' s chief contribution is to the 
effect that he conceives under "behavior" conscious as we ll 
as unconscious activity of the living creature. By this 
means he hopes to esc ape the objections tha t may be urged 
against Watson ' s view that rrbehavior" refers only to the 
:physical activities of the organism as a whole. Fisher and 
Richardson whom Roback calls "mota-mentalists" may be classed 
• I 
w1th Hoernle since they stress mental behavior as well as 
:physical. 
We have shown the variety of behaviorists and b ehavioristic 
111Behaviorism and Genetic Psychology, " Journal ..Qf. 
P hilos ophy, Volume XIV (191'7). 
59 
doctrine, and have seen how diversified. behaviorism is. We 
shall now summarize the chief characteristics of behaviorism 
upon which almost all behaviorists more or less agree. Then 
we shall consider the types of behaviorism and. their meta-
phy sical implications. 
First, a marked. feature of behaviorism is the uniform 
stress placed. upon behavior as the proper study of psycholo gy. 
Consistent behaviorism stedfastly excludes conscious states 
and processes--the subject matter of conventional psychology. 
Some behaviorists retain consciousness but only in na.me, for 
it soon is reduced to the physical a ctivities of the organi sm , 
or to a faint glow that attends organic movements. 
Secondly, behaviorism contends strongly for the ob-
jective method of observati on which will render the subject 
of psychology scientific. Introspection, as a method, is 
unreliable and its results private. These provide no ground 
for common observance. Hence, no science can be built on 
such uncertain foundations. Wherever introspection is 
ret a ined., it serves a subo rd inate role. 
Thirdly, behaviorism is monistic. It strives to bring 
all its facts under one p rinciple--the physic a l category. 
Bawden says it does not matter whether the universe be con-
ceived under a spiritual or physical category, but there must 
be only one order. 
by natural science. 
That order turns out to be the one conceived 
The physical is the ultimate because 
physics is the fundamental science. The log ical behaviorists 
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supersede this point of view in their doctrine of "neut r a l 
entities" as the ultima te. · 
Fourthly, behav i orism is phenomenalistic, avowedly 
so. It spurns metaphysics. It denies any reality which 
can not be experienced by the senses. It moves freel y 
among phenomena a s the final reality. lllod ified behavior-
ism a dmits metaphysical reality but intentionally excludes 
it from consideration. This is methodological behaviorism. 
Fifthly, behaviorism i s for the most part teleological. 
But teleology is conceived as a natur~u striving in the 
interests of biolo gical end s. It is unconscious, and 
therefore meaningless. Un l ess ends are chosen consciously, 
teleology is but a name. 
Finally, behaviorism is an attempt to be scientific. 
Its revolt against conventional psychology treats of a 
metaphysical entity, consciousness, as its subject matter. 
But this is an "eject" beyond the limits of the natural, 
and the r efo r e beyond the consideration of scien c~ . If 
psycholo gy is to become scientific, it must become a natural 
science. For this reason some behaviorists have inter-
preted psychology in terms of physiology; some i n terms of 
biology; some in terms of reflexive and instinctive a d-
justments; some in terms of the chemical and physical; some 
in terms of the sociolo gic a l; and some in terms of combina-
tions of two or more of these sciences. 
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II. TYPES OF BEHAVIORISM AND THEIR METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS 
1. Modified Behaviorism. Broadly speaking, some 
philosophers and psychologists see but two kinds of behav-
iorism: the methodological, which acknowledges facts of 
consciousness but says they can not be scientifically stated; 
and the metaphysical, which denies consciousness altogether 
by reducing it to movements of atoms, muscles and glands, 
·or some other physical activity. It has firm conviction 
that mind is behavior, and that behavior can be fully 
described and. explained in terms of the physico-chemistry 
of bodily movements. They differ among themselves as be-
haviorists in r espect to the scope that shall be given to 
mind and. consciousness. Accordingly, Lashley recognizes 
three distinct and "incompatible formulations" of behav-
iorism.1 To the two types of behaviorism already mentioned , 
he ad ds a third, namely, that the facts of consciousness 
exi s t and are capable of treatment separate from behavior, 
and by the introspectionist, but they throw no light on the 
problems of the behaviorist. This is "psycho-physical paral-
lelism" with chief emphasis on the physical, and is repre-
sented by the "early objectivists." Thi s is the view that 
Watson repudiates with vigor. An influential group of 
objectivists--Beer, Bethe, Nuel, von Uexk611, and Bechterew 
- - are "perfectly orthodox para.llelists" according to Wa t son.2 
Lashley mentions Bechterew and other "early objectivists~ ~· 
111 The Behavioristic Interpretation of Consciousn ess, " 
Psychological Review, Volume XXX, July, 1 9 23, pp. 237- 272. 
Zpsychology From~ Standpoint .£!~ Behaviorist. "Preface," 
p. 7. 
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evidently referring to the group of men whom Watson names. 
Watson and Lashley, therefore, agree that the "objectiviets" 
are "psycho-physical parallelists." Lashley feels that they 
represent one type of behaviorism. It is the opinion of 
Miss Washburn, tit:che:ne:r,and Roback, _ that these men have 
had considerable to do with behaviorism, despite Watson's 
denial. Watson confesses that the "conditioned reflex" 
was borrowed from Pavlow and Bechterew. Since Watson's 
doctrine of education is based upon the conditioned reflex, 
it is difficult to escape the conviction that the "objec-
tivists" have helped to shape behaviorism. Frost also seems 
to have derived his chief inspiration from these men. Their 
stress upon the physical and "obj ecti vi ty" of behavior 
gives us the right to include them among the behaviorists. 
I l 
Their type of behaviorism bears the implications of "psycho-
physical ,parallelism." 
These modified forms of behaviorism call for less ex-
tended treatment than extreme behaviorism; They are less 
important, yet a brief consideration will open the way . to 
better appreciation of metaphysical and logical behavior-
ism. We shall now set forth the claims of psycho-physical 
parallelism and methodological behaviorism under the type 
of modified behaviorism. 
a. Psycho-physical Parallelism. Psychologically, 
this doctrine means, simply, that the psychical and physical 
series accompany each other. A brain change .means a cor-
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responding thought change; a thought change is accompanied 
by a brain change. Yet neither influences the other~ . The 
two series run parallel, but in water-tight compartments, 
.l ike a pair of fishes swimming side by side on opposite sides 
of a glass partition. The principle of the conservation of 
energy, though belonging to the realm of physics, left its 
impress upon and helped to shape psychological theory. If 
this principle is steadfast, the physical order is closed 
to the intrusion of an alien influence, such as consciousness; 
nor. __ can any bodily energy escape to influence the mental 
without the violation of law. Hence, the prevalent dis-
position to regard t he physical organism as a "machine of 
clay'' with the conscious processes running parallel, and 
the tendency of empirical psychology to discover a physical 
correlate for every men t al process, result inevitably in 
the doctrine of parallelism. 
The metaphysical implication of the theory carries two 
principles (psychical and physical) straight through the 
universe. neither i nfluencing the other. Most thinkers have 
not been content to rest in fundamental dualism. Dualism is 
especially repellent to the thorough-going behaviorists. 
Mind and body, so disparate in the finite realm, are often 
identified in the infinite, so gre at is the reluctance to 
grant an ultimate cleavage. Spinoza attempted to unite the . . 
attributes of thought and extension under the single rubric, 
Infinite Substance. He accepted Descartes' notion of sub-
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stance as an independent being, needing nothing beyond 
itself to support it. Spinoza added to this conception the 
thought that the substance is conceived through itself, and 
not through anything beyond it. Hence, substance is unlim-
ited. There can be but one substance, therefore, and it is 
God. Thus, he apparently healed the dualistic world of 
Descartes. Spinoza excluded the many subordinate substances, 
but he provided for infinite manifestations of the One. 
Thought and extension are the only manifestations known through 
finite mind and body, which are also attributes; while the 
particular thoughts and bodily parte are modes in the 
infinite substance. 
God, or substance, is all that exists. The attributes 
are his essence. The modes are the particular ways into 
which the activiti e s of the infinite substance fold or fall 
in the changes caus_ed by the necessity of its nature, as 
the wavelets of the sea fold and curl by the nature of the 
great ocean that displays them. Of the plethora of attributes, 
only two cone ern us in our present problem: thought and 
extension. The Cartesians had busied themselves with the 
mind-body relationship, but had found no satisfactory 
solution. Apparently, mind and body influence each other, 
as the one is incited by thought and the other stirred by 
stimuli; but really they do not interact at all. For inter-
action would break down the independence of the two realms. 
Descartes did provide a mutual influence through the pineal 
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gland, but this was inconsistent with his original doctrine. 
He brought the physical (to safe-guard science) under mechan-
ical law; and, the mental well-nigh also. Spinoza carried 
out the implications of Descartes' system to the logical 
end, and offered a new solution to the mind-body problem. 
The attributes of thought and extension are not two inde-
pendent things or series, but aspects of the same fundamen-
tal substance. Thought modes and extension modes are in 
the grip of the mechanical operation of antecedent and con-
sequent in their respective realms, with no i nteraction between 
them. An exact paralleli sm i s established, caused, a.nd 
carried on by the action of the one, eternal substance. 
H6ffding, in his Problems of Philosophy, presents a 
similar vi ew. He offers t o us a "tap-root of being" which 
is the mainspring of the psychical and physical series that 
run parallel. We shall not find a fai r er expression of the 
theory on the psychological side than that of Warren in his 
Human Psychology, quoted and adopted by Seashore.l The 
Double-Aspect theory denies the causal relationship between 
mind and body. It accepts the facts of parallelism, yet 
differs from it in the as sumption of a single series of which 
mental and neural processes are aspects. Their apparent 
difference is the result of introspection and objective 
observation. Experienced from within, consciousness arises ; 
experienced objectively, through the senses, behavior appears. 
1 Introd.uction to Psychology, p. 203 ff. 
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This theory may be justly criticised on account of its 
vagueness. When phenomena "happen to me", they constitute 
the conscious aspect; but "when I observe them indirectly, 
through perceiving the behavior of other being s, by means 
of the senses, they appear in the form of motion, chemical 
change, and the like." The advocates of this theory pro-
pose to join the conscious aspect of one series, that is, 
my neural series and the behavior aspect of another's series, 
that is, the outward, observed activity of the nervous system 
of another. Surely, we can not unite what is happening to 
me and what is happening to another person (the form of 
motion, chemical change and the 1 ike) in a single series; 
for the events occur in two separate nervous systems. There 
is an alternative: the observation of the "form of motion, 
chemical change and the like '' is also a "happening to me. " 
What happens to me belongs to the conscious aspect. Hence, 
there is nothing that has been observed by me, either intro-
spectively or objectively, which does not belong to the 
conscious series. For I can not observe my neural processes, 
but must rely .u p on an outside observer for that. He alone 
can observe my behavior. There is then, but a single series, 
and it is altogether consci~us, s o far as my experience is 
concerned. 
Let us try a gain. A single s e rie s of events is occ urring 
in my organism. The inn er side belong s to the conscious 
aspect; the outer, I can observe. I must import an observer 
6? 
to behold my behavior, that is, "form of motion, chemical 
change and the like," going on in my body. But 11.!J!. obser-
vation happens to him,. not to ~· What happens to him and 
what happens to me can never be united in a single aeries. 
Therefore, we have two series, and both are conscious. I 
am conscious of one of them, and he, of the other. And 
neither of us can know the neural series (his own). I can 
know my conscious seri e s and his neural series (behavior). 
He can know his conscious series and my neural series {my 
behavior). But we can never unite his knowledge and mine 
so as to join the two aspects of one series. 
Moreover, if the conscious is ' an aspect or appearance 
of the neural, it must repre sent its essence. It is, there-
fore, neural and not conscious. If the neural is an aspect 
of the conscious, it must repre sent the essence of the con-
scious. It is, therefore, conscious and not neural. If 
each is an aspect or appearance of some more fundamental 
series, which is entirely different, there can be no connec-
tion between them. If they are really aspects of a more 
fundamental reality, as Seashore interprets Warren, and this 
reality is not different from the aspects, then the problem 
reverts to metaphysics for solution. Warren means to pre-
serve an even balance between the conscious and neural series. 
Such a conception wo uld favor some form of metaphysical 
monism. He actually do e s s upport e p iphenomenalism by making 
the conscious trail the neural series. At times, he identi-
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fies consciousness with the neural. "Neural events, accord-
ing to the Double-Aspect hypothesis, are likewise observable 
either as behavior or as 'our own' experiences." This is a 
bare, clear statement that there is but one series and that 
the neural. At this point, he is justly charged by Miss 
Calkins with falling back into extreme behaviorism, which is 
naturalism. However, the total impact of his doctrine favors 
psycho-physical parallelism. 
The form of parallelism that conceives the universe 
as frankly dualistic is consistent, but it is untenable. 
Most thinkers prefer some fonn of metaphysical monism. Let 
us consider the objections to a parallelistic monism. 
Spinoza came nearer success than any who have searched that 
way. Yet there are vital objections to his view. First, 
if thought modes and extension modes have nothing in common; 
and are modes of independent attributes which represent 
infinite substance, then there must be two infinite sub-
stances. But this is impossible; for infinite substance is 
all there is. This is a reversal of Spinoza's second propos-
ition in his Ethics. 1 The conclusion is that the one infinite 
substance is split into two, though Spinoza dogmatically 
declares them to be one. The same objection may be urged 
against the independent attributes which represent the 
essence of infinite substance. If the causal connection 
obtains between members of the separate series only, and if 
1Part I, "Concerning God." 
69 
it runs to infinity, the one fundamental reality wo uld be 
sundered again. For each attribute is essential infinity. 
Hence, the infinite substance must be comprised of both 
thought and extension. God or finite substance, then, is 
not one; but is, at least, two. If we include the infinite 
attributes (unknown) which are also infinite essentiali-
ties, we should have · a pluralistic universe, with as many 
qualities as might manifest themselves joined at the top by 
the term God or natural law. Moreover, a substance, without 
distinction, bereft of consciousness, intellect, and passions 
--a dumb, ineffable blank--, as Spinoza's God is, could 
manifest only the one attribute of dumb-blankness. 
If infinite substance is "all there is, " we can readily 
grant its existence ; for all there is, surely is. But we do 
not so clearly see that there are infinite attributes. 
There may be only a few besides thought and extension. 
Even extension is uncertain as Miss Calkins has shown.l 
If each attribute (however many there are) is infinite essen-
t i ality, Spinoza's one substance is broken up into as many 
substances or qualities as there are attributes, and his 
monism shatters into the multiplicity of the parts. If 
£undamental reality is substance, then thought and extension, 
modes, mind and body, and all finite phenomena are blurred 
in an indisti nguishable mass; and our world is left com-
pletely undefined. As long as we deal with substance, we 
1The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, p. 296. 
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can never make our way from unity to multiplicity; nor from 
multiplicity back to unity again. Spinoza provides no place 
in his system for the sense world. The finite order is, 
therefore, inexplicable, clinging like a parasite to the 
essence of the real and eternal. 
The problem of the contrast of God's intellect, con-
sciousness, will, etc., wi~h the finite and human has a di~ 
rectbearing on t he unity of his thought. We do not expec t 
such a contrast in a system so complete and uniform, especial-
ly since human thoughts are of the nature of God. If they 
are as far apart as "the dog, a celestial constellation, and 
the dog, a barking animal," we see how far apart Spinoza' s 
abstract and concrete worlds lie. The concrete thought modes 
and extension modes can scarcely claim such an alien cause 
as God. Doubtless, Spinoza's thought moved in the back-
ground of consciousness and intellect, both finite and in-
finite; yet he denied consciousness, intellect, and will to 
God in the narrow, human sense, as a protest against the 
extreme anthropomorphism of the day. He certainly thought 
of God as self-conscious, for infinite substance is "con-
e ei ved through itself. nl Here substance threatens to dis-
solve into mind, a conceiver of the type of the Absolute. 
This phase of Spinoza's thought is inconsistent. The only 
consistent psycho-physical parallelism issues in a concep-
tion of the universe dualistic through and through. 
1~ Ethics, Part I, Proposition 3. 
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These criticisms invalidate the doctrine of the unity 
of substance, and every form of parallelism based upon mon-
istic theory. Parallelism finds no adequate defense from 
the metaphysical viewpoint. If conscious and neural phenom-
ena constitute but a single aeries, the question is a~waya 
at hand, "Which one"? We dare not call it conscious; for, 
if we do, we invite an idealism of such type as would negate 
the neural series. If we say neural, we launch upon the sea 
of materialism with the submergence of consciousness through 
its identification with the neural. If we say that the 
series is something different and more fundamental, we drift 
into metaphysical remoteness. The only consistent parallelism 
is frankly dualistic. But this is contrary to the monistic 
tenet of behaviorism. Behaviorism of the ps ycho-physical 
parallelistic type allows the mental realm in which the intro-
spectionist may ply his trade, but it does nothing with the 
facts of this realm. It can not, therefore, claim to be an 
all-inclusive system; for it omits the mental facts, and 
deals only with the physical. Metaphysically, it implies a 
fundamental dualism with no inter-communication of mind and 
matter, no guaranty of co-operative action in the universe 
at large, or that a brain change would always be accomp anied 
by a corresponding thought. The correlation of the psychi-
cal and physical would be wholly accidental. Without Leibniz 1 s 
"Pre-established Harmony: the universe would be a disjointed 
affair; with it, it would be a make-shift. 
b. Methodological Behaviorism. This type of behavior-
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ism reluctantly grants conscious facts, but says they are 
incapable of scientific treatment. Behaviorists of this 
type have decided to ignore the facts of consciousness, and 
to proceed upon a program of experimental investigation among 
phenomena. They insist upon the exclusive employment of the 
scientific method of observation. The introspective method 
is set aside as altogether unreliable. This dogmatic t~mper 
helps to distinguish them from the "psycho-physical parallel-
ists," who allow t b e introspectionists to move freely in the 
psychic realm. Methodological behaviorism admits facts it 
can not interpret and use. It forbids the introspectionist 
to make use of them and to render them scient i fic. It 
spurns metaphysics with all its mystery and lack of perspicu-
ity. It limits the science of psychology to the study of 
organie behavior. It thus attempts to escape the difficul-
ties of a dualistic psychology which inherits the "mind-body" 
problem. 
While methodological behaviorism would not be inconsis-
tent in theory with parallelism, interactionism, or epi-
phenomenalism, it probably favors epiphenomenalism more 
because it allows conscious facts. It would not allow the 
conscious facts to interfere with the smooth running of the 
physical order of antecedent and consequent. It is pro-
fessedly phenomenalistic, withholding clear metaphysical 
p ronouncements. We can only judge its metaphysics from the 
character of the reality to which it has intentionally 
?3 
limited its science, namely, physical reality. Conscious-
ness may gild the border of its science, but it is no essen-
tial constituent. Though it is not real itself, conscious-
ness accompanies the real which is the physical organism. 
Were metho dological behaviorism but the method of objective 
observation of behavior which supplements the introspec tive 
method in the investigation of psychological data. no ,fault 
could be found by the conventionalist. But it goes further 
than that, and demand s a · narrowing of the entire field of 
psychology to its own method to the exclusion of all others. 
Its temper : justifies Lashley's remark that methodological 
behaviorism has all the faults of psycho-physical parallel-
ism pl u s intolerance. Their met aphy sical implications are 
qui t _e different. The one works in the back-ground of 
.... 
naturalism; the other is dualistic. The type we are con-
sidering is the most common form. It is the form Watson 
adhered to in his earlier efforts; but later he became more 
thorough-going, and saw that to be consistent he must push 
on to the complete identification of consciousness and 
physical action. Methodological behaviorism is half-hearted 
and timid. By denying the existence of a psychic reality, 
yet admitting the facts, it exposes to "critical assault" 
the flank of its major premise , namely, that it can explain 
all human activities by the physical category alone. 
If we are right in saying that methodological behavior-
ism is a form of epiphenomenalism, its ultimate implication 
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is naturalism. It is a modified materialism. Naturalism 
may be distinguished from extreme materialism in that it 
reco gnize s consciousness in the human realm, though not as 
an efficient, ontological fact. Materialistic behaviorism 
denies conscious elements by identifying them with physical 
action. There is just so much difference between methodolog-
ical and metaphysical b ehaviorism, as there is bet ~.reen a 
conscious realm that accompanies physical action, and no 
conscious realm at all. In epiphenomenalism, consciousness 
rises ·vv i thin the animal realm of nature, from the bosom of 
the material, and is a direct product of the physical. It 
is as the redness of the toaster when heated to a certain 
point after the current is applied. Professor Thurstone 
seems to favor this view, although he describes consciousness 
as a function "which mediates the caus a l relationship between 
the stimulus and the adaptive response. nl Primarily, an 
act is the whole movement wi thin the reflex circuit or 
circuits a s the stimulus passes over into the response. 
"An a ct does not become cons cious until it strikes a problematic 
fork in the road. 11 Consciousness, therefore, results from 
resistance encountered, and is the result of the physical 
reaction, not the mediator of causal relationship at all. 
The division point where the act becomes cons cious, if ' s uf-
ficiently remote from the end-result, is called a n idea. 
"An idea is concomita nt with the rendering conscious of an 
111The Anticipatory Aspect of Consciousness, 11 .Journal 
of Philosophy, Volu~e XVI, No. 21, Oct. 9, 1919. 
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unfinished act while it is still unfinished •••• The 
point of particular emphasis is that every psychosis actual-
ly is an unfinished act in the process of being defined. into 
an overt response." The conscious, then, is simply an atten-
dant glow of the act as it moves on to its finished form. 
We have already seen how Frost reduced consciousness to 
a "begleiterscheinung," an epiphenomenon, a vague notion 
that "biology can well do without." This conclusion is reached 
by a strange procedure which exalts a nerve impulse into a 
conscious "somewhat," clothing it with as much dignity as 
the displaced "self." If nervous arcs can be conscious, then 
matter is cons..cious; and the conscious element becomes a 
pale attendant of the neural action. This conception under-
lies \llarren's psychology in part, though he lays claim to 
the Double-Aspect theory. The same conception may be found 
in Allport's Social Psychology. A negative conclusion is 
drawn to the effect that "consciousness is in no way a 
cause of the bodily reactions. Consciousness often accom-
panies this chain of events (physical); but it never fonns 
a link in the chain itself."l This reduces consciousness to 
a shadow, or the creak of the wheel on a frosty morning. 
The creak is not essential to the turning of the wheel, nor 
to the drawing of the load. It .merely accompanies. Pills-
bury is also a repre s entative of this view of consciousness. 
These are typical of many others who recognize conscious 
1social Psychology, p. 2. 
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elements, yet who render them inefficient in their systems 
of thought. 
Epiphenomenalism, appa rently so simple, is full of 
difficulties. Strictly speaking, it can not be maintained 
that the men tal is the effect of the physical. As Professor 
Bowne h a s shown, 1 the law of the conservation of energy for-
bbds that any energy should pass over to the thought realm 
which would be necessary if the thought series is the direct 
result of the physical series. For the effect carries the 
potentialities of a cause because energy expended in one 
form must re-appear in equal measure in another. Thought 
energy would in turn become a cause, but this can not be 
allowed. Hence, the thought series has no ground anywhere. 
By asserting t h e continuity and independence of the physi-
cal series, thought is bereft of all reality, and has no 
reason for attending t h e physical series as it does. More-
over, an e piphenomenon, however tenuous, must be real for 
some one, if it be spoken of at all. Hence, the doctrine 
implies a conscious subject. It also violates the single 
category of physical science which it invokes for its de-
scription and explanation of all nature. For physical 
does not include, as its subject matter, the phosphorescent 
glow arising from the nerve impulse that races through the 
cortex. Physical science has not yet dared to endow matter 
with consciousness (though s ome scient ists have) in any 
1 Metaphysic~, p. 308ff. 
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form. If matter contains it, the categories of science are 
only r emote approximations to the truth. Epiphenomenalism 
implies, metaphysically, what it does not intend, namely, 
a gigantic system of nature, teeming with its multitudinous 
atoms, which move according to the mechanical law of cause 
and effect; and attended by a fog-bank of conscious elements 
in utter aloofness from the reality of things, or by a 
faint gJ.ow upon the horizon of t h e physical universe--a 
glow p roduced by the intense flight of atoms through unfathom-
able spaces. 
2. Metaphlsical Behaviorism. This type of behaviorism 
identifies consciousness with organic action. It frankly 
asserts that there is no psychic realm at all. "Behavior" 
is the only concern of a scientifi c psychology. Mind is 
behavior. Thought is implicit muscular and glandu~ar resp onse. 
It is a "neural process," or phy sico-chemical action. Singer, 
Watson, and Dewey are the chief representatives of this view. 
a . The Behaviorism of Singer. 
(1) Exposition. First, let us consider metaphysi-
cal behaviorism as presented by Professor Singer, · who is one 
of the most radical of the behaviorists, and who is a fore-
runner of Professor Watson. Singer identifies consciousness 
with behavior. Joining Professor James and others, he 
strenuously rejects the conception of consciousness as an 
"entity," or "eject" forever beyond the confines of experi-
ence. If mind is to mean anything acceptable to scientific 
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inquiry, it must come within the bounds of observation. 
F or no fact must be left unknowable, and forever veiled with-
in the vast realms of reality. As science has divested the 
material realm of all "extra" entities; so must it divest 
the living organism of "soul" or "mind." We must come to 
see that the living body is a mechanism that behaves in a 
certain way. Life is not a thing to be inferred from 
behavior; it ll behavior. For "Disembodied life has been 
pl a ced among the myths. ul 
Singer charges that the "additive instinct" has played 
a significant role in the conventional theory of conscious-
ness. As in biology, life is added to the body creating 
the doctrine . of "vitalism," and as physics has shown that 
heat is but the accelerated movements of atoms; so psychology 
must banish mind and conceive it as the behavior of the body. 
As close as was Aristotle, in his doctrine of "forma," to 
the treatment of life a dvocated by Singer, he violated the 
sanctity of strict scientific procedure when he introduced 
· a "soul" with an active, transcendental nature. Descartes 
also, as close as he wa s to t h e notion that a living body is 
simply a mechanism behaving purposefully, fell victim to the 
same error when he conceived the human being as constituted 
of body and soul with a mutual effect between them through 
the gateway of the pine a l gland. The fact is, that a human 
being is simply a physical organism behaving in accordance 
1
"Mind As An Observable Object,"~~ Behavior, p. 16. 
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with the rhythmic swing of clustered atoms. We need call in 
no extra mechanism in the Tay of "entity," "eject," "pa rallel 
series," or "epiphenomenon" to make the organism behave. 
Its potentialities of action are resident within itself. 
On the one hand, mind for Singer, as for Hobbes, is the motion 
of the atoms, or a name for the energy displayed by them. 
On the other hand, it is the "form" which atoms assume when 
grouped and moving in a livi ng organism. 
In order to trace the implications of Singer's thought, 
we must understand his conception of mechanism. According 
to his own estimate, Singer does not attempt to construe 
life in purely mechanical terms, as does Democritus who 
conceived the soul as a mechanical collection of atoms or 
as does De La Mettrie who surpassed Descartes and conceived 
man as well as the animal as a mere machine. Nor does he 
construe the mechanism in terms of life "making the mechanism 
alive at every point" in a "monadistic" fashion, for this 
would issue i n to "hylozoism." Rather he takes his stand 
between these views, and defines life in s u ch a manner that 
it may "dwell in mechanism and be a part of it" without 
either absorbing the other. They are distinct; yet there is 
no gap between them. Living being s are chara cterized by a 
comm on purpose, and it is this tha t define s them as living. 
Purpose implies freedom, but there is no freedom at the points ~ 
---
of the mechanical system. Only when the points are grouped 
is there life, purpose, freedom. We may affirm character-
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istics of the group or whole that can not be affirmed of 
the parts, as triangularity may be affirmed of straight lines 
when properly joined in a triangle; but could not be affirmed 
of the straight lines as distinct parts of the triangle. 
As a wave rises from the bosom of the sea and makes 
its way from point to point until at length it loses itself 
i n the great deep, or spends its fury u pon some cliff falling 
back exha usted to the common level of the ocean a gain; so a 
"pU:lse" of life may rise from the universal sea of mechanism, 
and make its way through the medium of which it is consti-
tuted until. it is 1 ost in the great deep. Unlike the wave 
of the sea, the pulse of life is not "wind-tos s ed, but rather 
purpose-drawn" as "'the lover is moved by the loved object' 
- - until breaking upon some sudden obstacle or dying out in 
the viscous medium it is seen no more. nl There is no more 
break between the pulse of life and the vast mechanism 
than between the wave and the sea. This "pulse" which is 
life is new in the universe, and may be defined in its be-
havior in terms of purpose which is "self-preservation_. 11 
Life is set in the frame of the vast, universal mechanism of 
nature. It pulsates through this mechanism as a medium. 
It r~ses from the heart of the mechanism from which it is 
distinct; yet of which it is always a part. It organizes 
itself toward ends which are the "average" effects of causes, 
and which are distinct from other "results" that causes produce.2 
~"The Pulse of Life,"~~ Behavior, pp . 53ff. 
"On Pain and Dreams,"~~ Behavior, p. 110. 
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Life sweeps through its medium--a "passing form," like a little 
whirlwind, which moves through the things that obstruct; yet 
it never ceases "to be of the same stuff and law as the other 
air through which" it moves.l 
Having established the category of life, at what point 
in hie system is he . to introduce ''mind?" Will he identify it 
with life throughout, or with only the higher reaches of life? 
Philosophers are accustomed to do one or the other; but Singer, 
in a concrete sense, does both. Mind denotes life, but con-
notes different levels of life. It is because living beings 
seek the same end with varying efficiency and forms of 
behavior that the concept of mind is imperative. If all 
being s pursued their ends with equal skill, the concept of 
mind could never arise. We are accustomed to say that dif-
ferent grades of mind produce different forms of behavior. 
But Singer exactly reverses this proposition, and asks 
why we should not judge differences of mind from observed 
,.. 
differences of behavior. ·wider variety of behavior indi-
cates superiority of mind. By the empirical method, the 
gradations of mind can be measured by measuring the dif-
ferences of behavior. Thus in his treatment of sensibility, 
he goes beyond Fechner who, though objective enough, measured 
the intensity of the sensation in terms of the intensity of 
the stimulus. Singer would curtail the examination of the 
stimulus, except at the point of its effect on the organism. 
1 
"On Pain and Dreams, " Mind As Behavior, p. 110. 
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He would collect his data by varying the objective conditions, 
and by watching the results upon the organisms as a class. 
After all, the behavior is not that of a particular organism, 
but a "statistical" behavior b a sed on as ma ny experiments as 
practical interests require. Such probable' behavior would 
include "virtual" as well as "actual" behavior.l 
The important phase of Singer's thought is the teleologi-
cal aspect. There is no sign of teleology in moving atoms 
as such; but when they carry out a function of the organism 
which is its ovm development, the movement serves in a t eleo-
logical capacity. 
tel eol ogi cally. 
The natural organism behaves, but it behaves 
Singer's view of the movements of the body, 
in one sense, can not constitute the tho ught of the body as 
a thinker; in another sense, they do constitute the body 
as a thinker. If the movements a re viewed as the behavior 
of any atoms outside of the body, anywhere in the universe, 
they are ·not thought; but if the atoms are looked upon as 
carry ing out the function of a special organism as a human 
body or tree, they may be r egarded as teleolog ical. The 
identical atomic movements, which, if not grouped, are 
mechanical, are teleological if they are in the relation-
ship of bearing forward upon their shoulders a living 
process. Atomic movements, realizing diversified functions, 
are teleological. The wheel, as a wheel among other wheels 
in a scrap-heap, would e njoy no t e leologic al character; 
1 non Sensibility," Mind As Behavior, pp. ??ff. 
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but that same wheel in a watch, or as functioning in a 
class of "timekeeping mechanisms," serves in a teleological 
aspect because it is carrying out a common purpose of the 
members of the class. The movements of the atoms in the 
organism, are serving in a tel·eologi cal capacity; and in this 
respect are mind. Referring to the n~assi ve Thinker, " 
Singer says, "What ! · observe of his present behavior is not 
his thought; what I expect in the way of future behavior 
is rot the full me aning of his thought •••• But in so far 
as they (atomic movements wrapped up in the same skin) 
are the mechanism by which the same aspect of teleological 
behavior may elsewhere be worked out--th en I am willing 
to say, 'This is the behavior of the pass·ive thinker that 
I mean by his thought'."l Teleology differs from mechanism 
in that it establishes an "average" relation between cause 
and effect rather than a universal or mechanical relation. 
The "end" which is the average consequence that follows 
on the means becomes a source of prediction. Thus the 
objective validity of teleology is set up. 
(2) Metaphysical Implications. Having set forth 
briefly Professor Singer's behavioristic philosophy in order 
to reveal its type, we shall now consider its metaphysical. 
implications. We confess at the outset that Singer pur-
sues his philosophy witp no completely unified thought. 
His ideas diverge. There are at least two important meta-
1
"on Mind As An Observable Object," Mind As Behavior, 
p. 48. 
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physical implication--naturalism and a form of idealism. 
(a) First, let us consider Singer's naturalism. 
Singer images the world as a universal mechanism from which 
life springs and has its being. As we have shown, Singer 
is unwilling to interpret life in terms of mechan i sm, and 
mechanism in terms of life. Yet it is difficult for thought 
to place both consistently in the same realm of being. 
We often mistake this difficulty of transition of thought 
for a real gap in nature. To bridge this supposed cha sm 
in nature, we build philosophies which reduce life to mechan-
ism, or mechanism to life. Obviously, Singer is making a 
t acit distinction between the thought world which is the 
s cientific reconstruction (mechanical ideal) and the sup-
plementary philosophical ideal (teleological), and "na-
ture" which is without break or chasm. Furthermore, the 
starting point for scientifi c reconstruction is the common-
sens e world which lies about us when reflection begins.l 
A realistic world of nature se ems to be assumed at the 
outset. Whether Sing er refers to this "common-sense" 
world, or to the reconstructed world, he does so in terms 
of moving atoms. The world lying in the backg round of his 
thinking is a dynamic atomism. It is not simply "atomism," 
for the universe may be explained by atomic structure 
(Democritus); yet it may be a static world. But for Singer, 
nature is teeming with energetic action. "Dynamic atomism" 
1 "Sensation and the Datum of Science," M.!.!:!.9. ~ Behavior. 
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is the term that covers the constitution of the uni t.s, , 
and describes the character of their relationships. In 
the lower phase of Singer's thought, mind shares in. the 
general char&cter, and is defined in terms of nature's 
constituents. Mind is not distinct from other parts of 
nH.ture, and it escapes the rigor of scientific treatment 
no more than clod or star. Nature is an energetic source 
of stimulation; the organism is an energetic source of 
response; and mind is measured by the observed resource-
fulness of the response. 
This conclusion is justified by most of what Singer 
has to say about the similitude of the distributive motion 
of atoms throughout the universe. He brings the mind of 
the poet--all poets, musicians, and thinkers to the level of 
the clod and star, culminating in an atomic "one-ness," 
a pan-atomism. Human beings, with all their boasted grandeur, 
with all their hopes that flare up to gild a future sky, 
are distinguished in no way from things in space and time. 
Should we confront Singer with the question, "Is thought 
but the movement of atoms?" he would reply, "Yes~ and 
"No ~ '! The apparent evasion, or contradiction is removed by 
the explanation "that the movement of an atom is the move-
ment of an atom and a thousand things besides. nl The 
passage of an atom of carbon through the mind of a poet is 
like that in a lump of coal when it shoots into the bin. 
111on Mind as an Observable Object," Mi!!.9. .§&Behavior, 
p. 45. 
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But Singer does not let the problem rest here. Is 
the poet simply a "congeries of moving atoms , " or is he 
something more? Singer agrees with Cossmann that mechan-
ism is "allgffltig," but it is not "allei~gfiltig," it is 
valid as far as it goes but it is not all the truth. Me-
chanical insights approximate, but they never quite arrive. 
If they should arrive at the whole truth, they would be 
face to face with "moving atoms '' which constitute nature. 
But Singer says that poetic atoms are grouped. We are 
dealing with a me chanism (the poet) that behaves teleolog-
ically. ~lhat does this teleological aspect add to the 
situation? The grouping, the form which is no addition. 
The form or curl of the wave is the new feature as the wave 
lifts itself from the level of the sea, but there is no 
change in the n a ture of the atoms which compose it. Vmat 
Sing er d oes say is that "living beings" are teleological, 
and nature is mechanical. But to say that living being s are 
teleological does not blot ou t their atomic character. 
Life, then , is b u t moving atoms; and mind which can be 
defined only in terms of the variations of the behavior of 
life is moving atoms also. Thus Singer leaves Aristotle's 
teleology dark and meaningless. Singer's teleology me ans 
grouped, moving atoms producing "average" results, which 
we may predict or expect. But atoms are grouped and moving 
in the stone, in the star, in the mass of the sea as well 
a s in the wave which represents life--in the universe every-
where, wherever there is any reality one mi 0 ht call a thing, 
or mind. The sameness of the universe cancels mind, because 
there is no call for this category where there are no dif-
ferences. 
Aristotle was not content with the mere mechanical 
changes of atoms, but he insisted that these must be sub-
ordinated to the "form" which is efficient. Singer can not 
hark back to Aristotle; for he blots out the nform" or rather 
transforms the "ideal" form into "spatial" form of behavior 
by identifying mind with atomic movements. While Singer 
does not accept Hobbes~ conception of sensation with its 
dependence upon physiological structure and physical stimu-
l us, he agrees with him in t h e conception that mind is matter 
in motion. We are not always sure, in Singer' a view, 
whether mind is simply "motion," or "atoms" moving. If 
the former, it is but the ghost of energy, which Singer 
himself would speedily banish. If "atoms moving" comprise 
the complete reality, mind is nothing at all. Really, in 
either event, mind is nothing at all. It finds no home in 
the vast realm of reality. Then why speak of it in any 
sense, even in that of identifying it with atoms in motion? 
The universe is divested of mind, and is comprised of atoms 
moving in a vast, teeming world of energy. Every vestige 
of "eject," "epiphenomenon," and "parallel series" is ex-
cluded "leaving not a single wrack behind." Singer should 
thus, logically, exclude also his "thousand things besides, 11 
--
his "more than poet, musician, or moral being," and his 
"certain order of facts," which we may indefinitely ap-
proximate, but which is very different from the. world of 
facts observed. 
Professor Singer faces the troublesome question as to 
what status the mind may have, when, apparently, the mechan-
inm is not behaving, yet is thinking. We are held in the 
mesh of an exciting and expectant spell while he makes answer 
to Miss Washburn's practical question, "What are you going 
to d'O with the being who thinks, but exhibits no behavior 
for the very reason he thinks?" The answer comes in the 
fascinating discussion of the "Passive Thinker."l Though 
a thinker may appear as "stonily statuesque" as Rodin's 
~ 
"Thinker" before the Pantheon at Paris, and even resemble 
the famous statue as to external complacency, he is not 
implicitly inert. For the vital processes are in operation, 
the eyes blink, and the "dendronated tennini of the axis 
cylinder processes of t h e cortical neuronic protoplasm may 
now and then put forth a new and tender shoot," while the 
a tom s dart hither and thither with lightning speed. On 
the surface, the thinker may seem composed; but deep down in 
his organism, he is teeming with dynamic energies whose activ-
i ty is thought. 
Singer's conception of the "Passive Thinker" is further 
clarified by the figure of the "dormant l'ife" which the 
1110n Mind as an Observable Object," Mind .ru!. Behavior. 
seed-corn illustrates. Though the seed does not function, 
it is alive. It seems lifeless, but it holds a promise for 
the future. The analogy is complete here as between the 
dormant life of the grain and the passive thinker. "Con-
sciousness is behavior if you will; but more accurately 
our belief in consciousness is an expectation of probab le 
behavior, based on an observation of actual behavior," 
says Singer.l The same difficulty that attends Singer's 
treatment of the thinker who manifests no outward be-
havior confronts him in his consideration of the intensity 
of sensation. 2 Advancing upon the older empiricism of 
Locke and Condillac which regarded sensation as the immedi-
ate d a tum of experience, Singer defines sensation, as he 
doe-s mind, in terms of behavior. As in Jennings 1 experiments 
with paramecia, we have the varying mechanical stimulations 
of changes of temperature, and the teleological response 
of the organisms as they re-arrange themselves in the trough. 
The observable behavior defines the sensation of the or-
ganism; the changing behavior represents the changing in-
tensities of sensation. But the objector asks, "Is the 
paramecium without sensation when it is not moving? If 
it has sensation (and Singer says it does) when it does 
not move, how can sensation and behavior be identical?" 
Singer replies that sensibility is "passive" and recep-
tive. If there is no behavior to be observed, there is 
1 Ibid. 
2non Sensibility," Mi.!1.Q. ~Behavior. 
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"virtual" behavior, that is, behavior that we may expect 
on the average from any member of the class. It is not 
necessarily the behavior of this particular organism, but 
such behavior as statistical probability might predict for 
and living being. But this is "average" behavior whi ch would 
not fit any particular behaving being. 1·1Ioreover, it would 
not be the behavior of the observed organism, either "vir-
tual" or "overt," but an abstract ideal of behavior, or 
rather an expectat i on of behavior existent in the mind of 
the observe~. 
Singer is compelled to desert his stringent empirical 
method when he admits that we have an expectation concern-
ing the dormant seed only because we have observed the 
functioning of other seeds, and infer that the dormant seed 
will function, since it is like the others. Should all 
seed lie permanently dorma nt, we never could conclude tha t 
they would grow, but we should conclude just the reverse. 
Similarly, we could never pass by observation alone from a 
passive to an active think er. We must first ob serve the 
active thinker, then we may infer that the passive think er 
might become active because it belong s to the same cl a ss. 
The dormant seed is a symbol of matter and its potentiality. 
It is not matter plus life; it is potential matter. This 
conception is half-way Aristotelian. It omits the mind-
e nergy, which makes potentiality meaningful; but it accepts 
the "timber," which furnishes a substratum for material 
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development. The substratum contains all the elements of 
growth within itself if properly stimul a ted. So mind, 
which may lie dormant for a time , needs only to be suffi-
ciently stimul a ted, and it wi ll pass into action. We may 
then observe the behavior tha t we expected of it in the 
sleeping st ate. A behaviorist of this type begins with 
energetic matter or matter in motion both in the organism 
and in the environment, which are considered from the 
biological and n a tural viewpoint. He end s by making matter 
teleological in name only. He really transforms teleology 
into mechanism thus robbing it of its significance. A 
refined materialism is the obvious outcome of the lower 
side of Singer's philosophy. 
(b) Seco;rrdly,, there are idealistic implications 
in Singer's phi lo sophy. After t h e naturalistic mould is 
full, Singer tries to cram into it something that lies 
beyond the pale of observation. We see, even in his close-
ly guarded thought, the "eject," which he strives so hard 
to keep out, now "clouding" his own way "throug h new 
fields." Like Banquo's ghost, i t is up a gain, though many 
times fatally?wo unded with f ierce saber-thrusts. For 
Singer asks, "If movlne; atoms are thoughts, had not that 
1 ump of coal a bit of the poet in its make-up? "1 When 
Singer speaks of the poet a s a "congeries of atoms," he 
intimates, without telling us clearly, that the poet is 
1110n Mind as an Observable Object," Mind ~ Behavior, 
p. 45. 
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something more than mere atoms. It is this "something 
more" that is of profound int erest to the psychologist and 
philosopher. If the thought is s omething more than the 
movement of atoms, what is to be added to the atom in 
order to constitute thought? To what sort of "additive 
god" does Singer now bow tha t lead s him to suspect the 
presence of something more in the poet than his atomic 
constituents? If in one phase of Singer's thought, the poet 
is interprete d in terms of the atom; in another, the atoms 
are interpreted in terms of the poet, that is, on the higher 
levels of re ality. Bawden and Singer both are inclined to 
leave us at the parting of the ways. 
Moreover, the pulse of life or "passing fonn" is of 
the same law and stuff as the medium through which it 
passes.l The poet is such a pulse · of life. But the atom 
in a lump of coal has a "bit of the poet" in it. Therefore, 
all at oms, whether in poets or in _lump s of coal, are teleo-
logical. The universe is teleological throughout. Singer 
has assured us that the "little whirlwind" which organizes 
itself, and hurries "down the s tre e t" is of the "same law 
and stuff as the other air" through which it moves. Read-
ing up the scale, the "other air" is teleological because 
the total is a group of moving atoms and is therefore 
characterized by life, freedom, and purpose. To have adop ted 
mind or "idea" at this p oint would have made Singer an 
1110n Pain and Dreams," Mind as Behavior, pp. 110-111. 
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idealist indeed. But he c a n not apply the term "mind 11 to 
his ontological mechanism becaus e the mechanism is uniform, 
while mind can be applied only to empirical differentiations 
of behavior. Life rises from the 11vast sea of mechanism"; 
it is "drawn this way and that 11 , even as "the lover is 
moved by the loved object." Sing er does not tell us by 
what, or by whom life is thus drawn this way and that way. 
Had he done so, he would have gone quite all the way with 
Aristotle. He comes only so far toward Aristotle as Spinoza 
where he rests in the dumb, ineffable, undiff e rentiated 
blank, which he does not call "Substance. 11 He calls it 
mechanism. 
Spinoza and Singer are in most respects by no means to 
be compared, but in some, they parallel each other very 
closely. By refusing to ascribe any character to their 
Ultimate, they conceive reality, as does the scientist, 
as a vast mecha nism governed by law. This at least is one 
aspect of their thought. For both, the f a cts of the 
finite world are dependent upon one another in an infinite 
series. This is the outcome of Sing er's view of the f unction 
of science as reconstructive in endless progress. Singer 
has also taken over Spinoza's conception of "self-
preservation" as the essence of life. This tendency of 
life to persevere; to welcome what enriches and to fight 
what opposes it, Singer construes in terms of purpose. 
Upon the conception of purpose as the "averag e 11 behavior 
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to be expected from a class of living beings rests the 
possibility of a "science of life" which is an "exact science 
of the probable in the domain of self-preservative behavior. 111 
While the abstract conception of Spinoza would logically 
exclude self-activity in experience, the law of sufficient 
reason would exclude it from Singer's conception also. 
There is no ground for the organization of the "pulse of 
life" within the total mechanism because Singer conceives 
the "vast sea of mechanism" as ungrouped and undifferenti-
ated. We could not expect a teleological organism to 
spring spontaneously from an "ateleological" mechanism. 
Each "pulse of life" rel a ted to its antecendent in an 
infinite series would be entirely without cause. 
We have seen how Singer draws away from crude material-
ism toward idealism; yet he falls short of the latter by 
his substitution of Spinoza's "natural mechanism" for 
Aristotle's conception. of God as "Idea," which would h ave 
made his teleology significant. We ha ve also seen how 
Singer has lifted the atoms of the lump of coal to the 
level of the poet. And if the mind of the poet is in any 
sense psychical, by implication, there would be psychical -
elements throughout the universe. This would be pan-
psych ism. But since Singer nowhere mention s the psychical, 
it may be unfair to conclude so much as pan-psychism. 
Probably he merits only the term "panhylist."2 
~"The Pulse of Life," Mind ..i!2. ~havior, p. 69. 
The New Realism, p. 2~ 
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A nearer approach to idealism is to be found in 
Singer's treatment of the "datum" of experience. His first 
proposition is that sens a tion can not be regar ded a s the 
immediate datum of experience. Nor can any other term b e 
found that does stand for the imm ediacy of experience, 
because there is no ultim a te d a tum. Sensation lies at the 
end of the sear ch for a datum rather than a t the beginning. 
I t is the ide a l, yet unattainable g oal. :But for Sing er, 
the search never ceases; it leads on into a distant, 
dreary, and endless way. Ordinarily, a definition of 
sens a tion ascribes to it certai n p hysical and physiologi-
cal r e lations. These render the sensa tion impure, for we 
can not abstract a "pure" sensa tion from the complexity of 
suc h rel a tion s h ips. Hence sensation, which is commonly 
supposed to be "given" in e xperience, is a highly reflec-
tive product. I f sensa tion is the product of reflection, 
the worl d which isbuilt of sensa tion is also a construct 
of r e flection, that is, a world which presents itself to 
finite thought. If suc h a world i s in any s e nse objective, 
it must also be conceived a s the outp ut of Infinite t h ought. 
:But Singer does not g o so far a s to reco gnize Mind in 
his ultima te; and to the e x tent that he falls s h ort of this, 
he fails, like Kant, to come through to a consistent and 
worthy idealism. Singer advances far beyond Hume with his 
v i vid "sense-impress i ons" from whic h he constructs . · 
his empirical world. Singer's conception of "scientific 
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reconstruction" supersedes the sensati onalism of Hobbes 
and Condillac which was directly dependent on bodily pro-
ceases. It ~inds Helmholtz's "mere quality" no more 
s atisfying. It even sets aside the modern subtlety of a 
James which converts sensation into "an ideal terminus of 
abstraction."l He, of course, rejects James' way of 
looking upon "bits of pure experience" as the immediate 
datum. Since the datum of science is purely relative, 
there can be no end to the search. The series is infinite, 
for "An absol u tely simple and ultj_ma te datum we :e.either 
must nor can have. Our search for it is a search for what, 
if found, would put an end to our scientific progress in 
the direction of further recon s truction."2 Singer rejects 
every datum which history h as proposed on the ground t hat 
it is self-contradictory. For an "immediate" is "inde;.. 
a:.eri bable and indefinable. 11 Therefore, it can not be found. 
If it could be found, it co ul d be described and defined. 
But we can describe only through universals; and a thing, 
when thus described, represents a type which passes beyond 
the "given," since it may b e applied to any member of the 
class. Therefore, the "describable" can not be the immediate-
ly "given." 
The positive conclusion which Singer .r.eaches . is tha t 
while we can not have an absolutely simple and immediate 
datum as our starting point, we may have an absolute starting 
1 11 Sensation and the Datum of Science, 11 Mind as Behavior. 
2 Ibid. --
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point which is nthe whole common-sense world in which we 
find ourselves when we begin to 'reflect'." With this 
we begin to reconstruct our world by both analysis and 
synthesi s . After laborious work, we arrive at a "compar-
atively eimple datum for construction." The datum of science 
is alway s relative, and it arises from the "contrast of the 
more constructive to the less constructive terms of our t h ought." 
Though vague and paradoxical, with each step in advance 
Singer ~rings his conception more clearly into view. He 
assumes the s t and p oint of science which recons t ructs the 
commo n-sense world. He even has a unique way of tre a ting 
the common-sense world. Usually the common-sense world is 
regarded as the raw f acts of nature which lie all about us 
waiting to be observed and recorded. It is regarded as the 
immedi a te sense world of n a ture which lies open to the 
investigati ons of scientists--a realistic world entirely 
inde penden t of mind and its operations upon it. Though an 
empiricist, Singer holds even the common-sense world at 
"arm's-length," if we may be permitted to use this expression. 
Whi le the scientist begins his reconstruction with the 
"common-sense world in which he begins to reflect, n he does 
not begin with "raw f acts." There is an element of descrip-
tion which t h e mind injects into the facts, so that the 
"fa cts henceforth fit int o the fr ame of interpretation. 
The "f acts" a re not to be discovered in bulk as they are 
sometimes thought to exis t in nature, but they are in a 
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sense "ideal." They are true, but they become more true 
as they are embraced in a wider interpretation afforded by 
further sci~ntific re c onstruction. The scient ist approxi-
rna tes the "ideal'' ever more and mo r e. And even the "ideal" 
should be looked upon as an endless series of experimental 
reconstructions, not simply as Kant r egarded it, that is, 
as a n ideal regul a tion of the regre ssive series (an idea 
for which there is no object). For Singer, who views the 
problem more objectively, Kant's "regulative principle" 
means," reduce your probable error, eliminate more and more 
of the inexhaustible sources of constant error."l 
By this objective method, Singer hopes to draw Kant's 
"noumenon 11 within the world of experience, rather than leave 
it, as Kant did, outside of experience and forever unknown. 
Singer interprets Kant's "unknowable f a.ct" (noumenon) as 
unknowable only in the sense that it is 11 unattain able," 
that is, it is an "ideal." This means that there are always 
more data for scientific reconstruction. Singer would 
define the "noumenon" in reference to the phenomena, even 
tho ugh it be a dmitted that the "noumenon" is different from 
the "phenomenon. 11 He would thus introduce into his emp ir-
icaJ vJOrld "that which appears" with the ''appearance," 
and he would say that "that which appears" is an attaina.ble 
"real" when compared with the ''appearance"; but it is itself 
an "appearance" when com1)ared with a "more r e al" (larger 
interpretation) which is attainab le, and of which it is an 
l"Kant's First Antinomy," Mind!'!& Behavior, pp. 280-281. 
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"appearance." Each "a ppearing" points to a "more real," 
which in turn becomes an "appearing" that points to a 
"more real," and so on "in infinitum." Here is a progress 
wh ose g oal is an "ideal," and progress alone "can defi n e 
a ~ ideal. nl 
Deferring for a moment the question whether Singer 
ac t ually dissolves Kant's "noumena" into an endless series 
of fleeting phenomena, or leaves his "common-sense" world 
where Kant left his "noumena ," we pass on to his ide al 
conception of n a ture. Expressed in a si ngle statement, 
nature is the average scientific descr~ption at any 
stae e of development. The "facts" of nature include a 
d egree of "probable error." Choices of interpretation of 
n a tur e a re alwa.ys possible, and a r e determined by the 
principle of preference. They are not capricious, but 
tend ever to ward "maximum unity." Science describes o r 
class ifie s natur e, and, fo r that reason, we may say that 
cl a s s es "exist in Nature."2 Nature embodies finite choices 
which may b e endlessly revised. With eac h revision, t h e 
probable error is reduced toward zero ~ut zero is never 
re a ch ed), and thus g rea ter unity is obt a ined. This is the 
"maximum unity" which a l v.'ays expands with later and truer 
interpretations--the unity of scientific description which 
Singer substitutes for Kant's "unity of consciousness" 
that e xpresses itself i n nature. Thus, in one sense of 
1 rbid .• p. 282. 
2"Choice and Nature," Mind .§:..§. Behavior, p. 209. 
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the word, Singer re a ches objectively t b.e same thought that 
Kant reached transcendentally, namely, "'·'The order and uni-
formity of the phenomena we call Nature, we ourselves intro-
duce into them, and we had never been able t o find it 
there had we not first put it t here'."l Nature is to be 
defined by a series of ever-broa dening finite in~ights 
which mak e up develo ping scie nce. "Science is n a ture in 
the making . Nature i s completed science •••• The maker 
of science must be the maker of n a ture. Nature is tha t 
imag e which science a pproaches as the erro r o f observat ion 
app ro a ches zero. So viewed, nature is no Ding-~-sich ! 
but the name of a certain ideal. n2 
It is the Kant of t h e Dialectic t h at Singer re inter-
p rets, and with wh om he feels h e is in agre ement. The 
"unkn owable fact" which lies outside of experience b ecomes 
an "id e al" whic h can be defined 11 o nl y in terms of a method 
tha t p ossesses a device for dist i nguishing between the more 
and t h e less real n; so tha t for every experimental r e sult 
t ak e n for "true, 11 there is al ways to be found by further 
experiment a "truer." 
Though Singer and Kant have certain agreements, Singer 
attempts to go beyond Kant in his treatment .of the Ding-.§ill_-
sich. For both , nature is the product of thoug ht. To 
that extent both are i dealistic. Kant finds thoug ht valid 
for n a ture becaus e it constitutes nature thro ugh the fact 
l Ibid., p. 215. 
2 11 The Mathematician and his Luck," Mind as Behavior, p. 288. 
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of the unity of "transcendental apperception". Individual 
thought in its universal aspect makes nature. The over-
lapping of the universal element of transcendental selves 
was intended as the _ ground of the objectivity of n a ture. 
For Singer, t h e interpretations of scientific minds g overned 
by the principle of relativity make nature. Both reduce 
nature to the phenomenal order, though Singer struggles to 
bring his "common-sense world" (his ultimate) within the 
bounds of the empirical. Kant frankly leaves his ultim&te 
(noumena) outside of experience. The "thin gs-in-themselves" 
are independent of consciousness, different from it, and 
out of relation to it. No- positive characteristics can be 
attached to them. They must e xis t, for there could be no 
••appe a rances" without them. llroreo ver, sensations must be 
caused by things inde pe nde nt of us. :But these things 
escape the categories of the understanding, and therefore, 
~re entirely unknown. The real or transcendental" selves, 
as contra sted with the empirical or phenomenal, are also 
r em oved from the realm of the e mpirical or knowable, and 
help to cons t itute ultimate rea.li t y . But Sing er seeks to 
p e rmit no "unknowable fact" or facts (things-in-themselves) 
to linger outside the realm of the empirical. In the 
scientifiG reconstruction of the common-sense world, Sin-
ger imagines that he h c-JS laid hold of the ultimate by identi-
fying the "appearance" . with the n ature of the thing that appears. 
If the ultima te reality is actually grasped by finite 
insights and interpretations, then it must be of such a 
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nature as to lend itself to finite interpretation s. And if 
this be so, we must invoke an ultima te reality of t h e char-
acter of mind. To in s ist up on the validity of scientific 
insi ght and the intelli gibility ~ df the world throughout i m-
plies the ideality of the world throughout. It is true that 
"the heavens declare the glory of Kepler and Newton." It ia 
no less true that they a lso d eclare the "glory of God," 
an d thi s f act provi d es an ab i d ing ground for all the recon-
structions of finite mind s. Finite insights i mply fi n ite 
minds. Scientific reconstruction impli.es a "knowable" wo r ld. 
Sing er insists that there is no "unknowable f a ct." The r e-
fore, his ultima te reality is not independent of fi n ite 
minds . His "common-sense" worl d , to b e k nowable, must be 
amen a ble to finite though t . To be amen able to finite thought, 
it mu s t be the manifest a ti on of infinite thought. It is no 
longer a "common-sense" world in the sens e of an extra-
mental world, but it is a phenomenal order which expresses 
the will and deed of the Infinite. When once launched upon 
an i dealistic course, to be consistent, Singer must a d-
vance to a thorough- going ide al i sm. .Billlpirical idealism 
sets out in the ri ght direction, but halts within sight 
of its goal. 
Singer's attempt to set out simultaneou sly up on two 
inc onsistent, if not cont r adictory, ways i s revealed i n t h e 
s tatement, "One is all t h e mor e a realist for being idealis t 
enough to see in Nature the embodiment of choices. ttl Singe r 
1 "Choice and Nature," Mind .§!&. Behavior, p. 209. 
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is a re alist then. In what sense is he a realist? In what 
sen sE::, · id eali st'L If we dared be paradoxical, we might 
say that he is half idealist, and he is all realist. We 
have already seen how Singer has adopted Kantian idealism 
in a modified form. He h a s divested Kantian philo s ophy of 
i t s tra nscend entalism. He h a s converted the~ priori 
"synthetic judgments" into empirical c h oices or i n terpreta-
tions of nature . In the interests of an Empirical Idealism, 
he has brought the "noumenon" into an ideal relation to t h e 
phenomenal series. Apparentl y , it is no long er an "unknow-
a ble" reality. There is no "Nature-in-it s elf" ling ering 
beh i nd t h e "described nature." Sing er favors t h e identi-
fication of the "universe of discourse" (the results of 
scientific descri p tion) with 11 the Uni verse." He rejec t s 
the sugg estion of dualism i n the st a tement of Montaigne: 
11
' I l y a le nom et la chose, le nom ce n'est pas u n e partie 
d e la chose, ni d e la s ubst ance: c' e st une pi ~ce ~trangere 
join te ~ la chose, et ho rs d'elle'"O· (There is the name and 
the thing, the name is not a pa r t of t h e thi ng , nor of the 
s ubs tance: it is a fore i gn p i ec e join ed to the thi ng , and 
ou tsi de o f it). The descri p tions a re more than n ominal; 
t h ey are "true to Nature." Th is i s Singer's i d eali sm . 
(3) Criticism. But Singer immediately qualifies 
h i s idealism in the intere sts of realism, for h e s ays, "It 
is no doubt al wa ys possible to di s ting uish between the f a cts 
111Choice and Nature," Mind ~ Behavior, p. 204. 
10 4 
of Nature and a classification to which they are subjected."l 
These facts of nature are indifferent to their classification. 
If they were not, a series of choices of interpretations 
would not be possible. But they are not "independent" of 
all classification, for the facts "presented in Nature" 
are the products of "finished classification." Otherwise~ 
they could not be "presented." Singer says that the recon-
struction (classification) never ends; it goes on "in infini-
tum. 11 Therefore, the "facts of Nature" can never be ''pre-
sented." This is Singer's realistic world of nature--a world 
which science ever approximates , but never reaches. 
Moreover, the "common-sens e" world in which "we begin 
to reflect," lies all about us before we begin the recon-
structi on. What was the nature of this world when it was 
young, before there were any scientists to reconstruct it? 
What i s the nature of the world which is not yet reconstructed · 
(for the reconstruction is not ended, in fact can never end)? 
Is not this "common-sense world" another "Nature•i d.iffering 
from the first a s the "realistic n a ture" which the biologist 
and physicist feels he investigates and describes differs 
from the scientific descri ll tio n of e,uch a nature? What is 
our assurance that our scientifi~ description "involves" 
the facts of nature? Is not "exact" science, confessedly, 
a short-hand description of appro x imate prob ab ilities, . 
and are not the laws of nature but statistica l "average s" 
lrbid., pp. 205-206. 
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of the observed behavior of matter? The length of two 
sticks is twenty-four inches. The "average" length of the 
sticks is twelve inches. Yet one stick is fourteen inches 
long and the other is· ten. The average may not represent 
reality precisely. The average mortality age may be thirty-
five years, but multitudes die in infancy and in old age. 
To regard nature's laws as certain as statistics is to render 
science to a degree uncertain. Instead of "approximations" 
making us certain of the truth, they let us: know that we 
have it not--ever not quite. To find the ground of truth 
in the gratification of a desire for "maximum unity" is to 
postpone it to infinity. At no point in the phenomenal 
series does Singer discover ultimate reality. His "Empiri-
cal Idealism" leaves the 11 Common-sense world" or re alistic --
nature waiting outside of knowledge. 
It does not avail to bring the "common-sense world" 
into the empirical se r ies for Singer to appeal to a "universal 
will"; for that ·will is not the will of a Supreme Being who 
actuates and embraces all. It is the will of society, of 
finite beings only; it is distributed to individual human 
bein ,~ s. Like Comte's "humanity," it is a pure abstraction, 
a remote image of the concrete units of the races of all 
ages. Is there a real, concrete humanity above and beyond 
the individuals that compose it? Is there a "universal will" 
or desire in addition to the individual wills and desires 
of the members that constitute society in all ages? Must 
.10 6 
not individual scientists reconstruct the "common-sense 
world"? Can we add indi~idual reconstructions and thus reach 
a "maximum unity"? Does not Singer go beyond experience 
when he conceives of a greater unity, a truer interpretation 
than that w}::lich already obtains? Kant assumes an attitude 
toward experience which renders experience "static." Facts 
flow, and they mus.t fit into the "categories" which are 
ready-made. For Singer, the "interpretations" which correspond 
to Kant's categories, flow. An~ priori comes to be. Ex-
perience is dynamic. With everything in experience flowing, 
there is no rational principle to st ab~lize experience, nor 
even to make it possible. The ground of experience dissolves 
into changing phenomena. Kant made the unity of apper-
ception the g round of all experience. Singer makes the 
struggle of thought "after maximum unity" the gro und of 
experience. But i! "maximum unity" is anything concrete and 
experiential (and it is for Singer), it is the result of 
experience, not its ground of possibility; for experi en ce 
must ever precede "maximum unity. " How then can ''maximum 
unity" constitute experience? Or how can the "struggle for 
maximum unity " be the ground of experience when experience 
must have set out in order that there may be a struggle? 
There could be no struggle for "maximum unity" until the 
scientists made a second "interpretation" which they prefer 
to the first. But by that time, some experience has trucen 
place in the way of observation, experiment, and the gathering 
of "statistical averages." Singer has led us to the point 
where we can appreciate h i s own paradoxical expression, 
"We can not start until we . have already proceeded, we can 
not proceed until we have started. nl When the scientist 
begins his search, does he share fully in the "universal 
wilJ of society," the will that is broader than his own 
age--as broad as all ages? If not, then the "struggle for 
maximum unity" does not constitute experience nor is it 
the ground of its possibility. If the scientist does share 
in the "universal will," that universal will can be nothing 
concrete; for the scient ist in the beginning h a s advanced 
but little toward actual max i mum unity. Therefore, Singer's 
"maximum unity" is an ideal goal of the "struggle." In an 
Aristotelian sense, it may be the final cause of the struggle. 
But in this ideal conception, Singer is far from his notion 
of e xperience as observation and experiment. 
In the me antime, Singe r 's "common-sense world" waits 
outside of this ideal structure. How shall we evaluate it? 
We h ave shown on the one hand how Singer idealizes nature. 
On the other hand, he assume s another sort of natu r e--a 
realistic world which is to be reconstructed. He attempts 
to include it in his experiential world by identifying its 
observable behavior vri th its ul tima.te nature. When Mr. 
Miller asks, "Are the nature of a t h ing and the tokens by 
wh ich I infer its presence the same?" Singer answers, "They 
l"sensation and the Datum of Science, II M.1!l.Q. M Behavior, 
p. 180. 
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are to me the same. nl Behavior is the meaning of conscious-
ness. Mind is only a term invented to express _the varied 
resourcefulness of lives and the measured differences of the 
behavior of life. The nature of mind lies in these differ-
ences. The tractor that does the work of ten horses must, 
therefore, possess the nature of a gigantic horse. The auto-
maton which plays checkers with a living hl~an being and 
defeats him must ·have the nature of a man, for it behaves 
like a man. The only differenc e is that the automaton has 
a higher grade of intelligence than the man. Strictly 
s peaking, there can be nothing but "appearance" in Sing er 1 s 
world of experience. And what could appear ance mean without 
someth ing to appear? What could "appearance" mean with no 
mind to appear to? How co u ld scientists reconstruct a "cornmon-
sense world" when they have no mind? 
Moreover, if scientific reconstruction only indefinitely 
approximates the . "common-sense world," that world must lie 
beyond the order of observed facts. ifuo can tell how closely 
one approximates unless he knows this "certain order of 
facts"? How shall we judge between the observed :r·ealm and the 
order we approximate? There is no way of knowing the phenomenal 
series until the data are all in. All knowledge is p ostponed 
p rogressively in infinitum because the data are infinite. 
This implies an independent, extra-observation a l order which 
eludes us. Singer 1 s "c omrno n- sense wo rl. d" like Kant 1 s "noumenal 
111Consciousness and Behavior," Mind.§& Behavior, p. 27 
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world" remain s forever in my s t ery because experience emb races 
only the phenomenal. Lik e Kant also, Singer claims k n ow-
led g e of the phenomenal ( t he observed); but he can not know 
even the phenomenal or ob served world unless it is t he man-
ifest ation of an ontolog ical caus a l ity of the nature of 
mind . Since SingeF rule s ou t mind altogether, he is thereby 
committed to naturali sm . 
It seems that Sing er has a ttempted to solve the problem 
of mind and expe rience by the most to r tuous a nd difficult 
wa y . In d enying an "immedi a te" he has overlooked the i mmed i a -
cy of cons cious experience. Conscious life bears direct 
witness to t h e facts of introspection. Immediate experi ence 
distinguishes the facts of consciousne~s and the behavior 
which symbolizes them. Inde ed , b ehavior could mean nothing 
with out the interpreta tion of consciousness. The observa -
tion of behavior would be impossible without consciousness. 
If t h e facts of consci ousness are not g r anted, the facts 
and l c:tws of n a t ure are ·i nac ce ssible, and an empirical world 
of any sort is an impossibility. 
Behaviorism decries the introspective method because 
it seems to hi d e mind f r om objective observation. A serious 
defect of t he behavioristic view is that thought is made far 
more hid d en, and unobservable than by introspection itself. 
Singer introduces elements more truly veiled than the total 
r e s ·ul t s of i nt ro specti ve study. This is obscurum obscuri us 
with a veng eance. If the met aphysic a l implications of Sing er ~s 
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philosophy lead us, on the one side, to a world of teeming 
energies, they present us, on the other side, with an unknown 
world forever beyond the power of men to grasp. Moving 
either way, we pa.ss toward the unknown. Singer deplores 
the unknowable; for there must be nothing veiled or hidden; 
y et he, himself, says, "If one should ask, what leads us to 
call certain objects conscious, I would say, 'I do not know 
and expect never surely to know'. If one should ask what· 
aspect of behavior of certain objects leads us to call t h em 
alive, 'I must return the same answer.' The deep, blind 
instincts of the race are not easily enticed out into the 
light of day." The root end of the deep, blind instincts 
lies buried in mystery, and the othe r end toward which all 
moves lies veiled and hidden because we only approach that 
"very different order of f acts '' u p on whose unkn own and un-
observed bosom the world of observation rests. Here, then, 
are enough hidden things for one who has no special predi-
lection for the mystic and occult. 
It is also a question whe ther the atomic movements, upon 
whic h this brand of behaviorism rests, are not equally hidden. 
Wboever observed an atomic movement in the brain, single-
handed and alon e? Is t here a ny instrument with which we have 
been able to see atoms moving through the brain, or mind? 
Profe s sor Singer would begin his search for thought "by 
looking for such movements of atoms as actually moved too 
slightly to be observed? When the mind is in action, it can 
\ 
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not be observed because atoms in movement are veiled and 
hidden. When the mind is not in action, there is nothing to 
observe in the way of action or mind. Logic compels us to 
conclude that mind is not an observable object. Singer would 
look at. the organs =of expression, the tongue principally (it 
is a novel procedure to look at one's tongue in order to 
observe his thoughts), and the eyes, or muscles straine d in 
inhibition. These, the subject might feel; but atomic move-
ments, the observer can not see. 
Furthermore, Singer assumes the work of mind in the 
observer. Or he is committed to the reductio ad absurdum of 
saying that a group of atoms observes another group, both 
equally blind and unobserving. There is no way to account 
for the power of observation, other than to assume what is 
obvious, namely, a person conscious of what he is about, and 
h a ving a unity of mind that endures. How could the observer 
unite his observations of the past dormant state with the 
present active behavior, or predict its future, if there is 
no thinking person to gather up the separate observations, 
and present them together as a unified whole? Singer says 
that when the introspectionist asks his subject, ''What's on 
your mind?" before the subject is able to reply he is another 
man, and his previous thought "is lost in the infinite ocean 
of the past, the pebble just now dropped into this ocean is 
no easier of recovery than is the treasure, sunk there a 
thousand years ago." 
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Were this the fact, the objectivist would be in no better 
position. He who can not introspect because no such pro-
cedure is possible, who can not even observe his own mind. 
as accurately as his neighbor can observe it for him, would 
s carcely find ground to endure long enough to take the second 
observa-tion, while he retains the first. How can his atomic 
movements :in the brain know from one moment to another what 
behavior they observed the moment before, or expect to see a 
moment hence; especially, if they are fleeting, born only to 
die an instant death, and sink into this . same infinite ocean 
of the p a st like pebbles dropped afresh into the deep, and no 
"easier of recovery than is the treasure, sunk there a thou-
sand years ago.~ Imagine an atom on swift wing, halting a 
moment on poised pinion over a dormant thinker (dessicated 
seed), and observing or peeking at the promise (mark well! 
the promise of behavior, not yet behavior) of behavior for 
the future. Then this group of moving atoms (the observer), 
remembering that it perceived the promise of behavior, be-
holds the actual behavi or of other groups of previously 
sleeping atoms (passive thinkers or dessicated seeds), which 
are now active. The moving atoms (the observer) have 
observed no behavior, in this particular dessicated seed 
(passive thinker); but they infer from their observation 
of like behavior in other 1 ike seeds (passive thinkers, 
who have become active) that this seed will behave. Assum-
ing that dumb atoms can observe and gather the observations 
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into an intelligible whole, on what grounds can Singer say 
that that particular seed (passive thinker) will behave? 
Certainly, not on grounds of observation but of inference. 
But what right h a s the behaviorist to pick up and use the 
weapon ( inference) which he has so recently stricken 
from the hand of the introspectionist? For the introspection-
ist has no more reason to infer something in his neighbor's 
mind "than to infer that every sun has eight planets because 
ours has eight." And behold ! Singer expects behavior from 
the passive thinker because he has observed the behavior of 
other, active thinkers. He arrives at his conclusions, and 
reaches his knowledge, after all, not over the lofty and 
shining way of observation; but by the lowly and despised 
way of inference. 
It is probably true that we can not gaze upon our ex-
perience in the initial act of its creation. Though thoughts 
are fleeting, they linger until we catch their flavor as they 
pass into the infinite sea. But it is not true that they 
are "no easier of recovery than is the treasure sunk there a 
thousand years ago." When the spider spins its web, at 
precisely what point is it web, and not spider? At what 
point is. it spider, and not web? Just at the point at which 
the spider passes into web, neither introspectionist nor 
behaviorist can observe. But after the spider has spun out 
its gossamer web, we can trace in memory the silver lines, 
though the process of tracing may not be as complete as the 
Freudian school would claim. They say that, by the device 
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of psychoanalysis, the lin e s of the past may be traced through 
all the tortuous turns of the me sh. Though this is probably 
an exaggeration, it is true that experiences, dropped _into 
the infinite ocean in youth, emotionally rise to the sur-
face, when the sea is lashed by storm, like the -logs in 
IJake Burt, which, a generation ag o, were swept from their 
mooring s, and became water-logged and sank; but now lift 
their noses to the surface to disturb the sportsman's craft. 
Our thoughts, circumscribed by momentary bond s, may presently 
be freed, and dip into the distant past, and come back laden 
with things akin, as the metal immersed in a sol uti on seeks 
such ingredients as its nature draws. 
If we can not reach our pas t by re-think i ng it, how shall 
we e xpect to reach it by a distant, though polite bow? If 
we can not re-instate our past, or depict our future with 
mind, how can we expect to do so without mind? To make no 
provision for the recall of the past (and the behaviorist does 
not), or for the anticipa tion of the future shuts us up to 
the razor-edge of the pre s ent response with no gateway to the 
knowledge of our objective world. To exalt organic impressions 
into clear-eyed memory, or to degrade conscious selection into 
bodily "sets" and "tendencies" is to do violence to the plain-
est facts. Can I not recall my dream of a few nights ago? 
Do I not see my friend sitting in a certain gallery above a 
famous street in a certain famous city, while above him in 
the gallery sirtis several men with whom he 'iS ' earnestly 
• 
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speaking? I see his lips move, and seem to hear him say, 
"Intellect is the heart of religion," to which I earnest-
ly nod my assent. These are the very words which I had 
used at a social gathering the evening before, projected 
into the mouth of another, and now coming back to me through 
the medium of a friend ~mom I had not seen in twenty years; 
but from whom I had received a letter a few days ago. 
Though in the dream I agreed with the thought, I . did not 
r e cognize the words as mine, no r that it 1.1\fas a dream until 
I awoke into the conscious unity of mental life. V!hen I 
bring to mind a past experience on the links--the strokes, 
the hazards, haystacks, trees, and all--that scene I recon-
struct quite accurately. I am more certain of both these 
experiences than I am of atoms darting through the he a d of 
some one else, or that I have no mind but moving atoms, or 
that I can observe · atoms that move "too slightly to be 
observed." 
After placing inference among the myths, Professor 
Singer makes his way by inference. He employ s it in the 
inter ests of observation, but will not allow the introspec-
tionist to use it. Obscure thing s he deplores; yet obscurer 
fu.ing s he employs. He will have none of mystery; yet he 
saturates his thoughts and confe s sions with mystery. Hid den 
thing s he will not suffer; yet he hides things beyond all 
recovery. The unknowable he dreads; yet he offers his readers 
a n extra-observati anal world unknowable, and ends with a mind 
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unknowable. Introspection of the mind, he forbids; yet 
freely introspects (but does not observe the atoms) the 
body. For what, after all, c:\re moving a toms but intro-
spections? Or, better still, what are they but globules of 
the imagination projected into matter for the sake of explan-
ation? 
b. The Behaviorism of Watson and of other Behaviorists 
Most Closely Allied 1Q Bim· There are a few behaviorists 
who deserve to be ranked with Watson because, like him, they 
deny the rights of consciousness, and entertain conceptions 
whose main metaphysical implic a tion is materialism. Though 
they differ from Watson and among themselves in det ::;:.il, they 
agree on fundamen t als. ~eiss, Lashley, and possibly Bawden 
are of this number. Since these play a subordina te role, 
we shall give Watson the fullest consideration. 
(1) Exposition. What Singer began from the philosophic 
side, Watson continues on the psycholo g ical side. Both rep-
resent the extreme typ e, and have contributed an undue share 
in g iving to behaviorism its real orientation. 'Vatson regards 
psychology as a purely objective experimental branch of natural 
science. nl It may be completely defined in terms of stimulus 
and response. It is a science of organic response to internal 
and environmental stimulation, whereby human activity may be 
predicted and controlled. Singer conceives of behavior as 
g rouped movements of atoms; '.1!atson locates responses in the 
1 
Behavior, p. 1. 
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muscles and glands of the biological organism. 
If muscles and glands seem at first sight to belong 
entirely to t h e province of physiology, we are reminded that 
physiology studies the organism by parts; while p sych ology 
studies the reactions of the organism as a whole. When 
man reacts, he reacts throughout the organism. "If he only 
raise s h is finger, or says the word 'red'," .his whole body 
is involved •1 Watson aims at a "unitary scheme of animal 
response. 112 The complete cycle of animal activity is 
brought within the circuit of stimulus and response. 
Another important consideration for Watson, as for all 
behaviorists, is that of method. If we are to render psycholo-
gy scientific, we must open its subject matter to the public 
gaze. This can be done only by applying to psychology, as 
to all other sciences, the objective method of observation. 
~fuat can be ob served in animal behavior falls within the 
re a lm of psychology; what can not be, and is b u t a ":private" 
experience in the so-called mind of the subject, shares the 
unreliability of introspection, and therefore, c an never 
become a part of our science. Consciousness and its contents 
can not b e observed, and are no legitimate part of the sub-
j ect. "The time s eems to have come when psychology must 
discard all reference to consciousnes s ; when it need no 
longer delude itself into thinking that it is making mental 
states the object of observation."3 Psychology can be 
~Psychology from the Standpoint of ~ Behaviorist, p. 48. 
3Behavior, p. 1. Ibid., p. ?. 
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defined as a "science of behavior" and we need "never go 
back on the defin i tion; never use the words consciousness, 
mental states, mind content, will, imagery, and the like. "1 
These are empty term~ for Watson, nor does he know anyone 
who "uses them consistently." This represents his most 
drastic iconoclasm. He does retain the old-fashioned terms 
"thinking" and 'memory "; the former, he identifies with 
implicit language reactions, and the latter with biological 
retentiveness. 
Personality is another interesting feature of Watson's 
psychology. After rejecting the mind as a psychological luxury, 
we wonder what import Watson could give to personality. He 
defines it as the biological organism, with its hereditary 
and acquired reactions integrating as a whole. "Personal-
ity is what we start with and what we live through."2 The 
bi ol ogi cal organism functions as a machine, though far more 
complex, with its linked formation of "interlacing systems" 
and "inter-dependent functions," wound up and ready to be 
sprung by the first stimulus that arrives. Watson would 
accept Descartes' notion of t he body as a "machine of clay" 
whose life and function can be understood by the mechanical 
movements of its parts. Descartes outstrips Watson only in 
his picturesque description of the flight of Diana, and her 
shy concealment among the reeds, or in his description of 
Neptune confronting her curious pursuer with a menacing 
~Ibid., p. 9. 
Psychology from the Standpo'int of a Behaviorist, p. 420. 
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trident. 
It is the claim of Watson that there are no conscious 
processes, and that we have fallen heir to them because we 
are overshadowed by an unhallowed metaphysics. There are 
two reasons for his desire to banish these psych ical mediariea: 
to avoid solipsism, and to simplify philosophy and insti-
tute a rapprochement .with science. The simplification of 
philosophy means its reduction to a monis t ic s·meme, whereby 
p sychology will be forever freed from a troublesome and 
qes pised dualism. If he can but eject consciousness, there 
will be left only the biological organism with its smooth 
running of physiologic a l mechanisms. 
The direct method of the elimination of consciousness is 
by t h e way of the substitution of bodily responses. 1Vatson 
exchanges consciousness for language reactions. His funda-
mental proposition is that thought results from the fol~a­
tion of word habits. By proper "conditioni ng," words come 
to be resp onded to in the same manner as the objects which 
t h ey ~· Vfue n the child is socialized, that is, forbidden 
to speak the wor d s aloud, he reduces them to a whisper; and 
when further penalized , he speaks t h em silently to himself. 
This "implicit b eha vi or" is "thi nking." Thought as identi-
fied with "implicit behavior" •s set in the integration of 
the org anism as a whole, "a constituent part of every ad-
justment process •••• It is not different in essence from 
tennis playing , swimming or any other overt activity except 
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that it is hidden from ordinary observation and is more com-
plex and at t h e s ame time more abbreviated so far as its 
parts are concerned than even the bravest of us could dream 
of."l These implicit processes, incipient muscular and 
glandul a r movements constitute "thinking" or sub-vocal 
talking, and are intensely operative even when the body as 
a whole is apparently quiet. In answer to Miss Washburn's 
question, Watson substitutes for Singer's "Passive Thinker" 
unobserved tremors of the laryngeal apparatus. For he says, 
111Nhen one seems to sit quite still , thinking , his mus cles 
are really as active and possibly more active than if he 
were playing tennis. n2 
Thought also has an objective si d e, which is called 
"explicit" and "laryngeal," involving the larynx and muscles 
of the neighboring parts, such a s the pharynx, palate, tongue, 
teeth, lips, and 11 speech muscles generally." The entire 
organisn is involved, of course, since the body is unit a ry; 
but certa in special parts are involved more than others. 
Watson, for the most part, thinks of the hidden processes 
as thought. Bawden st a tes the case more openly when he 
tells us that the "inner bodily beginning s" {Watson's im-
plicit processes) are of the same piece of behavior, which, 
in its overt form, may be ext ernally observed. · In short, 
the i n cipient movements, which c an not be observed except 
introspectively, and therefore, not at all for Watson, move 
1Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, p. 325. 
2Ibid., p. 15. 
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outward t~ the surface, where they can b e dealt with scienti-
fically. "Inside facts must first be made outside before 
they acquire the status of scientific data."l 
Every semblance of t h e psychical is converted int o im-
plicit and explicit bodily mov ements of some sort. The 
mental a nd physic a l , rath er than b eing two d istinct entities, 
merely represent the inner and outer limens of sensori-
motor action of the "minimum and maximum limi ts to which the 
sensori-motor activity may itself be reacted to or discrimi-
n a ted."2 Weiss reaches this con clusion in reply to a 
charg e that b ehaviorism is only the neural side of physio-
lo g ical psychology. This a pp a rentl y justi fies Lashley's 
sta tement that Weiss is a methodolo gic a l behaviorist, thoug h 
Weiss does a s similate t h e mental to the neural; and for that 
reas on is a behaviorist of the ext reme type. "For t h e behav-
iorist," Weiss s ays, "the mental series is regarded as only 
another neural series." Lashley is equally drastic, wh en he 
chides b ehaviorism for being so diffident a s to allow any 
vestig e of consciousnes s t o remain on the thre shold. He 
demands that the s ubject matter of psychology be brought 
w~thin the physic a l, ch emical, and physiological.3 Bawden 
also says that all proceeds in the same category, thoug h he 
does confess, "Whether t he principle shall be called material 
111 The Presuppositions of a Behaviorist," Psychological 
Revie·N, Volume XXV (1918). 
2"The Relation between Physiological Psy chology and 
Behavior Psychology ,": Weiss, Journal of Philosophy, Vol-
ume xgr (1922). · -- ~ 
"The Behavioristic Interpretation of Consciousness," 
Psychologi~~ Review, Volume XXX (1923). 
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or spiritual seems of less importance than the fact of the 
unity of all things to make up a universe. nl However .• he 
does, in fact, found all hi s conclusions upon a materialistic 
basis. 
(2) Metaphysical_ ImElication. The plain implication 
of this type of behaviorism is materialism. It is obvious 
that the behaviorists who have striven so hard for monism 
recognize but one principle; and that the materialistic, 
however strenuously they may disavow it. Lashley declares 
that behavi orism is not materialistic, only in so far as 
physics and physiology are materialistic. Doubtless physics 
is tending toward ideali sm, but the material "particle" 
is still retained. Even though Eddington2 may reduce materi-
al substance to an expansive series of energetic radiations 
(series of events), the material nature is retained with only 
a chang e of fonn. And though the nparticle;u were gone and 
only energy remained, it woul d still be physical energy as 
understood and applied by the average scientist. In Wat son's 
thinki ng , nature is nafvely r ealistic, all the external 
stimuli are purely physi cal, an d the r e sponses of the or-
g anism are physical. Mind has no place in the finite realm 
or in the cosmic order. Matter in motion is all the universe 
contains. It is called energetic behavior in the organism; 
it is energetic stimulation in the environment. Since both 
organism and environment belo ng in the same category, they 
111 The Presuppositions of a Behaviorist Psychology," 
Psychological Review, VolumeXXV (1918). 
· Zspace, Time, ~Gravitation. 
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constitute a completely materialistic world. Even Weiss' 
ultimate reduction of psychological phenomena to "electron-
proton confi gurations," that is, to "materials of t h e most 
objective sciences," does not deliver him from the charge 
of naturalism; but rather confirms it since he will not 
reli nquish his hold up on a uni v e r se of matte r in motion.l 
Even the prank~ of the nervous system (so fearful to Kantor) 
wh ich produce personal characteristics d o not prevent a 
strict naturalism. 
Materialism means a universe of matter in some f orm. 
There are varieties of ma teriali sm depending upon how matter 
is conceived. Philosophy bega n with t h e world of na ture 
wh ich l ay at hand to the sens es . It so ught a unifying 
pri n ci ple. For Thales, it was wa ter; for Anaximenes, it 
was a ir; fo r Heraclitus, it was fire; a n d for Democritus, 
it was atoms. For each, it was material, but even the 
te rm "material" has a history :~ Where once matter meant an 
undifferentiated ma ss, or "potentiality" awaiting t h e il-
luminat ion of mind , it was also conceived as atomic struc-
tures _of subst ance. Now the solid walls of substance have 
yielded to t h e dynami c flow of electronic and radiati ng 
energies. Matter is no longer a huge, s t atic mass, but it 
is a series of events in a vast system of ch ange. Matter 
has been refined more a nd mor e towa rd the ideal and mental 
until it is becoming customary to speak of the i d eal trend 
lA Theoretical Basis of Human Beha vior: Weiss. Re-
viewed-by Kantor, Journal of ~ilo SO£hl, Volume XXIV, Jan., 
192?. 
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of physics. Nevertheless, materialism regards matter in 
this refined form as the sole reality, and conceives of the 
universe as constituted of matter in motion in space and 
time operating mechanically under inexorable law. 
That Watson subscribes to t h is definition there can 
be no doubt. While he would accept the conclusion of modern 
physics that matter is energy or can be transformed into 
energy , he certainly would not accept the conclusion of 
Eddington: "Mind filters out matter from the meaningless 
jumble of qualities, as the prism filters out the colors of 
the r a inbow from the chaotic pulsations of white light •••• 
The conclusion is that the whole of those laws of nature 
which have been woven into a unified scheme--mechanics, 
gravitation, electro-dynamics and optics--have their origin, 
not in any special mechanism of· nature, but in the working s 
of the mind. nl Mind ignores the transitory and s eeks the 
p ermanent, and so selects "matter" a s the ideally permanent 
subst ance distributed in space and time and subject to the 
laws of mechanics, geometry, an d gravitation. The mind 's 
search for the permanent has creat e d physics. That mind has 
const·ituted "matter" and writ t en its laws therein is a· 
co n ception re p ugnant to Watson, for it savors of metaphysics. 
For Watson, the world is a mechani~m; and each biological 
organism is a machine mechanically responding to mechanical 
stimuli with no intrusion of c.onsciousness whatsoever. 
1 sermons of a Chemist: Slosson, p. 21?. Q,uoted from 
Space, Time, and Gravitation: Eddington. 
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Though he attempts to shun metaphysics, Watson presents us 
with a full-orbed philosophy of the universe--a philosophy 
which merits the name of the philosophy of a Hobbes or La 
Mettrie, a philosophy of materialism. 
{3) Criticism and Evaluation. Behaviorism is not 
without merit. Its insistence upon the method of objective 
observation is a strenuous attempt to become scientific. 
It intends to bring all the f a cts with which it deals """i thin 
the range of scientific observation, and therefore within 
the range of all investigators. The subject matter must be 
common to all. It is not to be concealed within the private 
thought of any sin gle individual. It must suffer neither 
the shifting of thought nor the defect of linguistic utter-
ance. It must not be subject to the unreliability of soli-
tary interpreta tion. It must lie open and exposed to the 
eyes of all gazers--the public ~roperty of a vast array of 
inquirers. Behaviorism lends fresh impulse to the method 
of observation and experimentation which h a s yielded such 
splendid results in comparative and human psy c h ology. 
Behaviorism escapes the difficulties of the mind-body 
problem by r e solving it into a purely body- problem. The 
outstanding theories concerning the relation of the mind to 
the body, wlnch have sprung up along the course of psycho-
logical development, have proved distasteful to great 
numbers. With a gesture, behaviorism sets them all aside 
with the insoluble problem~ (as they think) that are inevi ta-
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bly attached to them. This is an eaay way out of the diffi-
culties, provided no violence is done to the facts. Above 
all, behaviorism seems to escape the most difficult problem 
of all, namely, that of consciousne ss itself. A mechanism 
runs smoothly until some "spooky" intrusion from the "super-
natural" realm is thrust within the cogs of natural causation. 
Then all is confusion and disorder. There can be no com-
prehension of our world until all forms of the s pirit and 
mental vanish like "fluttering forms of vapor." Behaviorism 
promis·es to substitute for the s e 11ej ects," "myths," and 
"mysteries" a solid, explicable o rganism which stands forth 
before the clear gaze of all ro b ed with its natura l powers, 
a..11d res p ondi ng as a total unit to definite, material stimuli 
which may be predicted and controlled. Biological function-
alism is an attemp t at synthesis, and it represents a dis-
tinct advance beyond sensationalism. It is to be commended 
for wh at it includes, but it must be criti cis ed for its 
omission of the facts of consciousness with which our world-
building must begin and end. 
Let us consider the difficulties that are attached to 
the vie,.!Vpoint of the extreme behaviorist. First of all, 
Watson finds it difficult to identify consciousness 
and bodily action. He speaks of thoughts issuing into action 
as though action were not thought, b u t its expression. 1 
Again, thought is not "transcendent al" but "immanent," a 
1Psychology from ~ Standpoint of ~ Behaviorist, p. 327. 
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"constituting part of bodily organization and integration. ttl 
Possibly in this instance, thought might be a distinct reali-
ty, tho u.gh immanent in the bodily activity. Especially does 
'ilatson seem to distinguish "purpose" from mere physical action 
in his statement, "When we study implicit bodily processes 
we are studying thought; just as when we study the way a 
golfer stands in addressing his ball and swinging his club 
we are studying g olf. n2 The behavior is not thought and 
])Urpose, but it reveals thought and purpose. Unless Watson 
has chosen an ill-fitting simile, he means we are studying 
"thought," not when We are studying bodily movements; but 
when we are studying bodily movements set to a certain task. 
Bodily movements in swinging an axe instead of a golf club--
movement employed to cut down a . tree for railroad ties or 
winter wood, reveal the "thought n of another task. No revela-
tion could come directly by observing the bodily movements, 
but it could come only by inference based upon the past ob-
servation of a similar game or l abor. Purp ose then need 
not be identified with the behavior, but it may be expressed 
through the behavior. If this interpretation of Watson 
at t h is point is permissi ble, he approaches Singer's view 
that mind can be measured by what it does. Of course, both 
mean to identify the "expression" and the nnature.". How-
ever, this question of identification is the real point 
under dispute. 
~Ibid., p. 326. 
Ibid . , p • 3 26 • 
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It seems that Watson has touched upon the behavio r istic 
notion of purpose, though he is rel uctant to employ the te~~ 
even in its emasculated form. A further proof that Watson 
favors purpose may be found in the unction with which he 
greets Holt's conception of purpos~ve behavior as elaborated 
in his Freudian Wish, especially in his illustration of the 
man purchasing a railway ticket, etc. But only upon the 
as sumption of an "observer" who draws the inference, could we 
ever conclude as to the thought or p urpose involved in a ny 
bodily a ction. If purpose, in any sense of the word, is to 
be all owed here, it is only because s orne "conscious observer" 
reads the purp ose int o the action. In this instance, Watson 
himself is the conscious observer. 
Though Watson would be reluctant to admit it, he con-
s t antly assumes the role of a con sc ious observer. If Watson 
himself is a con s cious observer, he must admit that other 
investigators are also conscious observers. Therefore , con-
sciousness exists in finite h uman being s at least. But t h is 
conclu sion controverts Watson's fund amenta l proposition that 
consciousness does not exi st. 
On the other hand, if we take Watson as he intends, 
consciousness does not exist. There is only the physical 
organi sm set in its realistic environment. The first funda-
mental f act that the behaviorist accepts is that he himself 
is an organ ism. The second is tha t the re is an environment 
that stimul a tes the organism. And final-ly,, t h e organism 
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thinks of, perceives, and observes objects in that environ-
ment. How does the organism accomplish this? He does it 
by muscular movements in the larynx and neighboring parts •. 
But if thinking is only muscular movements in the throat, 
"thinking" must be confined to the throat of the thinker. 
How then could his thinking reach objects external to the 
. ? organ1sm. Muscular movements and thinking can not be described 
in the same terms; for the former are confined to an ind.i vi-
dual organism, the latter refers to objects outside of the 
organism. No detailed account of the size, shap e, o.r 
number of muscular movements in the larynx is comparable to 
the description of the thought of Hannibal crossing the Alps 
or of what is likely to be our social and financial status 
twenty years hence. To know the objects of environment which 
exist before their perception is certainly no t equivalent 
to dis placed and shifting molecules of the larynx. 
Moreover, Watson has no ground for say i ng that there 
a r e muscular movements in the larynx at all. Even if 
observation were reli able , he could speak only of mus cular 
movements in the l arynx of some other organ ism , for ob serva-
tion is ob,iecti~. He can not observe his own larynx. He 
can not observe even his own "overt" behavior, some other 
observer must do that. Unless Watson is conscious of "im-
plicit behavior" he h a s no re ason for cl a imi ng it at all. 
13ut con s ciousness of the muscular movements is a fact distinct 
fr om the movements themselves. Without the admission of 
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the fact of consciousness , Watson has no right to distinguish 
between "overt" and "implicit" behavior. Watson does make 
this distinction in his contribution to the "Oxford" dis-
cussion when he s ays, "The subject himself could observe 
during the apparently immobile period that he used words and 
sentences."1 "Observing" or thinking is the movement of the 
l a rynx. Uttering words and sentences is the same movement 
of the l arynx. We should have the movements of the l arynx 
observing themselves move which is a highly grotesque if 
not an impo ssible performance. No unity or multiplicity 
of language mechanisms could amount to thought or perception. 
Therefore, behaviorism ends in total ignorance of both en-
virorunent and organism. Despite his boasted power to explain 
all the f ac ts of convent ional psychology by behavioristic 
principles, the behaviorist can not explain his o~m propo-
sitions with all his cherished tenets. 
Furthermore, a little reflection will reveal to us the 
flaw in the genesis of thought through l anguage mec h anisms . 
A most extreme and questionable proposal concer ning "thought" 
is that it is a n external importation through the medium of 
explicit language habits. The g enesis of explicit and im-
plicit language h~bits and their re1 a ti on. to thought consti-
tute one of the most interesting features of Watson's dis-
cussion. A;fter consciousness is abandoned, it is interest-
ing to note how "th inking " and "memory " continue to operate. 
1
"Psychology as a Behaviorist Views it," Psycholo~ical 
Review . (191~). p. 174. 
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Habits are built upon original reflexes, as are instincts 
also. The difference is due altogeth er to the fact that the 
stimulus has changed from internal to environmental. It 
is a question how instincts, being hereditary, can operate 
after birth, if they differ from habits only in regard to 
their stimulus. They could not be said to operate after 
experience begins in the envirom1ent, that is, after birth 
because they are habits then. But most of the instincts 
have not yet begun to oper ate soon after birth. There is an 
alternative. We may say that instincts and habits are iden-
tical, since they are "undoubtedly composed of the same ele-
mentary reflexes. 111 Both are equally affected by environ-
ment. Watson justifies his conclusion by his own confession, 
"It would follow from this definition that so far as the 
observance of a single adult performance is concerned we 
should not be able to tell an instinct from a habit."2 By 
reverting to the genetic method, 1Vatson has not made clear 
b ow any distinction between habit and instinct can be made. 
Moreover, the method of observation, which is the only reli-
able metho d , does not see the difference. With instinct 
and habit identified, we are forced to the proposition that 
habits are original reflexes modified . by experience. There-
fore, there are no habits; there are only original reflexes, 
and reflexes modified (the same ones) in experience. By 
this time, we begin to see the utter mechanical nature of the 
~Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, p. 27 2. 
Ibid., p. 273. 
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procedure that would construct, by subst i tution, through 
conditioned reflex, explicit habits, and then t urn them 
back into the integrations of the organism as "implicit pro-
ceses" whic l! are to be identified with thought. 
Language habits arise out of bodily habits, and these 
arise out of ori ginal reflexes. Therefore, language habits 
should be identified with ori ginal reflexes, and the child 
would be expected to talk a t birth because ori ginal reflexes 
are opera tive then. At any rate, language habits are to 
b e i dentified with "ori g inal reflexes modified by experience." 
With t h is concl u sion Watso n agrees; for he says that earl y 
"word h ab its 11 begin instinctively 1 ike bodil y habits, 
except that imitation plays a greater part. The c h ild 
utters some instinctive sound somewhat like the articulated 
speech of the parents, who in ' turn utter the word nearest 
like the vocalization of the child; thus modifying the vocal 
mechanism of the chil d until, through repeated effort, the 
child bears more or less the accents of the parents. Three 
children, ranging from two and a half, to four, and eight 
years of age, rush int o the house to attract mother's atten-
tion to some interest ing event outside, by exclaiming resp ect-
ively, "Dock~," "Wook!," and "Lool~ ." These exclamations may 
be said to represent t h e respectiv e stages of development of 
their language habits with the degre e of modification wi thin 
this period of years. These language habits are integ rated 
with the muscular ·and glandular a ctivities of "arm, hand and 
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leg," and are substituted for them. 
Briefly, this means that after the child has learned 
from the parent or nurse the name of its toy dog, which it 
calls "goggie," it continues to use the word, as s oci a ting 
it . with the bodily movements to which it is accustomed , when 
handling the toy. Should the "goggie 11 b e beyond reach, the 
child enunciates the name vigorc:msly. The channel of action 
that ordinarily streams through hand, arm, and leg movements, 
now moves to the surface through larynx, lips, teeth, etc., 
in the form of the spoken word. This is the g e nesis of a 
true explicit language habit. These overt language h abits 
are rapidly multi p lied; they are g r adually subdued to a whis per; 
and they a re finally integ rated with bodily movements in the 
form of implic it language h abits which constitute thought. 
Thought does not rise subjectively, but is imported ready-
made from the looms of social custom. It bears no i mpress of 
the thinker 's personality. This round about me thod through 
the social and back to the implicit processes seems needless, 
since the implicit processes are assumed as instinc~ive at 
the outset. If they are instinctive, and hel p to create 
explicit language habits, then, thought is prior to langua0 e, 
and can not be identified with it. If thought is the out-
come of language habits, then, the behavior of the child prior 
to i ·t 's . fo rmation of expli,cit language h abits, is without 
thought; for the child behaves before it thinks. 1 f it 
behaves before it thinks, that is, before it talks, behavior 
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can not be identified with thought. 
Much of the behavior of the child before it arrives at 
the stage of explicit language habits indicates that it some-
how understands what it is about. At fifteen months, the child 
picks up its father's rubbers, when he takes them off; it 
carries them across the room to a door opposite leading into 
another room; it turns about and looks at the f;:;.ther, who 
remains at the other side of the room. The child is rest-
less, and utters a vocalization (not a word) like "Ugh." 
The father walks to the door, opens it, and the child throws 
the rubber s into the other room a nd seems satisfied. The 
child seemeS to understand what it .is: a bout, and how? 
Watson wo uld say, "by association the rubbers somehow got 
tied up with the activities of the body." How easily he 
glides right over the whole problem, with the apparent inno-
cence of a child, not even suspecting that a problem exists. 
What can association mean apart from some element of con s cious-
ness? Do the rubbers associate themselves with the acti.vi-
ties of the body? Or does the bod y , stripped of all conscious 
elements, associate itself with the rubbers? Or does associa-
tion associate itself with the rubbers or the rubbers with 
t he body? Watson might say that the child saw the rub b ers, 
the.t is, received a stimulus, and by habitual reactions 
under like conditions immediately performed the act. But 
this was the first time the child performed the act. Then 
he did it by imitation of the father's act by association. 
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But Wats on would have yet to explain h ow a father's habit 
can work in a ch ild bereft of any conscious con t ent. He 
must explain how a habit of one person can be bodily trans-
ferred to another person and be in g ood running order immedi-
ately. Imitation and association are empty terms dissociated 
from one wh o associates and imitates. 
Watson's conditioned r e flex (borrowed from Pavlow), 
whic b provides a basis for h abit, depends upon a substituted 
s timulus that c an not be operat ed wi thout consi derabl e in-
telligence, e specially on t he part of the experi menter. 
Is educat i on and learning so unnatural that nature must be 
lead f r om her true path? His entire learning process, which 
'1Jatson regards as t h e chief problem of psy chology, i s bui lt 
upon a system of substitution which presupposes t h e ope r at ion 
of t h e psy c h ical an e x te nd e d period before the format ion of 
language habits. The child develops quite an extens i ve set 
of me anings before it can t a lk at all. A chil d under 
s ixteen mon ths was told to look into a mi rror as it stood 
with its back to t he mirror. It turned and looke d int o the 
mirror as though it understood the command. It was told to 
place its hand on it s f o.ce; it did so repeatedly as though . 
. 
it understood it was to do that s pecific thing and not 
something else. It was in the kitchen and was told to g o 
into t he living-room and g et into a big chair, and it did so 
without being accompanied or further directed. ,,'Iatson himself 
s&.ys, "If we examine the bodily h Bbits of any child just 
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prior to the beginning of true languag e habits, we find that 
it can r e spond appropriately t6 hundreds of objects and sit-
uations, for example, to its doll, bottle, blocks, rattle, 
and many other things. nl We can not imagine a child doing 
all these things and doing them appropriately with out the 
exercise of conscious activities, without the presence of 
something we call ment al. Could it do all these things 
blind-folded or unconscious? Must the ch ild not perceive 
before it acts? Besides, if it does all these things before 
it talks, it behaves without thought. Hence, thought is 
not behavior. 
Professor Otis expres s es his a s tonishment that one 
should dispense with such concepts as perception, attention , 
will, etc.2 He shows conclusively that much thought is 
carried on wi t hout expression throug h langu ag e mechcmisms 
at all, but is done quietly without re aching the stag e of 
enunciation. "Meaning mc::.y e x ist entirely independent and 
ap art from any utteranc e, 11 he says. The meaning of a "sun-
set," an exa lted s piritual mood, some sacre d joy, we may 
never be fully able to fr am e i nto speech. No amount of 
"sub-vocal" talking will enable us to underst and a problem 
b eyond our depth; yet our appreciations often overflow the 
bounds of langu age. Langu ag e is only symbolic, wh ile me aning 
spring s from int elli gible experience. Wha t we c all "red" 
would be the same conscious impression whether we call it 
1 Psychology from the . Standpoint of a Behaviorist, p. 319. 
2iino We Think in Words?" Psycholo gical Review, Volume 
XXV I I ( 1 9 20 ) • 
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red or green or blue. 
Mi s s Calkins points out the fact that the same stimuli 
may call out different res p onses.l If one should stimulate 
the retina of a Frencr.ill1an, GE?rman, and lm1eri can with 
monochromatic light from 586mm to 535mm, the reaction would 
be, r e spectively, "j a une, 11 "gelb," and "yellow, 11 each enun-
ciation involving a different set of "implicit p r ocesses"; 
yet we c an not assume tha t the sensation is different in 
each c ase . Nor can we think that the "thought" is chang ed 
with the linguisti c form. Hence, thought and langua ge can 
not be identified. 
Muscio has shown with a good deal of force the incon-
elusiveness of Watson's attempt to identify thought and 
implicit language h abits. Its success rests upon the sub-
stitution of speech movements for other bodily behavior. 
Such substitution is carried out on the principle of the 
"conditioned r e fle x ." The behaviorist does not insist t hat 
t he s ubs titution s hall ne c essarily involve the speech mus-
cles, but that it may b e any substitution of one set of 
muscular"ac tivities for another. Accordingly, Muscio has 
offered a para llel to Watson 's proposition by substituting 
the activities of the left leg for those of the right a s 
geQerated by the conditioned reflex method. The beha viorist 
must admit that his formula of substitution is faulty or 
that the movement of the left leg is a case of thought. 
111 The Truly Psycholo gical Behaviorism, 11 Psychological 
Review, Volume XXVIII (1921). 
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Indeed, there is no more reason why thought should be located 
in the laryngeal regiQn than in the left leg or the sole of 
the foot. But even Watson would be slow to identify the 
movements of the leg with thought . But, as Muscio says, the 
latter alternative is not acceptable because "We are ac-
quainted with thinking, experiencing it as directly as we 
ever experience muscle-movement; and when we compa re what we 
are acquainted with as thou ght with what we are acquainted 
with as muscle movement substitution, we see that the two 
are not identical, no more identical than the muscle move-
ment of the ri gh t fore-arm flexor and the left thigh abduc-
tor."l In each case, the evidence is gathered from direct 
experience. The behaviorist rests his claim on the reality 
of museular substitution, and carries substitution into a 
realm where it does not occur. He says, for example, if 
one t h ink s of putting on his hat there is substitution; but 
there is no evidence of muscular movement in my right arm, 
which would execute the act of putting on the hat. One may 
think of :putting his hat on, but make no move to do so. 
To consider the prob able rise of language among primitive 
peoples will seriously und ermine Watson's view of the genesis 
of l anguage habits. If it be true that we began, not with a 
highly developed language, but with simple symbols of commun-
ication, how could the primitive race ever rise above its 
first language forms? From whom would the children hear 
1
"Psychology as Behaviorism," Monist, Volume XXXI 
(1921), pp . 182-203. 
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elegant speech? WhiJ.e it is true that we learn to speak 
the environment a l language, it is not true that we get 
ready-made from the enviromnent the ability to speak. 
If spee~ing words rests entirely upon hearing them in the 
environment, then the master's dog would soon learn to swear. 
But this is not confirmed by our observation. 
Mo reover, Watson claims that his theory of thought is 
the only reliable one because it is scientific. When we 
look for evidence for this view, there is very little, if 
any, forthcoming. Watson admits that the identification 
of thought with "implicit processes" is "larg ely an assump-
tion.111 It is true that all scientific discoveries have 
issued from assumptions, but an assumption backed by lit tle 
or no evidence is greatly weakened, if it does not fall t o 
the gro und entirely. "The e xperimental evidence for this 
view is slight, 11 2 says Watson. Besides, when we attempt 
to collect the data of b ehavioristic psychology, they are 
all out of sight, except the tongue and laryngeal movements. 
Evidence for the existence of these is negative and incon-
elusive. For when experime nters have attached t amb ours to 
the neck, and have "set their subjects such problems as silent 
reading and sub-vocal arithmetic or the recall of a poem 
learned in childhood," they · found the proces s es "so evanescent " 
that they really made no discovery at all concerning the 
identification of thought and language. Moreover, these 
~Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, p. 326. 
Ibid., p. 326. 
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"implicit processes" occur, if at all, in a mysterious realm, 
the manner of which r.~at son is not "brave enough to dream 
of." But we must not carry scientific assurance beyond the 
frontiers of mystery. The behaviorist adheres to the ob-
jective vievvpoint exclusively. He can observe explicit 
behavior only. Bu t thou gh t is implicit behavior. The ob-
jective method so far has yielded no t angible results. 
Therefore, we can not resort to the scientific support of 
· behaviorism. It stands upon the questionable observa tion 
"that orderly movements similar to tho·se in speaking are 
found."l . But often these "fail to appear, 11 even when all the 
scientific conditions a r e fulfilled. The "processes are so 
evanescent and sli p from one motor region into another so 
r e,pid ly" that only negative results obtain • . Thus Watson, 
wh o so t h oroughly scorns the metaphysic al assumptions and 
theories of conventional psychology, is found at last stand-
ing squarely upon a lowly and despised assumption. It would 
not be unfair to say that there is not a single shred of 
positive evidence in supp ort of this particu~ar view accord-
ing to Watson's own representations. 
Since other behavioris t s borrow rather heavily from 
Watson or rally lustily to his support, these admissions 
weaken, if they do not altogether destroy, the entire struc-
ture of behaviorism as espoused by its many advocates. Bven 
if, by more delicate and exact instruments, it could be 
1Psychology from the Standpoint of ~ Behaviorist, p. 326. 
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established that for every explicit process t h ere is a cor-
responding implicit process, it would n ot necessarily be 
prove d that t h ought is identical with implicit processes. 
It would prove only that explicit processes begin before they 
end, that is, begin in implicit processes, and that these 
are more remote than the expli c it. They must work thems elves 
out to the surfa ce by a spread through the orga nism or 
through the particular organs they a ffect. From the view-
point of the organism as compl et ely phys ical, such discov-
ery would be no more signJ ficant than to ferret out all the 
roots of the incipient muscular and glandular activities that 
start and support a sneez e . After the full discovery by 
observation, we should have to pr ove that sneezing is think-
ing. Likewise ,must we prove that implicit processes are 
think ing . However, if we start wi th the assumption that 
t h ought is not identical with the physical, such discovery 
would prove that all thinking involves the physical activi-
ties because the mental and physical aspects constitute the 
complete organism. Yet thinking is not identical with the 
physical activities because it involves them. 
If little plausibility attaches to the behavioristic 
doctrine of mind as the immedi a te response of the organism to 
the stimulating environment , its difficulties mount when we 
consider a delayed reaction. If a response is immediate, 
it seems to be the r e sult of a present stimulus; but if it 
is delayed for hours or days, the stimulus and response lie 
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too far apart--some links are lost from the chain. The be-
haviorist has not made clear what has transpired in the in-
terim. He has left a hiatus, which needs to be filled. At 
this point, Angell took exception and demanded that in-
trospection be employed to account for what occurs in the 
gap. One gets scolded, and laughs at the time, but in 
thinking it over he grows angry, returns, and demands a 
settlement. Such an experience, the behaviorist has not 
explained. Nor does he explain the situation, when a 
response is in the process of execution; but is checked and 
another course is taken. It is strange that Watson should 
cite the work of Angell and Fernald to buttress his courage 
that he might dismiss imagery from psychology altogether.l 
Squarely in the way of behaviorism, to obstruct its 
advance, lies the "ima ge." To surmount this difficulty of 
"centrally aroused" products, Watson substitutes kinaesthetic 
movements. "If thoughts go on in tenns of centrally aroused 
sensation, as is maintained by the majority of both structural 
and functional psychologists, we should have to admit that 
there is a serious limitation on the side of method in 
behaviorism. 112 Cattell admonishes behaviorists to include 
"image" in their scheme; but Watson sees that the inclusion 
of the image will weaken the whole structure, and so casts it 
out deliberately and decisively. 
Watson's illustration is worth repeating here. Some 
1 Behavior, p. 18. 
2 Ibid., p. 16. 
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one suggests that you borrow ~ $1000 and go abroad for a 
year. You think over the situation and are in a brown 
study for days to decide. "The train of thoughts going on 
in your mind according to the upholders of the image, has 
no adequate behavior counterpart while it is in transit," 
says Watson. But the behaviorist sees that you have lost 
appetite and are smoking and drinki ng more than usual. Ex-
perimental tests might disclose bodily weakness, lack of 
coordination, etc. But the introspectionist says these 
tests can not get to the secret mental content and tell whether 
one is grieving over his sins or trying to reach a decision. 
"If we grant this," says Watson, "and the impulse is very 
strong (he is almost persuaded here), the behaviorist must 
content himself with this reflection: I care not what goes 
on in his mi nd; the important thing is, given the stimula-
tion (the suggestion of a friend) it must produce a response 
or modify responses already initiated. This is the all-
important thing and I will be content with it. Ill Watson 
cares only for what goes on in the open, that is, the stim-
ulation and the reaction. He does not know what goes on in 
the interim, as in case of the chewing-gum machine at the 
railway station, where we may observe the penny put in and 
later the gum come out; but we know not what tru{es place 
within the machine. Watson will con cede no thought i n the 
form of an image, and no conscious content in form of 
1
rbid., p. 17. 
144 
affective st a tes. 
The full import of Watson's humor is not ~cr-J:-.sclosed 
until we descend to the footnotel where he says, "There 
/ 
I 
a re p r obably in most cases kinae s thetic substitutes for 
imagery. " "Concurr ently with t h e faintly articul a ted word 
'apple' there arise associ a ted kinaesth etic i mpulses in 
eye muscles," whic h give ri s e to t h e fiction of verbal i m-
agery. How the articulation of the word "apple," faintly 
or otherwise, could affect t h e eye muscles would require 
for e x:planati on more even than the ingenuity of Watson can 
provide . Watson does grant a fe w i mages, however. For he 
says, " I may h a ve to grant a few spora dic cas e s of i mage ry 
to hi m who will no t be otherwi s e con vinc ed, but I insis t 
that t he i mages of such a one are sporadic, and as unneces-
s a r y to his well-being and well- t hinking as a f ew hairs more 
or less on his head. n2 Here Watson seems to hav e come to 
a sudden r eal i zation of the e x tremity of his position, which 
n ow vents itself in an a ppropriate burst of frivolity. 
McDoug all would call Watso n 's p r ocedure here a n i n s t ance of 
the mytholog y of kinaesthetic sensations , which h a s been 
entirely overworked by t h e behaviorists. We may find solid 
reason for the rejection of t h is t h eory from the fact that 
Stratton showed, by photo g raphs of the eye movements d u rin g 
perception, that the movements sustain little correlation 
eithe r to the shapes of geometrical figures or to the n a ture 
1Eehavior, p. 18. 
2nrmage and Affection in Behavior," J"o u rnal of Philoso-
~. Volume X (1913). 
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of illusions. McDougall has shown the same thing in his 
study of the reversible perspective. 
Despite the f a ct that Watson has ruled out the "image, 11 
he retains the old-fashioned word "memory" which means that 
bodily habits, once regnant but now quiescent, will be re-
instated with "undesirable additions" (errors). But Watson 
does not make clear in what form the retention is realized. 
Since his major conception treats of muscles and glands, these 
habits must somehow be retained in the muscles and glands. 
Are the "habits" things in addition to muscles and glands? 
How are they related to the muscles and glands? If we should 
cut into the structures, wo u~d we find the habits concealed 
there? If so, when they are reinstated, would they not be 
in the ori ginaJ form wi thout "undesirable additions" (errors)? 
When we recall a s t anza .of poetry, how could the old habit 
make known to· the ~ one that the poem now being repeated 
is the same poem which had been formerly learned? If one 
habit can pass its content on to the next, it must be endowed 
with the intelli g ence of a person. :Memory can never be 
deduced from material particles in motion. 
Nor does it improve the situation when Watson defines 
memory as a "habit-function" retained as a part of the indi-
vidual's organization. Much of our ignorance is concealed 
by the word "function." We say that breathing is a "function 11 
of the lung s. Bu t what reality is there besides the lungs 
breathing? Is there a 11function" in addition to the lung s, 
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which is retained in the lungs as they breathe? There should 
then be a ''function" retained for every sort of stimulus. 
Therefore, the muscles and gl ands are full of extra enti-
ties (function). But the s e carry Watson outside of the 
real, for there are no extra entities beyond the bounds of 
the physical organism. "Expl icit bodily habits, e xplicit 
word habits, i mplicit word habits," if considered anything 
more than muscles and glands a cting in specific ways, are 
subject to the same strt.cture as "function," which is a thin 
substitute for them. 
Watson's view of the retention of "function" will take 
the form of modifications of the organism as represented by 
the advocates of organic memory. But the same difficulties 
must be met in this view. Modifications mean chang e if they 
mean anything. Therefore the organism, after modification, 
would not be identical with the organism as it was before the 
modification; and so the unity of the organism would be lost. 
What ground is there for this modified organism to resp ond 
in precisely the same way to the same situation as the differ-
entl y modified organism responded? To make sure of stead-
f gs t responses to the same stimuli, we demand the same iden-
tical organism. Moreove r, how could a changed organism 
recognize an event, which occurred in the organi sm before 
it was changed; and, especially, how could it recognize it 
as its own experience? Can modifications recognize on e 
"! 
another? Can a physical modification in a muscle or gland 
14? 
or any combination of them recall an event 1 ong since g one? 
Or can it plan to build a house, or perform the preliminary 
imaginativ.e work essential for some invention or creative 
piece of literature? If modifications possess such powers, 
they might well be called a succession of selves. If we are 
to secure unity of experience by means of the impressions or 
tracks or pathways which are actually made in pe rm eable 
matter, bow can we bring the separate modifications together 
so they might know one another? If a track is made in the 
nervous system today, on this theory, we must assume tha t an 
experi ence or stimulus tomorrow, which is supposed to arouse 
the track, actually makes a new track. If we do not assume 
this, then all experience doe s not make tracks, but t his is 
contrary to the theory. If it does make a track, it is a 
new one. And unless we identify the new one with the old 
one, there could be no unity of the experience of today and 
yesterday. If the identifica tion of the t wo were thinLable, 
we should have only one experience. It would still be a 
question of which one, today's or yesterday's. Moreover, 
there could be no experience or knowledge arising from crevices 
in the nerves because the nervous system, v.ri thout conscious-
n ess, is but dumb, blind matter like grass-blade or tree. 
Besides, when we revive an old impression by placing a new 
one down upon it, why do we not revive all of the old, that 
is, why do we forget so much and revive only here and there 
along the s tretches of the tracks? And why does the old 
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reaction rise with "undesirable additions" (errors)? 
There seems to be no solution to the problem so long a s 
we blot out consciousness by identifying it with the activi-
ties of t he physical organism. A conscious person can never 
be formed f rom the ma terial elements. If these, mechanically, 
produce effects, they could never be more than a s u1n ; they 
could never be a unity, certainly not a conscious unity. 
Brain atoms in motion, upon which this theory is based, are 
but conscious creations. Shall we employ the product of 
consciousness to rule consc iousness out? I f there are 
molecular movements i n the bra in, it seems that the b rain 
having them would k now of them most cert ainly and 'direc t ly. 
But·the behaviorist finds a more reliable way to the dis-
covery through the experience of an outside obse rver . He 
forgets th~t an outside observer is fully conscious. If 
the behaviorist, as a..n outside ob server, is conscious, ·why 
deny consciousness to the introspectionist? A succession 
of molecules in perpetua l motion could produce only suc-
cessive effects; it could not produce the exp erience of unity 
and succession. Memory is possible only on the assumption of 
a consci ous person who can identify his successive experi-
ences as belonging to himself; and who can dist inguish and 
compare the particul a r experienc e s, and relate them in a 
rational whole. 
Behaviorism denies the fact of consciousness which 
makes all psychologizing, even b ehaviorism itself, possible. 
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It makes no provision for the unity of personal experience. 
The organism can possess no sense of orientation, no power 
of initiation or selection; but it is at the mercy of the 
specific stimuli that throng the sense organs. There can be 
no unity among the stimuli, for we never can be sure what 
stimuli may affect us next. Therefore, th~re can be no unity 
of resr)onse, fo r the response is me chanically governed by the 
stimuli. Contrary to Wat _son, the body does not act as a 
whole; but it operates mechanically in a succession of 
sectional bodily acts each provoked by disconnected, chance 
stimuli. Therefore, there is no unity in the separate bodily 
acts; and, certainly, there is no c ausal connection among 
them because they do not depend upon one another, but they 
depend up on the character of the stimulation. We encounter 
the same objection here as inHume's succession of sensat ions, 
and as in James' succession of consciou s states. In nei tber 
case could there be any consciousness of succession. In 
.Watson, we have a succession of bodily acts instead of sen~ 
sa t ions or cons cious st a tes; but the same principle is at 
stake--the p rinciple of unity. There is no bond of union 
between the several acts, and therefore no explanation of 
how or why we behave as we do. 
The method of introspection is especially obnoxious 
to the thorough- going b ehaviorist. Bawden begins charitably, 
but en ds by positing an order of existence in which the ground 
of introspection f a lls away logically. Lashley wel come s the 
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data of introspective psychology only to cast them out b e-
cause they do not conforftl to the physiological categ ory. 
With intros pection gone, Watson's "verbal report method" 
would scarcely be reliable; for it depends upon the inter-
pretation of the subject. Besides, if there is no introspec-
tion there is no direct access to reality. 
The behaviorists and scientists in general overlook 
the fac t that every observa tion is t h e observation of some 
one pe r son. The observation is al ways pri vate and personal. 
A community of understanding n ust be established by means 
of a system of descriptive symbols. The facts of rny con-
sciousness and yours ma y be understood through the descrip-
tive medium. There is perhap s mor e liability to error in the 
description and exchange of mental facts than in physical; 
but the physical sci e nces often disclose variation and 
mistak es. If we can not trust ou r retrospection, we can not 
see how the b ehaviorist can speruc so confidently of objects 
to whic h he is not now r e s p onding, that is, that ar e already 
past or included in an anticipated future. The stimulus to 
th~ p ast act is no long er pre s ent. Hence, if we respond to 
the p as t, it must be without a stimulus unless it be a 
thought-stimulus, which 1.1!/atso n , of course, would not admit. 
Or, how could one res p ond to an invention, which h a s, a s yet , 
n ot been realized exce p t i n mind? If the behaviorist will 
not admit a thought-stimulus (and he will not), he can not 
say that an inventor can invent because there is no stimulus 
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anywhere in the universe to which he can respond. 
Watson's theory becomes plausible only be caus e he, 
himself, unwittingl y, becomes the conscious observer. Cast-
ing out introspecti on , he turns introspectionist. He even 
surpasses the conventional psychologist. For by his intro-
spective imagination, he posits "implicit processes" beyond 
the scope of scalpel, lens, and tmnbour. He even estab-
1 i shes a world of real movements bey ond the edge of dreams. 
Are these movement s in a vacuum? And, are they movements 
of muscles and glands of euch nature that Wats on is unable 
to conceive, that is, beyond his dreams? What sort of 
physical movements in the body can he identify with 11 impli-
cit processes" (thought ), which have, up to date, remained 
unobserved? Can a psychology of observation be based upon 
unobserved movements? Can physical movements imagine, as 
Watson does, and that without images? Can Watson's organism, 
which is mere physical movement posit a world of re ality 
beyond the imagination to conceive? Where will the fulcrum 
of the stimulus lie? Watson's method of observation has 
stretched far beyond the objective, discoverable world; for 
his psycholo gy rests upo n imagination and what lies beyond 
it. If it rests upon t h e unobserved, h ow can it be called 
scientific? If it does not rest upon the obj e ctivel y up -
observed, that is, the mental, how can it be called psychology? 
Roback is justified in choosing the title of his book, 
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Psycholo§;z §E.9_ Behavioris~· , as though the terms represent 
separate treatments. In an unwarranted endeavor to become 
scientific, the behaviorist has ceased to be psychologi cal. 
c. The Behaviorism of John Dewey. The story of meta-
physical behaviorism would not be complete without further 
reference to the phil osophy of Dewey. Philosophic a lly, Dewey 
is all things to ali men. He provides a stimulus for every 
philosophic creed. Santayana calls Dewey 's metaphysics "Half-
hearted Naturalism. ttl According to Dewey, 2 Thilly thinks 
Dewey 's "half-heartedness" is the saving grace of his philos-
ophy, for it ·implies an idealistic strain which is redeeming. 
Dewey confesses that he is an "empirical naturalist" or that 
he ad voc a tes a "naturalistic empiricism."3 He is a pragmatist 
and instrumentalist. He is an ally of new realism, and cer-
t ainly there is in his philosophy a rich vein of behaviorism. 
He is also a realist who advocates idealism. He comb ine s five 
distinct philosophic creeds: na:t!ve realism, pragmatism, ideal-
ism, new realism, and behaviorism. We are concerned pri-
marily with his behavioristic t end encies onl y . However, it 
will be necessary to show his behaviorism and its metaphysi-
cal implicat ions in relation to other dominant aspects of 
his philosophy. 1Ve shall now give a brief exposition of 
Dewey 's variant of behaviorism. 
(1) Exposition~ Naturalistic Implication. Dewey 
1
"Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics," Journal of Philos-
~, Volume XXII, p. 680. 
211Half-hearted Naturalism, " Journal of Philosophy, Vol-
ume XXIV (192?). 
3Ibid. 
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made one of the most significant contributions to behaviorism 
back in the pre-behavioristic days when he emphasized the 
fundamental nature and primacy of motor responses.l In his 
Essays in Experimental Logic, Dewey is a "conscious" behav-
iorist. Throughout his writings, Dewey records a strong 
protest against the "psychical," "consciousness," and "men-
tal states" as representing any reality different from things 
to be found in ·.a realistic, natural world. He vigorously 
attacks the "presentative theory" of knowledge partly because 
it implies "psychical" and "physical" entities.2 In his 
defense of pragmatism, he clearly reveals his hostile atti-
tude toward "mental states." At the same time, his behavior-
istic tendency appears in the statement, 11 That the pragmatist 
is (by his denial of transcendence) landed in pure subjectivism 
or the reduction of every existence to the purely mental, 
follows only if experience means only mental states •..• 
The pragmatist starts from a much more commonplace notion 
of experience, that of a plain man who never dreams that 
to experience a thing is first to destroy the thing and 
then to substitute a mental state for it. More particularly 
(here his behaviorism appears), the pragmatist has insisted 
that experience is a matter of functions and habits, of 
active adjustments and readjustments, of co-ordinations and 
activities, rather than of states of consciousness."~ 
l"The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," Psychological 
Revie~, Volume III (1896), pp. 357-370. · 
"Nafve Realism vs. Presentative Realism," Essays, p. 250ff. 
3The Influence of Darwin U£On Philosophy, etc., p. 157. 
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Here Dewey surrenders to realism, even ne w realism, 
and to behaviorism. He joins the "pan-objectivists," for he 
obliterates consciousness altogether. There are many st r ong 
pass ages directe d a g a i nst t h e assumption that consciousness 
is "something" outside of the real t hi ng , something d i f f erent 
whi"ch has power to invest real things with subjectivity.l 
In t h is as pect of his thought, Dewey contend s for a funda-
me n tal "immediacy" in the realistic sense. Mind as something 
ove r a g ainst the thing s, and which can know the thing s Dewey 
eliminates from his world altoge ther. Only thing s remain of 
whic h the physical organism is one. Thinking is nothing 
psy chical; it is active control of the enviroP~ent. Kno wl e dge 
.is not limited to the "men tal" even in the peculiar sense in 
whi ch Dewey employ s the term. For much "k n owl edge" or ad-
justment of the physic al org anism to its environment tak e s 
p l a c e on t he non-cognitive plane. Thihking is acting, d oing . 
Perceptions are not "c a ses of k nowl e dge." They are "natural 
events" having "no more k nowledge st a tus or worth t han, say, 
a shower or a fever. u2 This i.s Dewey's nai've r ealism. All 
re ality must lie within t h e b ound s o f the natural. Even 
"human affairs, associative and personal, are projections, 
continuations, compl ic a tions, of the nature which exists in 
t h e physical an d pre-hu."Uan world. n3 The implication of this 
p hase of Dewey's thought is na!ve naturalism or materialism. 
1creative Intelligence: .. Essays in~ Pragmatic Attitude. 
~"Nafve VS. Presentative Realism," Essays, pp. 253- 254 . 
"Half-he a rted Naturalism'': John Dewey, Journal of 
Philosouhy , Volume XXIV . (1927). --
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(2) Idealistic Implications. On the one hand, 
Dewey has banished the "mental" as anything real and efficient. 
On the other hand, he re-affirms the "mental" in a peculiar 
sense, and by implication makes room in his thought for the 
"psychical." Dewey says that i1' "perceptions" are "regarded 
as cases of knowl edge, the gate i s opened to the id ealistic 
interpretation. nl And by "second intention," in reflection 
when i nferenc es are drawn, "perceptions" become "cases of 
kno 'llvledge ." These "perceptions 11 are so important . and 
reliable that steadfast science "hangs upon them. For 
scientific purposes their nature as evidence, ~ signs, en-
tirely overshadows their natural status, that of being simply 
natural events." They are the "sole ultimate data, the sole 
media, of inference to all natural objects and processes .••• 
~e know all things that we do k now with or £z them. They 
furn i sh the only ultimate evidence of the existence and 
n ature of t h e objects which we infer, and they are the sole 
ultima te checks and tests of the inferences. "2 Dewey thus 
admits objective reference to an order which lies beyond 
"experience, 11 and in doing so becomes a victim of an epistemolog-
ical dualism for which he, usually, shows strong antipathy. 
In his contention with Professor P erry over the question 
of the "ubiquity of the knowledge relation," De w·ey says, 
"that if any realist (and he volunte ers to serve as a Mose s 
to lead all realists, new and old, o u t of their epistemological 
~"Naive vs. Presentative Realism," Essay! , p. 254. 
~Ibid., pp. 259-260. 
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b.ondage) holds that t h e sole and excl u sive relation of the 
one who is a k nower to thi n gs is that of being their k nower, 
then the realist can not es cape the impact of the (ego-
centric) predicament. But if the one who knows things also 
st a nd s in other connections with them, then it is possible 
to make an intelligible contrast between thing s as known and 
thi ng s a s loved or hated or a ppreciated, or seen or hear d or 
whatever. 111 Dewey first argues that "hearing a sound and 
seeing a color are of themselves" not "cases of k n owledge." 
Perry holds that nsensing" is a case of k nowledge, and that 
it makes the mind aware of a characteristic of the environ-
ment. According to Dewey, this is playing into the hands of 
the idealist, and it acknowledges the "constitutive efficacy" 
of the mind in the knowing proces s . Yet Dewey himself admits 
that mind enters and makes color the "basis of inference to 
some characteristic of the environment." When he does so, 
he passes from simple "immediacy" to the "mediate," from 
nafvetJ to reflection. Just here the idealistic camel thrusts 
his no s e into the tent. For can there be any objective 
reference with out a knower who makes the reference? Can 
t h ere be "immediacy" when objecti v e reference is required? 
And do n ot the "perceptions" which serve as signs of some-
thing bey ond them really represent the objects beyond c? In 
this aspect of his thought, Dewey might be called a represent-
111Epistemological Realism," Essay s, p. 273. 
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ative pragmatist. 
Furthermore, Dewey includes the 11mental 11 in his t h ink ing. 
It is true that he gives the term a peculiar status, but it 
means something besides physical resp onse. Dewey divides 
his world of "experience" into "mental" or cognitive, and 
"extra-mental " or non-cognitive. He certainly doe s not mean 
by "extra-mental n "things- in-themselves," for a pragma tic 
empiricist ndoesn't have a ny non-empirical realities," such 
as '"things-in-themselves,' 'atoms,' 'sensations, ' 'trans-
cendental unities, "' etc. 1 How·ev er, unless Dewey admits a 
conscious knower, he does actually (without intending it) 
imply a transcendent "extra-mental" world of objects to which 
11perceptions" refer. 
But if we take the "extra-mental" as Dewey intends, it 
is an experiential world of organisms resp ondi ng to thin g s 
in a nafve; realistic sense. This i s his behavioristic 
world. In addition, the nmen tal" means something specific. 
It means that physical things are implicated in a reflecti ve 
situat ion subject to specific treatment. It means "sugg es-
tion." Where the stimulation is sufficient to st a rt a resp on se, 
there is no suggestion. A sudden cry of fire starts the 
organism to running by what the psychologist calls the 
insti n ct of flight . There is no time for reflection, for the 
response to be postponed. In this instance there is no 
1~ Influence £!. Darwin upon Phil osophy, etc., p. 230, 
quoted from "Pra~ati sril Versus The Pragmatist u: Lovejoy, 
Essays in Critical Realism, p. 42. 
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suggestion; there is nothing "mental." It is a purely 
physical event. But if the r e s p onse is delayed, and if 
reflection enters, the re sponse ''may persist as suggestion." 
"We may, in a sense we must, call suggestion 'mental.' 
Bu t it is important to note what is me ant by this terrn. 
Fire, running, g etting burned, are not mental; they are 
physical. But in their status of being sugge s ted they may be 
c a ll ed men t al when we recognize this distinctive status. nl 
This st a tus, it seems, is suggested, me ant, or indic ~ted by 
"certain features of the actual situation." Are the "features " 
all physical? If so, t he flames tha t b r e ak t hrough the 
floor f rom the basement would m.:;..k e a sugge s tion to the stairs 
that they flee, and so the stairs, to the b eds i n the ro oms 
above, etc. Or must t he re be some mental fe ature present 
in t h e situat ion for a suggestion to arise? If so, then the 
"mental fe a ture" or suggestion is present and gives meaning 
to the situa tion. Something distinct f t om the physical seems 
to ~e admi tted here. It is ne cessary to recognize a distinct-
ly mental element in order that a. sugg es tion mi ght arise in 
connection with the person only. If consciousness be absent, 
there would be n o sugges tion among things. 
But Dewey insists that "certain given existences" indi-
cate "absent existences."2 This is representatiYe , but i s it 
idealistic? The "absent" e xistences are not present in t he 
seJTie manner as the "immediately given" existences, but they 
1Essays in J~xperime~tal Logic, p. 50. 
211 Introduct i on, 11 Essays in Experimenta l Log ic. p. 51. 
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are "present-as-absent." This is only another way of saying 
that they are not physically present, but they are present 
in thought or imag ination. The "absent" existences can not 
be "physical"; fpr they are not "present-as-absent," they are 
always "present-as -present." So it would seem to the "plain" 
man. Therefore, the "present-as-absent" exist e nces have a l l 
the characteristics of the "psychical ." As Lovejoy h as 
shown1 the experience of this moment (the representat ion) 
is distinct in its exis t ence (because temporally distinct) 
from the past or future that is represented as the object of 
knowledge. The representatio E must be psychical because it 
does not subscribe to a description of any object of physical 
s cience, and it can find no pl a ce in a physica,l order. Dewey 
is forced to broaden his conception of reality as altogether 
physical so as to i nclude this "present-as-absent" re a lity, 
o r he must surrender his "inter-temporal cognition." Dewey 
does not desire the latter, for it would close the avenue to 
all knowledge. 
The main tendency of Dewey 's thought is in the direction 
of dualism to which, a.t times, he gi ves cl ear and forceful 
express i on. The denial of the psycb ical is inconsisten t 
with the affirmation of the reality of ''aims " and "ide e:~ con-
tents" which lie outside of their "objectives and fulfil-
ments." Aims and ideals whicb are not yet realized (only 
set for fulfilment) are surely of a different nature than 
111Pragmatism VS. Pragmatist," Essays 1:...!:! Critical Realism, 
p. 60. 
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objects in a natural order. If we preserve the temporal 
succession of experience, which Dewey insists upo n doing, 
we must say that experience transcends the present and re-
fers to experiences (not present) whose marked characteris-
tics are logical equivalents of the pre s ent experience. If 
judgments are to Je "instrumental" they must refer to ob-
jects beyond ii!l.Tif,diate experience. If k n.owledge is to be 
/ 
"useful" it must serve to illuminate a reality that trans-
cends the "immedi ate." And espec i ally, if we are to hold 
rational communication with one another in a society of 
selves, we must recogni ze and refer to other minds and 
e xperiences, which we can not experience directly. These 
constitute a. real order objective to us whi c h we can know 
only indirectly by inference. Since Dewey makes much of 
society and the social, he p a sses the bounds of ''immediate 
empiricism." Strictly speaking, Dewey believes in objective 
reference to experience which transcends the given; he be-
1ieves in a society of persons who are objective to our 
tho ught of them, but with whom we may hold reliable inter-
course; and he believes i n a world of natural objects which 
are certainly distinct from our thoughts of t h em. It would 
be easy and natural for Dewey to go on and complete his 
truncated world of society and nature with a spiritual 
superstructure to which he co uld mak e as confident reference 
a s to any p E;. rt of h is system. By refusing to f ollow t h e 
the idea_listic implications of his thought, De,.l\l'ey is forced 
161 
to accept a dualism of mind and b ody, of organism and things, 
and finally of "things experienced as 11 and "transcendent 
things" referred to by perceptions. The only way Dewey can 
avoid an ultimate dualism is to advance to the objective 
idealism which he so much wishes to shun. 
( '3) Cri ti ci sm. In his anxiety to reduce all reality 
to the physical category, Dewey denies many obvious facts. 
Ot hers he distorts, or treats arbitrarily. His method of 
banishing the conscious knower is o r en to serious question. 
At the very beginning of his disquisition on "Nafve Realism 
VS. Presentative Realism," Dewey escapes enlightenment by a 
serious oversight. He cites the evidence which the idealists 
offer concerning the visible convergence of the railway 
tracks. According to Dewey, this convergence is not, as the 
idealist claims, a mental content; but it is t h e natural 
result of the physical laws of light and lens, and it can 
be "physically demonstrated in a camera." Wherefore, Dewey 
asks, "Is the· photograph, then, to be conceived as a psychice,l 
somewhat?" Certainly, the camera is not psychical. But 
Dewey has omitted an impo rtant item in this connection, 
namely, that the c Eunera never thinks of the rails as parallel, 
as men do. There is a very good reas on for t h is also. Is 
it because the camera is physical only? Had Dewey answered 
this question, he would have seen the plight of his physical 
organism divested of all that we call psychical. He would 
have se e n also that the camera can know as much about the 
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rail way track, or any other item of the world as the physical 
organism can. The camera "sees" the railway track as con-
vergent, but mind sees the convergence and thinks the rails 
parallel. Had Dewey given slight attention to the reason 
for this, he would have seen the necessity of admitting a 
"conscious observer and thinker." Without the mind of Dewey, 
or the mind of the photographer to note and interpret the 
record upon the plate of the camera, the ph otograph reveals 
nothing of the world. VTithout mind, "experience" is mean-
ingless. In a world of purely "natural events," there can 
be no "loving," "hating," or "appreciating." 
Dewey would ex~rcise the psychical by showing that 
mirrors placed in di v erse positions will make a round 
table appear to assume elliptical shapes just as will the 
perceptions of observers located in different positions 
relative to the table. Dewey has been unfortunate in his 
choice of an illustration. Instead of ruling out the psychi-
cal, this illustration renders it imperative. Without some 
one to observe the reflection from the mirrors, the mirrors 
alone could never cause a round table to a ppear elliptical. 
So much the greater need for a "conscious observer"! Dewey's 
discrimination between the "real" ta.ble and the "images" in 
the mirrors is also substantial evidence of the psychical. 
The same argument will hold relative to his illustration of 
the lump of wax located at different positions, but subjected 
to the same heat. "Now the wax is solid, now liquid--it 
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might even be gaseous. How 'psychical' these phenomena! nl 
But should the llrrnp of wax b e empowered to distinguish it-
self as a lump from itself as a liquid or a g a s, as Dewey 
seems able to do, how psychical indeed would be the lump of 
wax! Dewey seems to forget all the while that he, as a 
"conscious observer," is making distinctions that no mere 
1 umps of wax can make. It may be because of the psychi ca.l 
nature, which he decries, that all discriminations and 
comparisons are possible. 
Moreover, if perceptions in their primary st a te are but 
natural events, an d do no t concern a "knower," we are a.t a 
los s to know how, even by the mystery of "second intention," 
the knower can select just such perceptions from the common 
lot in n a ture as will se r~e in the case of knowledge of 
definite, specific objects. Inasmuch a s Dewey, at times, 
inclines toward monistic realism in order to p oint the way 
of excape from dualism for the new r ealist, he must identify 
the perception with the real object (he denies thia at other 
time s). Therefore, he is in t h e untenable position of assert-
ing that what is perceived as a circle (round table) by one 
observer and an ellipse (table from another position) by 
another is the s arne thing. The perc~ption of a circle and 
the perception of an ellipse are identical with each other. 
On the basis that perceptions are "natural events" no other 
conclusion could be reached. 
1 
"Nafve Realism VS. Presentative Realism," Essays, p. 252. 
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But Dewey's philosophy will not bear the strain of such 
absurdity. Apparently having vanquished dualism by his con-
cepti on of "immediacy, 11 Dewey himself turns dualist in ways 
we have indicated, and further by reducing knowledge to a 
matter of nanticipation. 11 As Lovejoy ha s shown,l knowledge 
consists in reference to the past as a matter of fact; and, 
moreover, no fut~re plan could be laid except on the founda-
tion of the past. If that past is unverifiable and untrust-
worthy as Dewey claims, it could give no clear guidance for 
our anticipation. Besides, it is imp ossible to start into 
a future fulfilment from a "zero" present. If the claims of 
the past are rejected bec ause ·bygone, the trustworthiness 
of t h e future must be discounted because the future has 
not yet arrived. If an a n ticipatory experience, whic h has 
not yet become a physical experience, is allowed, then an 
experience which re-inst.ates the past should be allowed; for 
such an experience was once a physical experience. Besides, 
Dewey himself says, "Imag inative recovery of the bygone 
is indispensable t o successful invasion of the future." 2 
Dewey is therefore bound to the dualistic e xperienc e of 
anticipation and recovery. 
I n contrast to his t Jl eory of anticipatory experience, 
Dewey as a behaviorist should insist upon the r eality of 
past experience and not upon the . reality of future experi-
ence. For the activities of the organism (the sole reality), 
111Pragmatism VS. Pragmatist, 11 E ssays in Critical Realism. 
2creative Intelligence: Essays in the Pragmatic Attitude, 
p. 14. 
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presumably, leave "traces" in the organism. These can be 
carried forward to the present after the manner of Bergson .' s 
ball of snow. The p a st would thus be rolled up in t o the 
present. But nothing of the future would be represented 
the re , for the future h as not yet made any record. When 
percept ions are regarded as related to organic activity and 
not to a "knower" or "mind , 11 their very g round is removed; 
they have no status whatsoev e r . At mos t, they would be 
but effects of one thing u p on another by impact. They 
should be called indent a tions as the beatings of a hammer 
upon brass rather than percep tions. Even organic memory, 
a s biologically conceived, is meaningless until we i nvoke 
consciousness. The "paths" or "tracks" said to be r evived 
operate in the interests of expl anation onJ.y on the assumption 
of mind. They are doub tful even with that assump tion. 
According to Dewey, '1seen" is not a case of knowledge; it 
is on par with "gnawing n and "poking." Yet "seen" mus t 
i mply that someth ing is seen, and that it is seen by something 
or some one. "Poking" is a case of knowing when a blind 
man pokes the sidewalk; for by that a ct of poking he knows 
that :h e is on the sidewalk a n d not in the gutter. We under-
stand '~pking" quite well when consciousness is involved, but 
the behaviorist would be hard-pre ssed to tell just what 
"poking" means in the absence of consciousness. We wonder 
whether the organism would "poke" or "gnaw" in solving 
p roblems inv olving logarithms. 
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The fundamental weakness of Dewey's philosophy is laid 
bare when we begin to analyze his conception of "experience," 
which he seeks to identify with re ality. In the first place, 
we are not always sure just what experience he means. There 
seems to be two notions of experience. On the one hand, ex-
p erience means the interactions of "natural objects 11 of which 
the animal organism is one. The physical organism assumes no 
more i mportant role in experience than any other object, for 
it shares the same status as other physical objec t s. "Think-
ing," "knowing," "inference," etc. are retained as terms, 
but they are given a new interpretation. They are deprived 
of all value in terms of conscio usness, and are assigned 
values only in terms of the physical. Knowing is organic 
response. Inference is behaving to a · certain situation. In 
"knowing " and "inference" the organism seems essential. Yet 
"experience" is a term that applies to physical behavior 
wherever found in the universe; it serves to preserve con-
tinuity when dualities threaten. It unifi e s a world which 
is torn asunder by such dual conceptions as are implied in 
the terms "organism" and "environment," "subject" and "ob-
j ect," "persons" and "things," and "mind" and "nature." 
"Experience" means "an immense and operative world of diverse 
and interacting elements." 
If "experience 11 is a world of interacting natural objec ts 
of which the organism is one, e~perience is not necessarily 
tied u n with the organism. Indeed, one of the things Dewey 
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stressed most is that perceptions are not attached to a 
"knower. 11 Is it unfair to say that the perceptions are not 
attached even to the physical organism, which has been sub-
stituted for the conscious knower? There is no presumption 
in favor of their attachment to the organism rather than to 
other natural objects, for ''organism," "perceptions," and 
"other objects" are all alike natural objects. They all 
interact in a unified, continuous universe. Experience does 
not belong to the organism, but rather organism belongs to 
experience. "Things'' themselves present in a non-cognitive 
way change in to the "psychical" in the sense of serving as 
"clews 11 to future action. Reality is continuously trans-
formed--a process in which "idea'' and "object" are prog res- -
sively re-made to meet the needs of the "situation." The 
"self" rises out of the experience; it, in no sense, consti-
tutes experience, but it is constituted of and in experience. 
Experience, in this sense, is identified with reality. 
Dreading an Absolute, Dewey does not spe ak of experience as 
a totality. But, since ther e is nothing beyond expe r ience, 
he does erect it into a sort of absolute. In this "pan-
objective" world, "things" pu r ely physical and objective, 
constitute the fundamental reality. 
On the other hand, Dewey gives us a more organic and 
personal conception of "experience. nl For out of a "situa-
tion" ( this is an "infinity word" like "experience" ) "things" 
1 E:ssays in Experimental Logic I 11 Introducti on II especially. 
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develop knowing expe riences. As I take it, the "situa tion" 
is to be identified with the prima ry, non-cognitive exp erience 
before "thinking" and ''reflection" have begun. Thinking and 
reflection "denote inquiries or the results of inquiry ," 
and such i nquiry holds an intermediate pla ce in the develop-
ment of an experience . Prior to the reflective experience, 
there is always thenon-r eflective. It is the latter that 
Dewey me ans most of t he time when he uses the word "experi-
ence." It is such an experience t h at things are experienced 
first-hand, but they a re not known~ objects. Dewe y would 
not p r eclude the hypothesis of conscious experience in the 
s .enee of some things representing other things. Indeed this 
is"highly plausible," but we must never forget that the 
intellectual or cognitive element is always "set in a con-
text which .is non-cognitive. nl 
In contrast with the "experience" which seems all-
embracing, we are here presented with an "experience" which 
is vaguely outlined, which is operative withi n narrower 
limits, a..nd which definitely i n volves t h e organism; fo r , 
certainly, the organism is the actor in the processes of 
"thinking" and "reflection." Moreover, "Another trait of 
every~ is that i t has a focus and context: brilliancy and 
obscurity , conspi cuo.usness and a pparency, and concealment 
or reserve, with a constant movement of redistribution. 11 
Even "consciousness" is a "small and shifting portion of 
111 Introduction," Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 4. 
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experience." "' Experience ' suggests •••• an actual focussing 
of the world at one point in a focus of immediate shining 
apparency."l Such a description fits only a "situation" 
in which one of the 11 factors" is cons cious. If 11 experience 11 
means that the world focuses at one point, must not that 
"one point" be the organism? And a ''conscious organism," 
or rather a conscious being is imperative in order to i n sure 
the "immediate shining apparency." 
It is true that the organism is not the only factor in 
the "situation." A word just written on the type-writer may 
be the focal point for the moment. Around it shading off 
into vagueness "are · all the physical features of the environ-
ment extending out into spac e no one can say how fa r , and 
all the habits and interests extending backward and forward 
in time, of the organism which uses the type-writer and which 
notes the written form of the word only as a temporary focus 
in a vast and changing scene. n2 Here again "experience" 
seems to necessitate the organism. Besides, when thinking 
or "knowledge- e etting" is in progress, it is no passive or 
meditative affair. It involves "explorations" for procuring 
data and the "physical analyses" by which these are rendered 
trus.tworthy; it means much r e ading to secure information; 
and it means the comparis on and manipulation of significant 
hypothe ses . Activities of the cortex, sense organs, hands 
1 Ibid., p. ?. 
211 The Ne ed for a Recovery of Ph ilosophy," Creative 
Intelligence, p. 8. 
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and feet, and experimental apparatus are all employed in the 
process of thinking. Vle can n ot be mistaken when ·we say that 
the organism, even a conscious p erson, is indispens able to 
such an experience as has just been described. 
Dewey's view as expressed elsewhere confirms t h is notion 
of expe r ience. "Where there is experience, there is a 
living b eing . 11 The organism is not quie s cent in respect to 
the environment. While it r e c e ives stimulating energ ies from 
the environment, it modifies in behalf of its own interests 
and needs the surrounding forces; it utilizes the changes 
that are g oi ng on ab out it and aff ecting it. Here the o rganism 
seems to be set over a gainst environment, while it seeks to 
control the environment for its own enrichment. If we wish 
De we y 's f ina,l word on the meaning of experience, at h is in-
vitation let us g o to the fundamentals. We find here that 
the significance of experience lies not in the fact tha t 
the obje cts of our world are "creatures of the senses," but 
tha t men r e f use long er to believe in the exi s tence of t hings 
unl e ss these things are capabl e of entering into specifiable 
cormecti ons with t h e organism and the organism with them. ul 
Once more we may say that it is the experience of the i nd i-
V-idual organism with thing s. 
Also if "experience," as Dewey has defined it, is 11 the 
intercourse of a living b eing with the physical and social 
environment," t hen experience can occur only in connection 
111Introduction," Essays in Expe r imental Logic, p. 62. 
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with an organism. If experience is to be identified with 
reality, there can be no reality except for organisms, and 
in relation t o organisms. If this does not imply the "ubiqui-
ty of the knowledge-relation," it certainly implies the 
. ubiquity of the organism-relation. But this conclusion con-
flicts with one of Dewey's latest utterances that nature 
(and therefore ultimate reality ) exists "in a physical and 
pre-ht~an (and I presume Dewey would admit a pre-organism 
world ) world. 111 
Dewey's assumption rests upon the pro position that per-
captions are not "cases of knowledge." But they turn out 
to be cases of knowledge, then what becomes of the assump-
tion? If "thing s" are what they are experienced .@:.§. (and they 
are), they are not the physical objects that scienc e recognizes 
in the observer's world; but they are the "features" of our 
environment which come and go with our perceptions and interests. 
"Experience" then represents my limited, human situation, 
a nd it might properly be called & experience because the 
"situation" centers about my o r ganism, and ministers to my 
needs. The experience is no less mine because I experience 
an objective world. And I am able to experience and k now 
such a world only because it is the phenomenal expression of 
the ontolog ical world which is its abiding ground. But 
Dewey's "experience," since it reaches only phenomena, leaves 
"Nature" ultimately dark and inaccessible. 
1 
"Half-hearted Naturalism," The Journal of Philosophy, 
Volume XXIV (192'7). 
1 ?2 
Besides, Dewey's continuous reconstruction of experience 
and transformation of reality turns out to be but the / contin-
uously changing beliefs concernin3 a r eali stic nature e~ternal 
to the mi n d, Can Dewey logically hold that "real things" like 
a typ e-writer to which we may react automatically in a smooth-
running non-cognitive experience will be transformed by think-
ing or inquiry when something interrupts the flow of the origi-
nal process? According to Dewey's theory, in what respect, 
other than mechanical impairment, would the t ype- writer be-
changed under analysis from what it was under automatic re-
action? And after the repair is made knowingly, woul d not the 
instrument be the same "real" thing that it was before the 
interruption? Dewey has simply describ ed here the fact that 
we may place our attention upon one thing or process, whil e 
at the s lline time we may by force of habit perform anoth er 
act automatically. Dewey mentioned only one f a ct involved, 
t ha t of habitual reaction, but he omitted the f a.ct that the 
attention was "knowingly" on the subject matter to be 
e xpressed. What happened in this exp erience is that the sarne 
conscious person put his attention primarily on the message 
i n the first instance; in the second, he pl a ced it upon the 
instrument. The type-wri ter unde rwe nt no chang e, for "think-
ing" is not constitutive .. But if we grant t hat non-cognitive 
reality changes into an object of thought under analysis, 
how do we know what it was before it changed? Moreover, 
all of the "situation" does not enter in to the compass of 
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thinking and inquiry, for the "cognitive" is always "set in 
a context which is non-cognitive and which holds within it 
in suspense a vast complex of other qualities and thing s that 
in t h e experience itself are objects of esteem or aversion, 
of decision, of use, of suffering, of endeavor and revolt, 
not of knowledge."l If the non-cognitive portion of the 
"situation" and the reality which exists before it changes 
are unknown (these are the non-cognitive and, therefore, 
identical), then their appearance to the senses is also 
unknown. We conclude that reality can not be known at all. 
And that reality is assumed to be nature which is governed 
mechanically by l a w and change. 
On the whole, Dewey has advanced far beyond the sensa-
tional psychology of Locke and Hume, and h as substituted for 
a "mind" mechanically made up of impressions, sensations, 
and ideas according to the laws of association an agressive 
biological organism which appears to understand the strategy 
of selection and attack rel a tive to a c h anging nature.2 
The senses are no longer gateways to knowledge, but serve 
as stimuli to organic response. This conception supersedes 
the analytic method, and attains a certain wholeness which is 
commendable. Since the thinking and inquiring, even "con-
scious" organism is capable of doing everything that a con-
scious person can do, Dewey could well advance to the conven-
~"Introduction, 11 Essays in li:xperimental Logic, p. 4. 
"Changed Conceptions of Experience and Reason," 
Reconstruction in Philosophy. 
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tional view of consciousness. The organism does "change the 
changes of nature." Therefore, it must be constitutive in 
experience. And especially, since reality is what it is 
experienced ~. and is reduced at last to ~ expe r ience for 
every living being, Dewey recognizes the finite phase of 
experience which should be defined as a fact of consciousness. 
For the "things" (feature of environment) which constitute 
the experience are my perceptions and thoughts of "nature. 11 
Nature is thus utilized and made to serve the purposes of 
the organism. Dewey is right when he insists upon the objec-
tivity of nature on the side of the finite, but he provides 
no intelligible ground for such objectivity. He could justly 
be charged with "subjectivity" unless he is willing to 
recognize a metaphy sical causality of which nature is the 
manifestation. By refusing the overtures of the ontologi-
cal, Dewey jeopardizes the phenomenal. 
-3.. Logical Behaviorism. The .:thi"r{f type of behaviorism 
m.ay well be called "Logical Behaviorism. 11 For,metaphysically, 
it reduces the world, in its ultimate analysis, to logical en-
tities. The leading exponents of this view are the new real-
ists, Perry and Holt, and the nee-realist Bertrand Russell. 
Russell has adopted the "neutral entities" of the new realists 
and in turn has impressed them with his logical doctrines. 
We are interested here in the realists only who turn their 
doctrines to behavioristic acco unt. We shall now examine the 
behaviorism represented by each of these writers. 
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a. The Behaviorism of Perry • 
. .(l)Exposition ~Naturalistic Im:£lications. We have 
seen how Perry has come to regard the "mental" from the 
standpoint of observation and behavior.l This point of view 
is s t rongly maintained in Present Philosophical Tendencies 
also. 2 Consciousness is not only denied as a metaphysical 
entity, but also the introspective view-point is superseded 
entirely so far as underst a nding the nature of mind is con-
cerned. 'While the menta l content can be known by the indi-
vidual, the nature of the mental can be known neither by an 
"analysis of the mental contents nor by self-intuition." 
Indeed, the method of self-knowl e dge must be surrendered 
altog ether and the objective method of observation must be 
substituted therefor. Perry advances beyond .Tames who inter-
preted the mental in terms of the feeling of bodily action. 
Professor .Tames came so n e ar the behavioristic interpretation 
of mind that Perry had to chide him only for defining the 
mental li f e as · a feeling of phy s ical action instead of in 
terms of the action itself. 3 The feeling of action is itself 
not action. The feeling of action belongs to the contents, 
and some kind of action is required to bring together the 
con tents. That action, for Perry, is purely physical. ·He 
thus sets aside wh a t little shred of the mental .Tames re-
served, and turn s t h e mental into organic respo nse and 
lPresent "Dissertation," pp. 9-10-11. 2
"A Realistic Theory of Mind," Present Philosophical 
Tendencies. 
3Ibi d. , p. 285. 
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contents which are the very objects that the organism selects. 
The needs of the biological organism determine the selec-
tion of content. The nervous system is the mechanism that 
makes the selections in the interests of the organism. The 
organism as interested and selective, Perry takes over from 
James. The mind, as a selective and interested organism, is 
teleological. It seeks ends, always in its own interests. 
Like a tendril that feels for the support, the mind feels the 
way for the organism. In re·la.tion to the envi ronrnent. it ad-
vanc e s when it profits; it retires when it fails; it dodges 
difficulties; and it squirms and wriggles through unti l it 
at length gets what it wants. The organism a s serts its 
interests and seeks to satisfy them in a natural, realistic 
environment. 
The selective character of the mind is set forth in 
terms of purpose which is defined as a "set" or "determining 
tendency" in the nervous system.l At first this was con-
ceived as a suspended response which commands for the moment 
the energies of the organism. Later the conception is 
expanded to include the energy released by the stimul u s. 
Besides this main tendency, there are certain auxiliary 
activities which spring up in expe ri ence in the event that 
the initial tendency is for any reason checked. A mental 
act is converted into a response, and a mental state is turned 
into a "disposition to re spond." These reserve responses are 
l"A Behavioristic View of Purpose," Journal of Philoso-
~. Volume XVIII, No. 4. 
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physiological realities "even though they are not in action 
and should never be called into action." 
In other attempts at a definition of purpose, Perry 
discussed it as "systematic unity, 11 "tendency, 11 and "adapta-
tion. 11 1 But these terms sugg est a mechanical conception of 
organic action. A significant principle appears only when we 
regard behavior as modified by experience. The organism 
makes its adjustment not automatically, but through what it 
learns in its experience. The higher, selective "propensity" 
which drives the organism to persistent end eavor governs 
the lower, eligible "propensity" which is acquired.2 These 
propensities working conjointly constitute purp ose. Purpose 
is a persistent impulse which gradually mounts and compl etes 
itself b y supporting with its energy the reflexes that help 
it forward, and by combatting the reflexes that tend to 
thwart it. That organic activity is purposeful which seeks 
an end that is discovered through what is learned in experi-
ence. The striving is not "hit and miss," for it is governed 
by experience; and it is therefore "open-eyed" making antici-
patory responses to the meaningful end-result. Human conduct 
has meaning only as it anticipates the end of the action. 
Perry shows respect for the traditiona l view of purpose whi ch 
requires that the future shall g overn the act. 
Furthermore, it might be said that Perry gives us two 
l"Purpose as Systematic Unity," Monist, Volume XXVII (191?), 
pp. 352-3?5; and "Purpose as Tendency and Adaptation," Philo-
soph ical Review, Volume XXVI (191?), pp. 4??-495. 
211Docility and Purpose, II ~Psychological Review, Volume 
XXV (1918), pp. 1-20. 
conceptions of purpose. In the sense already defined, purpose 
anticipates the future through what experience reveals. But 
he also speaks of purpose as belonging to an instinct which is 
inna te. In building the nest, the bird reaches a definite 
end; but it does so without anticipating the end. It in-
stinctively acts, and that act calls for another in a chain-
like process which at length brings it to the end. But cer-
tainly the bird does not pre-vision the finished nest as a 
man pre-visions a finished house. Perry himself makes this 
distinction. Purpose in the sense of anticipation of the 
end-re sult seems to fulfil all the requirements of the tradi-
tional view, while instinctive purpose strives toward a 
definite end without being conscious of the end in advance. 
If consciousness be granted, there is a real distinction 
here. But if we are de a ling with the physical organism only, 
as Perry is, we can not see that we are entitled to the 
di stinc ti on. 
In this phase of his philosophy , Perry is obviously 
materialistic, for only the physical category is acknowl-
edged. The physical organism is the so-c a lled "knower" 
which reacts to a selected portion of the environment thus 
cons t ituting it "mental" content. The portions of the environ-
ment selected as content exist also as physical objects in a 
purely realistic world. When they are said to be conscious, 
no change occurs in them except they are not related to the 
organism, while before they were related to one another only. 
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To call them "psychical" or "conscious" just because they are 
related to the organism appears to empty the "psychical" of 
all content. There remains a world of physi cal objects in 
interaction. And since such a world is arnenable to scientific 
investigation, according to Perry's own definition, hi s con-
ception deserves the name of na turalism. 
(a) Criticism of Perry's Naturalism. In the first place, 
hu.'l!la n nature is naturalistically conceived. In his "Presiden-
tial Address" Perry gave u s to understand that the gre a t 
problem of the day is to ri ghtly discover h L@an nature.l Stress 
must be laid upon the "human." The supernatural must depart; 
t here must be nothing among the clouds. The task of behav-
iorism is to transl a te psychology into '~he language of physi-
cal science." The languag e of physical science is the language 
of moving atoms and electrons, of energetic forces in mechani-
cal interaction. Yet Perry goes on to speak of reaso n , pur-
pose, belief, and interest as though they retained someth ing 
of their old-fashioned significa nce. He really reduces them 
to "sets" or "determining tendencies" in nervous system and 
muscles. 
But the conception of "set" or "detennining tendency" with 
its "auxiliary" under control will not st a nd the strain of' in-
vestigation. Is it not too much to ask of a "set" in the ner-
vous system that it select a portion of its environment, and 
t hus constitute it a content of its knowledge? Can a physical 
lttAn Appeal to Reason", Philosonhical Review, Volume XXX, 
No. 2, pp. 131-169. 
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organism know in any sense of the word? Without conscious-
ness, how could the organism know a world entirely objective 
to it? It could know the nature of other minds only by 
observing their behavior. How can it observe without being 
conscious of the behavior? The doctrine is plausible only 
upon the assumption of a conscious knower for whom all be-
h avior has meaning. 
Moreover, we can not see how a ''d etenn ining tendency" 
in the nervous system can rea ch an anticipated g oal. We 
can underst and how there may be tension in the nervous system, 
but it is not so obvious whY such tension should drive the 
organism to a goal set up in advance. In a causal chain, 
the dynamic organism will work in some direction; but why 
in one direction rather than in another? If physical reaction 
is the sole road to knowledge, how can the organism know a 
future goal when it reacts to t h e present only? Can mere 
nerves and muscles anticipate? Anticipation is possible only 
through imagination. With no power of anticipation, the 
selective function of the organism disappears also. 
Furthennore, if the "determining tendency" furnishes 
the driving power for the auxiliary tendencies, how can the 
auxiliary tendencies do otherwise than move parallel with 
the main t endency? Since the auxiliary tendencies tend to 
thwart the determining tendency, and must be drawn back to 
its support, or inhibited, they are not caused by the deter-
mining tendency. They have no assignable cause within the 
181 
organism. Therefore, the unity of the resp onse is dest r oyed, 
and the organism is torn by many conflicting tendencies. 
The tendency which, apparently, is to command the organism 
from the start might be overwhelmed before it proceed s far 
by other tendencies which arise after the main activity begins. 
We could never determine which is the main tendency un t il the 
act is completed, and even then it would be only a name for 
a movement assumed for the sake of the description. The 
"determining tendency" acts blindly; it is devoid of expecta-
tion , purpose, or anticipated end. The activity of nerves 
and mu s cles promises no definite goal, but it only insures 
that the organism will ~ct. The action is not pro phetic; it 
is historic. It is simply an event which reveals what has 
happened after it has occurred. If the organism is "set" 
for taking a train and there is no train at that hour, tha t 
is error. If the trai n is at the station to "complement" 
the r e s ponse (going to the station ) , that is truth. Thus 
truth and error are robbed of all meaning; for all we can 
say of the two instances is that, in the one, an event 
occurred, while in the oth er an "expected" even t fail e d t o 
occur. We can understand h ow t h e organism may r e spond t o 
a portion of the environment toward which it happens to be 
turned, but how it can res p ond to an "expected" enviromnent 
calls for further consi deration. Stripped down to facts 
(and it is to facts tha t Perry would al ways mal{e appeal) , 
we have only nerves and mus cles set for action. In relation 
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to these how shall we define the "expectation"? And what 
is the nature of the "detennining tendency" that it possesses 
such potency for driving nerves and muscles? 
Under this view, "Reason," "Belief," "Interest," and 
"Intellect" shrink to physiological "sets" and "tendencies." 
In their mental character, they find no room in the narrow 
biolo gical category. Physiological psychology is una ble to 
support and give content to the high claims of these psychical 
terms whose meaning has been lost in behavioristic inter-
pretati ons. "Purpose 11 also is robbed of all that is character-
istic and worth while in the notion. It is logically carried 
back not only low in the phylogenetic and ontogenetic sc a le 
but also into inorganic nature whence the organism spra ng. 
All activity b ecomes a purposeless energy pushing forward 
not to ends or goals but into events which have no other 
. determination than the determination of the nature of the 
whole-- purely impersonal and mechanical. If purpose is to 
be significant for hum an conduct, Perry must admit a pu,r-
poseful being which he · assumes throughout, but of which he 
gives no adequate account. He will thus be led beyond the 
consi deration of the physical alone to a self-determined, 
purposeful Being whose n a ture i£ the ground of all activity. 
(2) Exposition and Logical Implications. We have 
seen how Perry, when he champions the cause of behaviorism, 
tends toward naturalism, though he would . strongly resent 
being called a naturalist. ~Vhen dealing .with the physical 
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organism in resp on s e to phy si 8al objects, Perry is quite 
materi alistic. But he recognize s other reality than physical 
objects to which the organ ism resp onds. We may res :-ond to 
a non- existent (in the . sense of non-physical) or generalized 
ob ject as well as to a particular, physical object. This is 
a recognition on Perry 's part of a social, intellectual, and 
id e a l environment to which in fact we do res p ond on the h i gher 
p lanes of life as truly as we res p ond to natura l thi ng s on 
the lower plane. Perry utters a warning against a too hasty 
"dismissal of the trad itional association of purpose with 
non-physical or 'ideal' · entiti e s." We are apt to lose our 
way Lf we confine our analysi s to the l ower forms of mi nd , 
for "as a matter of f act most JlUrpo s ea (human) deal with 
'objec ts ' of hope, fear, or aspiration tha t find no place 
at all in the fiel d of nature a s that defined by the phy-
sical sciences. 111 Perry believes that such an admission d oes 
not contradict the f undamenta l t h esi s of beh avio r ism, al-
though it seems to do so unl e s s we rega rd b ehaviorism a s 
s p ring i n g up withi n the larg e r world of lo g i cal entiti e s. 
Ext reme behaviorism insists that the physical fact is 
ultimate in the universe. Logical behaviorism can not re-
gard phy sics as a fundamental s ci ence. Neither are the facts 
determine d by physical means ultimate facts. Perry says, 
"This conclusion is fa tal to naturalism. It g ives to being, 
i n lli ~ analysis, a l ogical, r ather than a phys ical, 
l"Docility and Purpose," The Pslchqlogical Review, 
Volume XXV (191 8 ). 
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character; and reduces the experimental method of physics 
to the p os ition of b eing a special instance of logical method . nl 
The truths of logi c and mathematics a re independent of their 
e xpre ssion in languag e or s~nbol. Physical descri p tions 
presuppose logical and ma t h ematical hypotheses a nd are sub-
sumed under them. Perry seeks to avoid the narrowness of 
naturalism and exuberance of idealism. He thrusts his 
doctrine between absolutism and anthromophi sm . He respects 
the empirical temper of s cience and the idealistic yearning 
for realiti e s that lie beyond the p ositive sciences. 
The conception of the universe of "neutral entities" 
may be approached from the view-point of Mach as set forth 
by Perry in Presen1 Phil osoph ical Tendenci es . 2 The mental 
and physi cal a re reduced to neutral elements that are neither 
physical or mental. The physical and mental a r e highly 
organized comple x ities of these simpler terms. For example, 
a color may be studied from the standpoint of physics relative 
to wave-l engths or the source of li ght, or from the stand-
po int of psychology in relation to the nervous system and 
the organism. But color itself is neither mental nor physical. 
Perry accepts this doctrine as far as it goes, but he feels 
that Mach tends toward naturalism and lacks the saving grace 
of logic a l analysis. Sensible qualities and ''more fun damen-
mental formal relationships, such as implication, order, 
causation, time, and the like" mingle in physical and psychical 
1Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 83. 
2rbict., pp. ?8, 310-311. 
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complexes. Such relati ons can be disc overed only by logical 
analysis which :passes beyond. the sensible. The same elements 
constitute mind and body, and these very elements are composed 
of the logical element s and sensible qualities. The refore , 
reality can no longer be thought of as divided into two 
mutually exclusive realms, but it may be conceived "as a 
field of interpenetrating relationships, among which those 
described by physics and psychology are the most familiar and 
typical, and those described by logic the most simple and 
universal."l In this manner Perry appears to remove the dual-
ism of mind and body. He also attempts to remove the dualism 
of thought and thing by their identification. Our chief 
concern here is with the nature of the ultimate. We have 
found it to be of the nature of "neutral entities." The 
analytic method carries us beyond naturalism to a logical 
reality independent alike of physics and psychology. 
(3) Criticism of Perrl's Doctrine~~ Whole. 
Without hesitation we should designate Perry's realism 
materialistic were it not for the fact that, in the end, he 
rises above the physical to the level of ultimate logical 
entities. When he reaches this new altitude, we should 
hesitate to call his conception behavioristic were it not 
for the fact that the a ctivity or response of the biol ogi-
·cal organism is an essential fact of his philo sophy. In 
order to remain s cientific, Perry must insist upon the natural 
1Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 311. 
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organism which res1"l onds to a world of natural ob jects . 
Biological organisms and n a tural objects constitute the physi-
cal order or nature. If the introduction of logical entities 
as the ultimate carries with it the sublimation of the physi-
cal order, then, strictly speaking, there are neither biologi-
cal organisms nor natural objects in a realistic worl d. There-
fore, Perry can no longer claim to be scientific . If Perry 
holds to the scientific view, and also retains the logical 
world, he has two realm s on hiB hand s--the physical order 
and the world of logical entities--with no communion between 
them. One is a nafve realistic world, the other is a logic a1 
r e ali st ic world; both are extra-org unic and extra-mental, 
and therefore out of relation with the biological orga,ni sm 
and with mi nd. But even if relation be admit ted, there is no 
occasion to speak of co nsciousne s s . For the physical organism 
is a thing among thing s, and if it happens to be near other 
things there is no more reason to call the t h ings conscious 
than if thing s are ne ar other thing s in the ab.sence of the 
physical organism. What could hinder the tree from being 
conscious of the stones tha t lie a t its roots? Perry must 
see something more than the physi c al apout the organism that 
causes it to bestow a peculi. e>_r relation upon the environment 
t o which it reacts. 
Moreover, should we s e ek for the cause of the activity 
of the organism , where shall we find it? In the present 
environment? If so, why should the organism respond to a 
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future environment? Is the cause of the a ctivity to be found 
in the natural environment? Then why does t h e organism 
respond to a logic a l environment ? The p rinciple of response 
of the organism operates only upon the assumption of the 
action of stimuli of a natural environment u p on that organism. 
This is the common assumption of the behaviorist. And while 
Perr y c ondemns this principle a s mechanical, in t he end h e 
is forced to o.ccept it bec ause the n a tural environment i s 
t h e only acces s ible field of stimulation. The "logical 
entities" c an no t serve as s timuli bec au s e the y are inde-
pendent and a1 oof, and they can be rea ched only through 
mediation, by identity of meaning; while the organism enters 
directly and immediately into relation with natural objects. 
Besides, it may b e tha t "logical entities" are but the out-
put of the imagination of the new realists, and therefore, 
i n an initial sense, can no t be a means of stimulating such 
imagination. The logical behaviorist provides no sound 
b a sis for either the activity of the organism or of the 
stimulating environmen t. A physical order is presupposed as 
a source of stimulation. This issues into naturalism. 
Moreove r, Perr y reco gn i zes the difficulty of attempting 
to harmonize behaviorism with the ideal elements of knowledge. 
When the behavior is "peripheral," Perry i s mo r e confident 
that the observation of behavior wil l reveal thou ght. But 
he i s less a s sured when thou ght rece d es and attempts to 
co nceal itself. i?.Jhen deception is practiced or when thou ght 
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is delayed in its expression, tb~ task of discovering the 
ideal and mental is far more difficult because the observer 
can not "see" the ideal. If the pol iceman c auld "see 11 the 
ideas of the bandit at the moment of their inception, he 
might fore stall the robbery. Before be begins to carry out 
his plan, the ideas of the bandit are quite different from 
the series of bi ol ogi cal. acti vi ties whic h 1 ead up to the 
robbery. The mind of the bandit can not be identified with 
the physical processes whereby he works his ideas out. There-
fore, external observation is not an all-sufficient method 
in the discovery of mind. My idea of a house that I am 
going to build some t .i. me in the future certainly can not be 
identified with the actual process of building the house 
when the time comes. My idea represents a present content 
and forecasts a future event, while not a s j ngl e biological 
event concerned with building the house has Yet occurred. 
Besides, a present biological event can not possibly repre-
sent a future event, it can not transcend itself. 
Furthermore, Perry's identification of the idea s of 
different persons is open to question. If it were true that 
my neighbor fl.nd I experience the very same ideas, it would 
have the effect of denying the private nature of our separate 
experiences. With the privacy of experience denied, behav-
iorism is free to assert complete objectivity. If we allow 
the i d entity of thought and thing, and also that the thing 
can serve in two contexts, we may appa rently reach the 
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identity of ideas in different person s . This is possible 
only u p on the assumption that the thing i s reducible to its 
logical character, and that it be allowed to enter into two 
relationships as the same "a" may be the second letter in 
"man" and the fifth in "mortal." As long as Perry remains 
on the logical level, the t h eory a ppears plausible; but when 
taken concretely, it shatters on the tough facts of ex-
istence. The choice of the illustration is unfo r tunHte for 
one \vho stresses a natura.l, concrete order of facts. One 
would need only to visit the type-setter to have the argu-
ment decided in a practical and speedy way. Should Perry 
accept the pragmatic outcome, he would find two concrete 
pieces of ty pe similar but not identical~ Unless the typ e-
setter uses the very same piece of type "a 11 in "man, 11 which 
h e uses in the vmrd "mortal" and at the same time, Perry's 
argt®ent possesses no significance. To refut~ the argu-
ment, we need but reveal its misleading character. If con-
sciousness must be brought from subjectivity to objectivity 
over this path, it indeed moves over a hard way. Logically 
we may say that when two minds mean the s ame their ideas are 
i dentical, but psychologically there are two occurrences 
in the separate minds. We reach community of thought and 
understanding not because we experience identical ideas, but 
we experience similar i d eas because of the similarity of 
our mental constitution and experiences. 
We shall now summarize the results of our inquiry 
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conce r ning Perry's form of beha v i orism. Perry is a realist. 
He has brough t to the defense of b ehaviorism the logic a l 
d octri ne of the new realists. As a behav iorist Perry r e duces 
consciousnes s to bodily activity and the selected con t ent of 
the environment. The organism is physical and the environ-
ment is realistic. Therefore , his behaviorism in one aspect 
is n a turalistic. But Perry saves himself from materiali sm 
b y s ubordina ting t h e phy sica l to the logical, and by con-
ceivi ng t h e universe in terms of logical entiti e s. There 
are t wo worl ds- - a natural wor ld a nd a logical world-- with no 
communication between them. The natural world is independent 
and extra-mental, the logica l world is extra-ment al, e xtra-
organ ic,. and unsci en tific. We shall defer t h e evalua tion of 
logical behaviorism until we have examined the behaviorism 
of Holt a nd Russell. 
b . ~Behaviori sm of Holt. 
~)Exposition and Metaphysical Implic a tions. Professor 
Holt rewards us with a type of behaviorism which, though 
unbelievable, is exceedingly fa.cinating. The universe is 
Being; every thing that can be thought of just is. (Probably 
the notion of "pure exp erience" wa s suggested to both James 
a nd Holt through their study of Avenarius.) The unive r se of 
"being" is composed of 1 og i cal or neutral entities organized 
upon different plane s of comple xity. The nervous sy s tem c an 
s elect and respond to complexities withi n , or conti guous to, 
its own plane. It can res p ond to color because it can carry 
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the vibrations of color stimulations on the level of its 
ovm activities. Any "cross-section" of the universe selected 
withi n the upper and lower limens of visibility is called 
consciousness bec ause it is that portion of the universe 
to which the nervous system responds. Thj_s "manifold" is 
const a ntly changing as the nervous system changes. The 
direct cause of the nervous change (and therefore of selection) 
is the objective stimulation which is complex and continuous. 
Therefore, mind or consciousness is entirely objective--
"a cross-section of the universe, selected by the nervous 
system_. nl Mind then is a highly complex organization of 
the simple eleme nts of the world. 
Things also are generated by the activity of the logical 
entities. They are the more or less complex forms of · these 
pure entities as expressed in the hierarchy of spe-cific 
being. Locke said that "primary qualities" are objective 
and "secondary qualities". a re subjective. Berkeley drew 
Locke's primary qualities to the subjective side of being. 
But Holt reverses Berkeley's position and declares t hat both 
secondary and primary qualities are objective because they 
are composed of the same "neutral stuff . 11 "Mind and matter 
consist of the same stuff, and the little entity that in 
aggregates of various densities constitutes the second a ry 
qualities is not far removed from the little atom that 
constitutes physical bodies, and in point of substance there 
1 New Realism, p. 354. 
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is no distinction at all. So, it seems to me, we get an 
intelli gible picture of how the secondary qualities are as 
objective as the primary. Their being included or not being 
incJuded in the class of things which we name a conscious-
ness, depends for both alike, on their being specifically 
res p onded to by a nervous system. But consciousness is in 
no · sense at all within the nervous system. nl This view 
obtains throughout The Concept of Consciousness, especially 
is it set forth in the chapters on ''Substance of Mind" and 
"Substance of Matter. " 
In Holt's ear lier writings, the "specific resp onse" of 
the org<mism seems to have been to the physical objects 
selected by the nervous system from a realistic environment. 
But in its most refined form, Holt's behaviorism is the 
specific response of the nervous system to neutral entities 
which play upon it to limit and define its action. With the 
fulfilment of the promised revision of "specific response,"2 
the immediate stimulus "recedes," leaving the nervous system 
to fac e directly the radiating, pure simplicities. Holt's 
revision appears in its best form in the Freudian Wish, in 
which he describes behavior concretely enough to win the 
approval of Watson. It is described not so much as mere 
reflex resp onse ·to objects in the environment as "integrated" 
respons e in a ·."situation" in which purpose is revealed. What 
1 New Realism, p. 355. 
2-Ibid., p. 355, footnote. 
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Watson regards as Holt's clearest and best description of 
behavior is illustrated by the man's behavior successively 
carried out by the purchase of a railway ticket, fo l lowed 
b y a series of acts which culminate in the placing of 
furniture in the new home. 1 Just here Holt points ou t that 
the "too materialistically-minded" biologist, fearful of 
encountering a "psychic" spook, reduces behavior to pure 
reflex action induced by a specific stimulus. But Holt 
contends that the behavior is evoked by the complex mani fold 
as a whole. "No immediate sense stimulus whatsoever will 
figure in a straightforward and exact description of what 
t h e creature is do ing. n2 The purchase of the ticket, the 
meeting of the real est a te dealers, the purchase and pla~ing 
of the furniture, etc.--all these special a cts which ma ny 
behaviorists consider the last word in behavior, become, for 
Holt, but subordinate event s in the more comprehensive process 
of buying a home. The more circumscribed behavior is caught 
up into the larger circle of activities as the bodily inte-
gration p roceeds, and •mental ends" falsely ascribed to a 
t h inking subject are displ a ced by the surmoun t ing manifol d 
which is always objective. The significant feature of this 
doctrine is the objective refere nce of the response and the 
way it is determined by the environment in terms of which it 
may be completely described. To deserve the name "behavior," 
the incomplete action aimed at a complex order of entities 
~Freudian Wish, pp. 83ff. 
Ibid. , p. 78. 
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must fit into the more complete activity which always com-
prehends the less complete. This is Holt 's logical behaviorism. 
But there is another phase to Holt 's thought that tends 
to agree with the materialism of Watson. By identifyi ng 
thought with muscular tonus too feeble to arouse over~ behav-
ior, Holt approaches Watson's position that thought is to 
be identif i ed with "implicit processes" too remote as yet 
to be detected by instrumentation.l The difference between 
thought and overt behavior is that the latter is more wide-
spread and observable. They are the opposite end s of the 
same process that begins in the depths of the organism and 
refers to . some situation in the environment. Thought is a 
"neuro- muscular ·attitude" which prepares the body for a.. 
course of action toward things and occurrences and their 
relations in the environment. Such environment seems to be 
nai'vely realistic, and no.t logi cally so. Holt agrees with 
James in denying consciousness as an entity an.d in reducing 
it to a relation that the organism sustains to the environ-
ment. The organism is the 11knower" and the objects to which 
the "knower" resp onds are "the known. " The objects are known 
imr-ediately without the intervention of a filmy veil of i mage 
or idea. Mind and thing are identical in the act of thinking. 
The organism is a thing among things. All of the activities 
of the organism, whether implicit or overt, must be described 
as functions of the outer reality to which they are resp onses. 
1 F ·ct· w· h 68 ,-. reu 1an -L~ , p. • 
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Even a volition, such as our purpose to walk safely above a 
cliff, is to be fully defined as a function of the edge of 
th . . l e prec1p1c e. ·. The purpose that is to be carried out by the 
organism is embodied in the "neuro-muscular apparatus." 
Holt accepts Sherrington's statement that "in the light of 
the Darwinian theory every reflex must be purposive. " In 
this respect, he differs from Perry, who says that reflexes 
and instincts are purposive only when so modified by experi-
ence that we may say the organism learns. The reduction of 
consciousness and purpose to the physical category, and the 
identification of thought with muscular tonicity imply na:fve 
natur ;.llism. 
(2) Criticism. The first fundamental difficulty that 
confronts Holt's theory is how dessicated, logical proposi-
tions can generate the multiplicity of concrete f acts. Pro-
fessor Royce used to say that brute facts have a way of 
being very stu1Jborn. So long as we are dealing with concepts 
only, we are able to manipulate them without mucb friction. 
So long as our 1 ogi cal co-ordi na.tion s keep clear of parti-
culars, they glide to their destination smoothly; but when 
they descend to the concrete, they are apt to shatter upon 
the hard f a cts of existence. All theories that have dealt 
with the universal alone have come to grief as soon as they 
descended to the dreary realms of the finite. So long as we 
are dealing with concepts, as Holt is here, we may define them 
recessively in simpler terms until at length we arrive at a 
!concept £! Consciousness, p. 287. 
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few basal indefi nabl e s . We may b uild a h o s e of indefinable 
blocks, but we shall have for our ~ly a multipl icity 
of blocks. 1,'qe can n ot expect to nave something entirely 
diff e r ent from the single block. . ' By what log i c then can we 
expect to arrive a t a. definable by the mult,'iplice tion of 
/ 
inde finables? How can we deduce fron. :p~~osi t iona some thing 
. , ' , 
utterly unlike t hem? Should we cons tr~c ~ the logical enti-
ti es t o a high degre e of c omplexit*ye cc._n not presume to h ave 
as a result mind and· matter. The s e f all a cy lurks here as 
~  
we h ave dealt with i n t he casepA:--Spinoza's "Infini te Sub-
. __./ --
s t ance" with its attributes of t hought and extension. So 
here, mind and ma tter p i erc e to the heart of the logi c al 
entity which can not b e regarded as "neutra.l stuff, 11 for 1 t 
shares in the stuff of both mind a nd matter. Its unity is 
broken up, and a duali sm cleave s t o the center of thing s . 
Moreover, a log ical entity in no way resembl e s a man or a 
tree, much less a feeling of joy or sorrow. We find it 
equally difficult to speak of simple entitie s , though mul-
ti r)lied to compl exity , a s pos s essing ability to make "selec t-
ive response" to a limited portion of a n ultimately neutral 
environment. We shall also h a ve to f a ce a situation dif f icult 
to conceive in the f act that a unified activity of neutral 
entities not only g enerates mi n d and ma tte r but also develops 
a n antithesis between them in the character of stimulus and 
and response. This would seem to call for the diremption of 
the simple, unified activity of the neutral proposition, and 
19? 
would also leave the antithesis without cause. 
Another vital objection might be brought against the 
conv ersion of "secondary qual ities" into physiological densi-
ties. If "color" is entirely objective, and if it sends 
out vibrations through intervening space to a nervous system 
which must carry vibrations of the same frequency in order 
to make response, why should Holt mention consciousness at 
all in connection with the situation? He tells us truly 
that "qualities" are no more in the · nervous system than in 
intervening space. 1 But why should "consciousness" be relat ed 
more to the response of the nervous system than to the "in-
tervening space"? For vibrations of the same frequency are 
involved in each case. ~~at besides vibrations is needed 
in order to see color? Moreover, when qual ities are turned 
into "densities," there is no longer need to reso rt to 
"neutral" stuff; for the stuff of the universe is now ex-
clusively physic a l. 
We have seen how difficult it is for I-iol t to hold to a 
logical world and an empirical world at the same time without 
inconsistency. On the one hand, the resp onse of · the nervous 
system appears to be made to 'a spatial object if it brings the 
body to touch that object, to point toward it, to copy it, 
and so forth. 11 It is the empirical response of the organism 
to a perfectly realistic environment. But Holt has not s hown 
how the nervous system can respond to an object or an ideal 
1 New Realism, p. 354. 
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situation which is not present to the senses of the organism. 
On the other hand, the organism can not resp ond to absent, 
ide a l, and non-~xistent entities for the simple reason, as 
Professor Rogers has shown, 1 that in a world of log ical 
entities, there is no concrete organism. There is only the 
cancer ,! organism and concept response. Halt must either 
take his :logical consideration half-heartedly or surren der his 
empiricism a,ltogether. Should we grant that Holt has de-
fined reality in logical terms, we c a n not be certain that 
we could find the logical entities were we to set forth 
scientifically with the help of experiment· and instrumentation. 
It might be said of Holt's conception that it is an at-
tempt to unite the logic al and empirical p oints of view with-
out recognizing thei r i n comp a tibility. Though more thorough-
e;oing t han most behaviorists, Holt has h ad less influence than 
either Perry or Russell; a nd since he has altered h is extreme 
position, he probably does n ot deserve as extended treatment 
as the others. "Ne shall now turn our attention to the be-
haviorism of Russell. 
c. The Behaviorism of Bertrand Russell. Russell's 
g eneral aim, to which we have alre ady made reference, i s to 
reconcile the materi al istic tenden cy of psycholo gy cU '3 repre-
sented by behaviorism with the "anti-materialistic" trend of 
phy sics as represented by Einstein, Eddington, and o thers. 
The Point of reconciliation is found in the conception of 
1English and American Philosophy Since 1800, p. 447. 
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"neutral stuff," which he adopts from Professor James and 
the iunerican ne w realists. 
(1) Exposition a.nd I mplications. Russell agrees with 
James in "rejecting cons ciousness as an entity," bu t he 
follows the Americ a n realists only in_ part. Certain of the 
P.meri can new realists reduce the world entirely to neutral 
stuff, while Russell admits images which belong on l y to the 
mental c ategory. There may also b e occurrences which do not 
enter into any "experience." that is, they do not come into 
relat ion with any organism. They belong only to . the physical 
world . There a r e t wo kinds of causal laws, one belongs to 
phy sics and the other to psychology. For the old-fashioned 
scientific formula of c ause and effect, mod ern physics has 
substituted laws Qf change . Nature is a conti nuous process 
of change, and the cause must be contiguous to the effect. 
'Caus e is neither universal nor necessary; it is comprised 
of more or less variable antecedents . The causal laws may be 
stated in terms of collections of "particulars. 11 Russell 
illustrates these l aws by stellar photo g raphy. Each star 
produces its separate effect u p on the plate. Between the p late 
and the star, something is happ ening dynamically which c onnects 
with the sta r. The occurrences at any particular pl a c e (on 
the plate) constitute a "perspe ctive. " It is a view of t he 
world fr om that place. The perspective gathers all the "appear-
ances of different objects from a given place. ni The human 
lThe Analvsis of Mind, p. 105. 
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brain, as passively as the photog raphic plate, is affected 
by all t h e sensations that come within its scope. These make 
up the "perspective" which is s o i mpor tant for psychology. 
They are all the perceptions at a given time in a gi ven 
brain, and they are purely natural events. On the othe r hand, 
if the stars were photog raphed from all points of space, 
all the different appearances of one star would re p resent 
that star. Physics regards the appearances f r om different 
pl a ce s , an d co nstruct s ob jects or t h ings out of "sets of such 
a ppearances." The ''limiting set of appearances," in which 
the "l a ws of perspective" operate i n the absence of any 
distorting medium, may be defin ed from the stand p oint of 
physics as a "piece of matter." These two ways of collec ting 
"particulars" repres ent r espectiYely the laws of p syc h ology 
and t h e l Bws of physics. 
The fundamental diffe r ence between psychology and physics 
is tha t "physics treats as a unit the whole system of a ppear-
ances of a piece of matter, whereas psychology is interested 
in certain of these a ppearance s themselves."l P sychology is 
concerned with "actual particulars," wh ile y:hysic s is con-
cerned with a "system of particulars" as a causal unit. 
Having shown the difference between psycholo gy and 
physics, Russell goes on to de f ine the laws of psyeholog y. 
His chief aim is to d imini sh the differences commonly supposed 
to exist between mind and matter. Conventional psychology 
Ibid. , p.l04. 
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believes that thoughts, desires, feelings, emotions, etc., 
are radically diffe r ent from the elements of the physical 
world. Mind is com posed of introspective element s; matt er 
is constituted of atoms and electrons. But Russell concludes 
that matter is ultimately sensations, and "other things 
similar to sensation s as regards extent and duration."l 
And thoughts, feelings, desires, emotions, etc., are "all 
·oui l t up out of sensations and ima ge s alone," and sensati ens 
do not differ intrinsically from i mages. Thus mind and 
matter draw very close together, almost to the p oint of 
identification. Images d iffer from sensations only in their 
causal laws. Images arise through "mnemic causation" which 
means that "past occurrences in t he history of t he organism" 
must be added to the present stimulus and bodily condition 
in order to account for the present resp onse.2 However, if 
mnemic causation "is derivative from ordinary physical c ausa-
tion i n nervous (and other) tissue," 3 there is little (if 
a ny) difference between images and sensations. 
Sensations and images can be und erstood only within the 
back-ground of the "ultim.s te constituents" of the universe. 
':J.'hese are ultima te in the sense that they have been analyzed 
as far as possible with our present knowledge. w·ith added 
light , they are capable of further analysis. 'l'he ultimate 
constituents are neither mind nor matter; they are _neither 
lThe Anal ysis of Mind, p. 121. 
2Ibid., pp. ??-92-.-
3rbid., p. ::1o?. 
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physical bodies in space nor elements of consciousness as we 
understand them in their hi gh degree of complexity. Russell 
has already p ointed out two vmys of g roup ing p a rticul a rs, one 
of v!hi ch g ives us nthings," the other, "series of perspectives." 
The particulars may be grouped actively, for exarnple, where 
a star is, or passively, where there is a nervous system • 
. B'r om the physical standpoint, a perception is "the appearance 
of the object from a place where there is a orain," or nervous 
structur-e which constitutes the medium. These appearances 
(happenings) of objects differ from the appearances elsewhere 
in that they "give rise to mnemic phen.omena and are them-
eel ves affected b y mnemic phenomena. ul This mean s that they 
"may be remembered a nd ass oci a ted or influence ou r habi ts, 
or g ive ri s e to images, etc." They are also modified by our 
past experien c e. Thi s des cri p t i on bears all the significance 
of t he conve ntional notion of p erception. Appe arances become 
perceptions only because they occur in connection with a 
living b eing. We r e we to subtract frbm the perception t h e 
mnemic phenomenon, that is, the part played by past exp erience, 
the ~emainder would be a "sensat ion." The "sensati on is the 
t h eoretic a l core of actual experience; t he actual experience 
i s t h e perception ."2 
Moreover , sensation is not an awareness of the object; 
it is identified with what we ordinarily regard as the ob ject. 
1 The Anal vs i s of Mind, p. 131. 2- ~ -I b id. I p. 132. 
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If we look at a patch of color, the sensatio n is the patch of 
color. In this identification, Russell follows James, Dewey, 
lih ach, and the 1\merican realists. In one instance, the p a tch 
of color is "an actual constituent of the physical world. ul 
In another, it is both p hysical and psychical. 2 In yet aneth-
er, sensation is neutral, neith er men tal nor physic a l . The 
whole i mpr ession seems to b e that s ensations are the neutral 
"particulars" related to a nervous system, or structure.3 
Sensation is not co gn i tive; it is the cause of cogni tion. It 
provides the data for "knowled ge of the physical world, in-
e luding our own bodies." The sensation is the sign of other 
things with which· it is related . Just here Russell seems to 
incline toward na:l!ve re alism, for he describes a common-sense 
world of objects relate d to a n organism. The ment a l life is 
constituted of sensations and images. The images are copie~ 
of past sensations. If the images are copies of sensations 
and a r e derived from them, do they differ from the s ens a tions 
intrin sically? Russell says that they do not dif f er in this 
respect. They differ as to t h eir causal l R.ws. .But a re their 
causal laws not physical in t he l as t analysis? Past. sensa-
tions depend upon present sensations; present sensations 
dep end upon external stimuli. Therefore, images whose exist-
ence and character are derived from past sensations are 
mediately dependent upon external stimuli which are physical. 
The "sensat ions" and "images 11 of Russell may be identified 
1 The Analysis of Mind, p. 142. 2- - -
3Ibid., p. 143. Ibid., p. 144. 
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(for para ctical purposes) with Hume's "impressions" and 
"ideas."l In this phase of his thinking, Russell adopts 
sensationalism as Rogers declares. 2 
But Russell is not an intentional sensationalist in 
the sense of the older school. His conception bears other 
implications. He endeavors to preserve a distinction between 
sensation and image. He agrees with Hume tha.t there is a 
distinction between them, but he does not think it can be 
based on the nforce and violence" of the i wpression and the 
"faintness" of the idea. :P.'or images sometimes are as "forceful" 
aa sensations. The real difference is to b e found in the 
man ner of causation and the effects. The sens a tion i s g overned 
by a physic al cause; the image is produced by mnemic causation 
and the physical causation. The stimulation of nerves leading 
into the brain plays an i mportant role in the causation of 
sensations , while imag es arise from our total past experience. 
Sensations enter through the sense organs, but not so with 
images. Imag e s are sub stituted for the psyc h ic a l nature of 
the "subject" or "self." Images are "faded'' sensations in 
the sense that they take their place in a past context. 
Since the "fading" process is rather rapid, t h e sensati on 
turns quickly into an im a.ge. Sensations belong equally to 
psychol o gy and physics; images are exclusively psychological 
d a.ta. 
The last statement app arentl y redeems Russell's philoso~ 
~Ibid., p. 145. 
English and .American Philoso phy since 1800,· p p . 439-440 
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phy from materialism. Sometimes doubt is expressed as to 
whether the advan t age shoul d be given to psychology, or 
physics . 1 Sensations, as we have seen, are in "causal de-
p end ence u p on physical l aws." Images are subject to mn emic 
caus a tion. But even mnemic caus ation" may (italics mine) 
be reducible to ordinary physical causation i n nervous tissue. 11 
Wh et:her it is thus reducible, Russell is not sure. Whether 
mnemic causation is ultimate, he does not decide. 2 However, 
he thinks that "the materialistic answer" is "more p robable." 
This would me an materialism if matter were ultima te. But 
if matt.er is only a "logic al fiction" and not the ulti mate 
re ality, it might still be possible that an ultimate sci entif-
ic a cco unt of t h e world could be rendered in te rms of psy c h olo-
gy rather than physics. Were the c aus a l laws of t he universe 
ex·pressed in terms of "ul t ima. te particulars," they would 
a T-PlY equall y to psychology and physics. Since the da t a of 
bo t h psychology and physics "are s ubject to psychological 
causal laws, 11 while the d ata of ma t t er are definable onl y 
in terms of physical c ausal laws, p s y cholog y comes nearer 
t he e xpres s ion o f t h e ultimate nature of things. In this 
respect , Russell inclines to id eali sm. 
we . h ave seen that Russell conceives ultimate reality as 
"neutral stuff " or "ultimate constituen ts . "3 These elemen t s 
are neithe r mind no r matter in the usual sense of the terms. 
1~ Analysis of Mind, pp. · 303-305 . 
2Ibid., p . 305. 
3 Ibid. , p . 1 24 . 
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When they lend themselves to nervous tissue, or the plate of 
the camera (or any instrmnent that can record sens a tions), 
they are called "perspectives," particulars gathered pas sively 
a t one place. When collected actively from diverse points , 
they represent a ~bing." Sensati ens and imag es take their 
place within this vast scheme. Images are always passive, 
cmd they are independent of the l aw s of physics . Sensati ens 
and images with their relations primarily constitute the 
mental. 'l'hese are the ultima te data of psychology. 
But there are other elements that enter in to the mental 
in its more compl ex forms. Does consciousness characterize 
the mental? According to this view, it certainly is not 
fun damental . Sensation does not demand the existence of 
con s ciousness. We may be conscious of sensation, but we 
are not a.lways conscious of it. 'l'here are unconscious be-
liefs and uncons c ious desire s. In fact, there are no "mental 
or other occurrences of which we are always conscious whenever 
they happen. 111 Mere imagination does not bear the character-
istic, c onsciousness, unl e ss accompanied by a "belief which, 
when we reflect up on it, make s us feel that the ima ge is a 
'sig n' of something other t han itself."2 In this instance, 
the image may be said to constitute consciousness of the 
sensation which it follows, and of which it is a 11 copy." 
The belief must be of the nature of objective reference. 
1
.'/hen di reo ted to objects of perception, the belief assumes 
the form of expectation. But, since expectation may be 
!The Analysis of Mind, p. 388. 
2T"'hT' - . - -Ibid • , p. 28 9 • 
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disappointed and memory is fallible, we must extend the 
definition to include t he assumption tha t the beliefs are 
true. ll'urthermore, "beliefs, desires, volitions, and so on" 
which are complex phenomena constituted of sens ations and 
images interrelated, and which are "di stinc ti vely mental, and 
furthest ; r:e .moved from physics, are, like physical objects, 
constructed or inferred, not part of the orieinal stock of 
data in the per fected science. ~  
Some negative conclusion s may be drawn from Russell ' s 
theory of mind. Memory, which is usually thought to be a 
characteristic of mind , may b e explained physiologically. 
It can not serve to disti nguish the mental . Some of the 
behaviorists assume that because the organism is capable of 
acquiring experience it ·bears the mark of the mental. .l:lut 
this may b e exp lained through t he e ducation of the nerves, 
through a modification of the organism. Consciousness, 
experience, memory--none of these is a sure sign of the 
mental. 
However, "subjectivity" is a marked characteristic of 
mind. It means nothing of a private chara cter as conv en-
tional psychol ogy views it. ~3ubjectivity mean s the collection 
of appearances of things at a g iven pl a ce 1.11Thich, at a g iven 
time, constitutes a "perspective." If occurrences are viewed 
dynamicall y in succession, t hey form a "biography. 11 Per-
spectives and biographies are not peculiarly mental, but t h ey 
1 Ibid. ,-;: 300. 
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presuppose the mental a s in mnemic caus a tion. Subjectivity 
and mnemic causat:h_Qll.§. are the most essential chara cte ri stics 
of psychological l aws. 
We have seen something of Russell 's conception of ultimate 
reality, and the essenti a l characteristics of mind as he 
conceives th~m; but we hav e not yet set forth the character 
of his b ehavi orism. We should call Russell a methodological 
behaviorist, or no behaviorist at all we re it not for t he 
f ac t t ha t he attempts t o deliver b eha viorism from a materialis-
tic ultimate by interp r eting it in terms of an anti-materia~is­
t ic physics. A log ical con cept i on of the universe does not 
n ecess a rily imply b ehavio r ism. 
In what sense, then, is Russell a behaviorist? He 
retains in abundanc e psycholog ica l terms such as "consci ous-
ness, 11 "desire, 11 "memory," "imar.;e, " "volition," 11mind, 11 
etc. He even declares tha t Watson denies the :pl ain facts of 
experience when he rejects images. But we must n ot think 
that the "imag e" retained by Russell is anything psych ical 
in -the conventional sense. Th e image mruces no reference 
beyond itself without the attachment of "belief. " (The 
"b elief" in respect to its cause an d ori g in is exceedingly 
o bscure; it is a mere add en dum .) The image is not con s cious 
of itself. It is a 11 faded 11 sensation and, there fore it is 
p hy sical because sensat ion is r hysical Yrhen nervous tissue 
i s affected. At any rate, if sens a tion is not physical, it 
is neutral. The im~ e. then, would be neutral, not p sychica l. 
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It could become psychical only by magic. 
Moreover, word-habits may be substituted for images. 
In this respect Russell apJ) rO aches Watson ' s po si ti on, though 
there remains an apparently important difference . In his 
discussion of "Words and Meaning,"1 Russell adopts partial ly 
the viewpoint of Vatson. The "unders tanding" of words re-
qv.i res nothing mental . It demands only an appropriate r2 sponse. 
'rvords displace images in the "demonstrative" use of languag e , 
and such usage can be accounted for by behavioristic princi-
ples. Words which produce certain effects (as emotions) when 
corrm10nly used in the environment, w·ill cause s i mi l a r behav-
ior without the intermediary of " ideas. " Such results rna;,:: 
be e xpe cted even in "narrative. " " The more familiar we are 
with words, the more our ' thinking ' goes on in words instead 
of ima ges . 112 But, in origin at least, words employed in 
"thinking'' depend u po n images. At thi~ point, Hussell parts 
company with ':Vatson. He includes Wa tson ' s "inner speech" 
and g oes beyond it . When the object is present, it may be 
the cause of the wor d; but when it i s absent, the occurrence 
of t h e word , c an . not be accounted for by the extreme behaviorist. 
Gene tic a lly, language-hab its depend upon images. And t he word, 
in t he absence of the object, is caused by an image. '!lhen-
ever ~e use a word , either overtly or implicitly , a sensat ion 
or image lies at its roots , that is, it has been asso c iated 
with it, a n d now through habit cause s it. In a ll of this, 
I ' The Analysis of Mind. 
2!Did~---- -- ----
210 
Russel-l ·seems to agree with Watso n that there a r e phys i cal 
objects (in t be usual sense of the term) in the envir onment 
which pr ovide the s t imula tion to produce t h e 11worcl." 
Rus s ell manifests the b ehavior istic at titude also in 
h i s tre atment of consciou snes s . It is defined in tenns of a 
11 rel a tion of an ima ge or a word to an object,"l the object 
being d efi ned a s "me an ing . u2 Consc ious n es s is r emoved from 
it s cen t r a l r>l a ce as t he e ssence of mind , a nd it turns o ut 
at leng t h to be but 'a trivi al and unimportant out c ome o f 
li nguistic habits. 113 Such a treatment of consciousness 
a ccords with the gene ral tenor of behaviorism. 
Furthennore, Rus s el l ad op ts the ob jective stand p oint of 
behaviorism. He begins and eno s with t h e point of v i e w of 
the ob serve r. He prefers t h e out-of- d oors. The re is noth ing 
to be gained by delving into the subjective and private. 
"Self-knowledgeu is "precarious and deceptive." The me thod 
of introspection is no more trustworthy than external ob-
serva tion. '!Jhile Russe l l cl oes not deny int r os p ection, he 
assigns to it a subordinate r ole. He incli ne s to Watson's 
vie;,~r that imag es ( and these are the only psychical elements 
in mind) o f bodily movements may be explained as i n cipient 
muscular and glandular movements. It would not surprise 
Russell to find by experiment with a delicate instrument to 
r e cord small movements in the throat when the i nstrument i s 
~Thi Analysis of Mind , p. 28 8 . 
Ib d., Lecture XI. 
3Ibid., p. 40. 
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placed in the mouth, and the subject repeats in his imag ina -
tion a poem, that the instrQ~ent would actually record small 
movements which t Clke place "while he is ' mental ly' saying 
ove r the verses." In all these respects, Russell discloses 
a strong b ias toward behav iorism. 
( 2) Criticism. A serious difficulty is encountered 
in the construction of a log ical universe when the agent of 
construction is omitted. Russell realizes the difficulty, 
for he says that his task would be easier if a "subject" 
were admit t ed. The notion of "perspective" could never 
suggest itself to a n unconscious orga nism. This concepti on 
is reached only on the assumption of a conscious pe r son, 
w·ho ha s experienced perspe c tive s. It is obvious that "appear-
a nce s 11 would be out of place in a world devoid of c onscious-
ness. The conception of "appearances " collected in one p l a ce 
presenting a world-view from that particular point, and the 
''appearances" collected a t the possible infi nite points of 
vievv i a possi-ble because, unwi titin gly,, RusselL. imag ines his 
own mind present at each a ctual or possible point of view, 
t !'lus making possible the perspectives. A p.h oto g r a phic plate 
may be impressed by the oc currences going on within .the world, 
but it is incapable of an advance to perceptions. The per-
spective of the plate would be listless indeed without the 
presence of a conscious observer. 
I f "appear ances" mean nothing apart from mind, they a lso 
demand a cause of some sort in an objective order common to 
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all. How can "appearances" appear without a cause? If 
light radiates from a star, is not the star something from 
which the light radiates? The mind logically constructs 
the star. It constructs it out of the "appearances" or 
occurrences of the star. Must Russell not, therefore, admit 
that the "appearances" of the star occur before there is a 
star? Russell's logical scheme of correlated particulars is 
supported at every turn by the assumption of a common-sense 
world of objects whose appearances differ somewhat from 
different points of view. Without this assumption we have 
neither subject nor object. We are left with "appearances" 
of nothing to no one. With the assumption, we have a · complete 
system which gives meaning to our description, rather than 
sense data with which the logical construction begins. 
Again, who will collect the ''appearances" in order to 
construct the star? With Russell's conscious mind brooding 
over the analytic process, it seems easy to collect the 
p a rticulars. But when we remember that his mind is a passive 
photo g raphic plate with no awareness or apprehension, how is 
it possible for the "appearances" on other photographic pla tes 
(nervous tissues) to be collected into a whole called a star? 
What is their bond of union? With the "appearances" detached 
from both mind and object, the universe breaks up into un-
related fragments of "neutral stuff. " And there is no reason 
for saying that the constructed "thing" is a star, rather 
than a tree, or stone. Russell has analyzed reality into 
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aspects. He has put these aspects together by logical con-
struction and off ered them as a substitute for reality 
itself. 
Russell's treatment of consciousne ss also is question-
able. He denies it a central pl a ce in psychology, and re-
duces it to high ly complex and accidental rel a tions of sen-
sations and images. In fact, relations give to mind its true 
chara cter. Professor Schiller says that Russell's main thesis 
is ~hat "all psychic phenomena are built up out of sensa-
tions and im a ges alone." And he adds, "Actually these struc-
tures do require (and e mp loy) a minu·;1um of mortar, both in Hume 
and in Russell. This is introduced under the names of 'associ-
ation,' 'causality, 1 'memory,' •••• 'meaning.' .t)ut their presence 
and activity are so little emphasized that they are even 
verbally denied, as in the passage just quoted. nl Schiller's 
criticism, which is largely justified, invites from Russell 
the following retort: "If I said 'The walls of my house are 
built of bricks and mortar alone, 1 should I be suppo sed to 
be asserti n g or implying th a t my walls were indistinguishab le 
from a heap of separat e bricks and a p uddle of mortar? It 
is obvious that the bricks in the wall hav e a structure, that 
the structure consists of relations between the brick s, 
tha t these relations are given empirically in whatever 
sense the bricks are given, and that the relations 
1 
"Mr. Russell 1 s Psycholo gy," Journ§l.l of Philosop~. Vol-
ume XIX, No. 11, May 25, 1922. 
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are something other than the materials of which the walls 
a re built. ul He goes on ·to say that sensations and im ages 
d o not constitute psychic phenomena without 11 sui table re-
lations," and that throughout t .b.e bo ok he never ceases to 
emphasize the requi rement of relations. !!lind is made u p 
mostly of a number of comple x habits, "and habits are ob-
viously constituted by rela t ions." Relations and terms a r e 
expe r ienced together empirically. 
Russell's conception of relations, however, only com-
plicates matters the more. It adds another logical entity 
to 1 ink up with the system. If the relations are as real as 
the terms, and if they c an be experienced outr ight, the criti-
cism of Bradley and Royce2 is to the point. As the criticism 
points out, each term is a sepa r ate unit, and eo is the 
relation. The relation, therefore , would need to be joined 
to the terms by another relation and so on ad infinitum .3 
Mechanisms would multiply endlessly. This criticism wil l 
apply to Russell's empirical vi ew of relations which app ear 
to be as substant i a l as t .he mortar between the bricks. On 
the other hand , Russell's stat ement that the " relations are 
something other than the ma teri a ls of which the walls are 
built" loses its significance entirely from the empirical point 
l"Dr. Schiller's Anal ys is of 'The Analysis of Mind ,'" 
Journal of T'hilosonh~, VolumeXIX, No. 24, l'! ov. 23, 1922 . 
ZThe ~.Vo rld and the Individual. Part I (in the discussion 
leadingti'p to the-fourth conception of reality). 
3Appearance ~Reality, pp. 25-34. 
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of view. For this would mean simply that the bricks in the 
house are ''under each other," or "over e a ch other ," or "be-
side each other, " etc. But we may say the s am e ab out the 
b ricks lying in a heap. Rel' tion s woul d be no more signif-
icant in one in s t ance than in the other. So "sui ta-ole rela-
tions" constitute no unique cha racteristic of the mind. In 
the last analysis, sensations and im ages inter-related make 
up the mind f or Russe ll. In order to r ender relations im-
portant, an active mind mus t co nstitute them in experience. 
Furthermore, objectio n might be _found to Russell's 
p h ilosophy on the basis of its ambiguity a nd vagueness. At 
one time, the universe is composed of "particulars" which 
include sensations and images. At another time, "neutral 
stuff" is the all-embracing term. Again, the neutral stuff 
that r elates itself to an organism becomes sensat i on, while 
the neutral stuff that is not rel a ted to nervous tissue 
constitutes physical objects. Sometimes sensations seem to 
b e caused by obj.ects; they are "the irregular appearances 
of physical objects. ul At other times, they are the "ultimate 
constituents" of objects. Sensation is the r es iduum that lies 
beyond the present power of analysis. Since analysis is the 
only way to knbwledge, sensations lie beyond knowledge. Yet 
they are represented as leading to knowledge through the fact 
that they are experienced in the organism. And if sensations 
are de p endent upon the organ ism and all organisms or nervous 
1 The Analysis of Mind, p. 303. 
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tissue, their ultima te nature is seriously compromised. 
There is anothe r way of looking at the problem. It is 
obvious that Russell desires to keep close to the scientif-
ic view of things. He is especially interested in the point 
of view of modern physics which h a s refined matter to energies. 
We might say that the universe is constituted of radiating 
energies, rather than of ma tter or mind. For example, whenever 
the rays of li ght are intercepted by a retina sensations 
occur. These vibrations sweep through the nervous system 
1 eaving images behind them. Sensations and imag es relate· 
themselves in various ways and belief a r ises. l•'inally, 
volition, emotion, desire, and consciousness are present. 
Mind and matter are inferred from the s e nse d a ta, a logical 
world is born. This logical world may be regarded a s the 
p roduct of the finite mind. It may be considered the con-
struction of Russell's own mind. For his re a lity is .con-
structed from the a spects of his own analysis, a rid is collected 
b y the a ctivity of his own mi nd. Instead of presenting us 
with a real world, pink with anima tion, Russell a sks us to 
cont emplate with him the dre a ry solitude of his own logical 
reflection. 
Should Russel l sto p at t h is point, his concep tion would 
imply solipsism, which he seems, at times, to prefer. If 
he would only grant to others the same capability for logical 
construction tha t he possesses, the way to i d ealism would be 
cleared. For he will not allow materi a lism of the older sort. 
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And even if we charge him with sensationalism, as Rog ers does, 
it is a refined sens a ti onalism. It is not meant to be the 
sens a tionalism of material, extra -mental objects, but it is the 
sen s a t i anal ism of "neutral stuff." In the two forms of sensa-
tionalism, the sensations are a ccounted for by different ul-
timate situations. If physi cs is "anti-materialistic," we 
may s ay tha t it is also "pro-idealistic. " So far as analysis 
has carried us, the world is amenable to thought. Russell 
s ays that the analysis ma y be advanced in the future. The 
advance is ever i n the direction of the interpreta tion of the 
ultim a te in terms of mind. And it is not far from a worl d of 
atoms and electrons, or of neutral stuff as the ultima te to 
a concep tion of infinite causality which is of the nature of 
mind, and whose activity is manifest in the order of physical 
thing s. The rad iant energ ies of the universe will t h en be 
regard ed as the con s cious will of t h e Infinite. 
We have now set fort h in detail the types of behaviorism 
a nd their metaphy s ical implic ations. In conc l usion, we shall 
unde r take briefly a critic a l eva luation of behaviorism a s a 
whol e . We shall confine our discussion c h iefl y to the imp or·-
t ::m t typ es--metaphysic al b ehavior i sm and l og ical behav iorism. 
4. Evalua tion of Behaviorism. Since metaphysical behav-
iorism a nd logical b ehaviorism a re disti-ng-uished by diffe r ent 
ultimates, we shall evaluate them separately in the order in 
which we have considered them in t h is discussion. 
a. Evaluation of Metaphy s~~~~ Behavioris~. The 
truth of this typ e of beha viorism invol~es the truth of 
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naturalism. There are at least two forms of naturalism mani-
fest in behaviorism--the crude and the critical; the former 
is represented by Watson, t h e latter by Singer and Dewey. 
Both forms return to the same proposition, namely, that 
physical nature is the final fact of reality. Both apply 
the concepts of science to the interpretation of reality. 
The one accepts scientific concepts uncritically; the other 
subjects them to critical analysis. For both, scientific 
knowl e dge is final, or it is the only verifiable knowledge. 
We may say that naturalism is the application of scientific 
method to philosophy as an exclusive method. Experimental-
ism overshadows sensationalism. The physical response as a 
whole is substituted for the mental, which is constituted 
mechanically of sensations caused by an extra-mental world. 
"Ideal" sensations have replaced "real" sensations. They are 
polished and rounded into suitable form by analysis. Or 
they a re not empl oyed at all (though in good repute) in the 
new structure of mind. 
Another way of stating the distinction between crude and 
critical naturalism is on the basi s of the acceptance or 
rejection of "substance." Crude naturalism regards the 
concepts of sci e nce , such a s "matter," "force," or "energy," 
as ultimate and interprets them in terms of universal sub-
stance. Though matter h a s been refined into the finer fonn 
of energy, it is still substantial. The organism is sub-
stantial matter in action; even the light wave s that affect 
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the retina are material, and a re the effects of concrete 
things in a "real" en vi ronmen t. Whether we regard the monism 
of matter. as expressed in Btlchner's succinct phrase "Keine 
Kraft ohne Stoff,--kein Stoff ohne Kraft!," or Spencer's 
apotheosis of Force, or the conception of universal energy, 
we refer sub stantially to matter in some form. This is crude 
natura lism. One aspect of met aphysical behaviorism adopts 
this point of view. On the other hand, critical naturalism 
rejects "sub s t ance" as enduring qualities, but retains the 
term as signifying quantitative constancy. The universe is 
constantly und er~~ng transformations wh ic h yield stead fast, 
pred ictable, and ev.en measurable consequences. The concept 
"atom" becomes an "ideal" construction to be employed in the 
formulation of natural l a ws. Such laws are ab breviated 
descriptions of the sequenc es of nature as revealed in ex-
perience. Natu r e is k n own thr oug h the descriptions which 
s erve a s an e co n omy of thought. Nature is no abysmal "un-
k nown" behind e~perience. Experience busies itself directly 
with the "foreground of n a ture ." That foreground d oes not 
b a r our way to the ·backg round , -but it serves to co nduct us 
t h ither. This is critical naturalism which as s umes that the 
final :fact is physical, or tha t ultimate reality can b e 
explained in physical terms; or that physical theories are 
the only verifiable t h eories. In its highest form, metaphysi-
cal b ehaviorism assumes this point of view. It differs 
widely from the sensationalism of Locke, Hume, and .James Mill, 
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and it represents a significant advance over old-fashioned 
material ism. Even the cruder form of this type of behavior-
ism may be said to represent an advance over sensationalism, 
since it adopts the wholeness of the biological organism as 
a unit of interpretation. 
Behaviorism, as we have pointed out, has fixed u pon 
physics as the fundamental science. It therefore enjoys a 
large sha re of the prestige which science has acquired. 
Science has cast a spell over the imagination to a remarkable 
degree. Almost every convenience and luxury of home, commerce, 
and tra vel is justly accredited to the triumph of science. 
We await with bre a thless interest for its next announcement 
of invention or discovery. 'l'urn where we will, we witness the 
omnipresence of science. The great men of science we venerate; 
they have so enlightened the world. They have mastered nature 
for the common man; they have given to the civilized world a 
sense of security and pow·er. 1Jilhen science speaks, it makes us 
feel that it possesses the f a cts, that it knows. We are not 
surprised that behaviorism feels secure with the ma ntle of 
science about it. 
Moreover, behaviorism selects the same field for its 
labors that science is interested in. Both are busy with 
sequences among phenomena. When it understands itself, science 
makes no mistake concerning where its problems lie. It 
realizes that it is riot concerned with ontological reality . 
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at all. It does not deny the ultimate; it leaves a field for 
philosophy. But behaviorism turns science into philosophy. 
and imagines that it is concerned with ultimate reality when 
it is dealing onl y with phenomena. This constitutes its 
regrettable limitation. 
Doubtless. metaphysic a l b ehaviorism or naturalism is a 
half-truth. It has described more or less accurately the 
reactions of the organism to its stimulations as these re-
res ponses a ppear to an observer. but it has jeopardized the 
splendid results by needlessly omitting the observer. For 
objective observation is a derivative of s elf-observation. 
Observations of a half-world are reliable only on the condi-
tion that the half-world is the expression of a whole-world. 
Science itself is but a mechanism of human beliefs whose 
validity is questionable. unless the world which engages the 
attention of scienc e is the manifestation of Infinite Mind. 
Knowledge of the lavirs of behavior provides a certain ground 
of prediction and control only up on the assumption of a stead-
f a st purpose at the center of things. Naturalism offers a 
convenient method of depicting behavior. but it possesses 
no value as ontological e xplanation. 
Metaphysical behaviorism in its naturalistic phase can 
not explain the facts of consciousness. It deliberately 
omits certain facts of the universe. As we have seen through-
out our study. the reasons for such exclusion are not con-
vincing. Naturalism can not claim to be a full-orbed doctrine 
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when it excludes an important phase of reality. In order 
to determine that there are facts of consciousness, we need 
but appeal to consciousness itself. To deny the facts of 
consciousness is to deny the facts of nature and of the ob-
jective world; for though distinct. they are indissolubly 
joined in experience, tha t is, one does not exist without the 
other. Naturalism seeks to extend its explanation of a por-
tion of exp erience to the whole of exp erience. and, for that 
reason, reveals its limitation. 
Naturalism p roves inadequa te also to explain its chosen 
fundamental--matter itself. Matter is the behavior experi-
enced, tha t is, reacted to. Berkeley conclude d that 1Q be is 
to be perceived. Behaviorism makes an advance over Berkeley, 
and say s that 1.£ be is !.9_ be reacted to. Matter must be 
particular and not universal,- for no org anism can react to 
universal behavior. V/hat is matter when not reacted to? 
Does i t ;; c ome into existence only whe n some organism selects 
it and reacts to it? Behaviorism can never tell us wha t 
matter is except in the instance of t h e matter behaving for 
the ob servation of an organism. What matter is in itself, 
behaviorism can never know. If matter is to serve as the 
object of science. it must be specific~ Then its universal 
and metaphysical character can not be affirmed. But be-
haviorism does affirm the universal and metaphysica l char-
acter of matter. The.refore, matter can not serve as the 
field for the operation of science, and behaviorism grows 
223 
dogmatic rather than scientific. If matter is universal and 
that to which the organism responds is specific, what is the 
relation between them? This problem is left completely in 
the dark. Behaviorism can not declare for the universality 
of matter in motion (as it does) without the extension of its 
principle of observation beyond the realm of behavior, for 
matter must behave often when there is no organism to observe 
such behavior. Logically, this conclusion supersedes the 
principle of observation and substitutes for it the universal-
izing principle of thought. Since the organism can not 
respond to a universal, a mind that universalizes is implied 
even in a naturalistic conception which recognizes matter as 
a universal. 
Further, naturalism attempts to hold t o the empirical 
point of view and at the same t ime it is materialistic. It 
does not discern that empiric ism and ma terialism a re entirely 
. 
incompatible doctrines. It has been obvious since the time of 
Hume tha t empiricism cancels materiali sm altogether; for we 
experience only ideas, not ma terial objects or laws. On the 
other h a nd, materialism cancels empiric ism. Materiali am, 
if scientific and consistent, views nature as a unified system 
of' matter and its l aws. If thought appears i n the s y stem, 
it must be regarded as integrated to the whole. This is 
precisely the way metaphysical behavi_orism views thought--
as t he activity of' ma tter. And by so doine, the very ground 
of empiricism is removed; f'or all empirical reflections and 
224 
explanations . in reference to experience are thus rendered 
impossible. Behaviorism reveals contradictory principles 
within itself. On the other hand, if thought is given any 
status at all in the ultima te, then matter is not .the wh ole 
and materialism is, at lea st, seriously modified. 
Moreover, naturalism is confused when it represents the 
universe as a vast mechanism of matter in motion with its 
potentialities. Matter does not need to be moved by some 
force external to itself; it bears within its own bosom poten-
tialities of movement and develo pment. The re is but one 
order of facts distributed in space and time which includes 
dynamic causation and all. But this conception has insur-
mountable difficulties. Assuming that causality is within 
the phenomena themselves, we might account for action after 
it is onca started by a "Prime Mover." But we can not account 
for the fact that phenomena act in definite ways in accord-
ance with inexorable laws. Desultory action can provide no 
system of lawful intera ction. The purpose so obvious in 
hum an experience, and which the behaviorist insists upon in one 
form, can find n o pl a ce in such a scheme. What reason could 
there be for i matter in motion reaching even an instinctive 
end? If definite and uniform behavior is necessary in order 
to create the idea of mechanism, then something beyond the 
mechanism is needed to make such uniformity possible. Re a lly 
mechanism is a human invention whereby phenomena are cast 
int o intellig ible s equence for the sake of scientific de-
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scription. We then mist ak e our description for t he reality 
described, and convert our mechanism into metaphysic a l 
caus ality by what Bownel c alls the "fallacy of the universal." 
Since behaviorism sinks all diversities in the common ground 
of matter, it may be said to represent the fall a cy of the 
universal on a g igantic scale. 
Behaviorism is ri ght when it insists on the dynamic 
character of the universe, but it locates the dynamism in the 
wrong realm. In order to b ring naturalism to intelligibility, 
we must take causality from the sequential order of phenomena 
and place it in t h e ontologic al order. There is a describab le 
world of phenomena picturable in sp <;,c e and time and an "un-
picturable" metaphysic al caus ality u p on which the world of 
space and time depends. How shall we conceive of c ausality, 
potentiality, et., as relat e d to the elements of matter? 
If energy is the re ality, what becomes of the "particle"? 
How c an a system of behavior c9nsistently hold. the notion of 
potential or virtual behavior?. How can matter in motion ever 
cease t hat motion, or ever start it again? Behaviorism does 
not make clear how t h e p otential becomes actual. There is no 
answer to these questions until we lift our problem to the 
level of the ontol og ical r eality which ever founds the 
phenomenal. 
Furthermore, mechanism explains noth ing ultimately. If 
mechanism seems to expl a in everything according to the current 
lTheory of Thought~ Knowledge, pp. 244ff. 
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view, it ne eds itself to be expl a ined; for it only duplicates 
the facts and in no sense goes beyond them. The effects are 
read back into t h e c auses, t h en these causes mus t account 
for just such effects. In t hi s manner we pass back and forth 
b etween effects and causes without making the least progress 
in final explan a tion. If the cause li es in the antecedent, 
from the simple we could never re ach t h e complex. Fe eling and 
emotion could not arise from unemotiona l antecedents. Conscious-
ness coul d not issue from the uncon sc ious nervous system. 
Intelligent behavior could never be expected from non-intelligent. 
Compl ex social u ehavior coul d never b e a co n sequence of the 
simple adjustment of t h e amoeba in its se a rch for foo d . If 
the more complex i s caused by the simple, the principle of 
causality is violated; fo r the effect e x ce eds the cause. To 
account for t h e higher by t h e lower, the spiritual by the 
material, is to set aside the law of sufficient reason. The 
end interprets the beginning, rather than the begi nning the 
end. Ra ther thun the aco rn shaming the oak, the oak sheds 
a new glory upon the a corn. 
Thought demands a system. But no system can be reached 
by the mechanical route, for such expl a n a tion never end s. 
If the scientific mechanism is ultima te reali t y, another 
mechanism is needed to e xplain the first, and so on ad finitum. 
When once it is seen that c aus a tion is not i n thing s or antece-
dents, we may say that l ater conditions follow the earlier; 
we should import no other meaning. Succession may be affirmed 
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of phenomena, but we must look deeper for caus a lity. Try 
as we may to reach explanation through potentiality, causality, 
and the like, we shall find them futile until we invest them 
with a metaphysical import. On this plane, causality means 
the self-determination of a free intelligence to which all 
movement and unfoldment must be referred. This is the in-
spiring conception to which the healt .l:ly mind must ever turn 
from the dark and impenetrable necessity of mechanical ex-
planation. Under this conception, the past is not the cause 
of the present, nor is the present the cause of the future 
any more than the storm is the cause of the sunchine because 
sunshine follows the storm. Past and future, storm and sun-
shine alike, rest back upon a Supreme Intelligence in which 
each finds its ri ghtful source and sienificance. 
b . Evaluation of Logical Behaviorism. We have seen 
that metaphysical behaviorism reveals naturalistic implications; 
and that there are at least two forms of naturalism--the crude 
and the critical. Within behaviorism itself, there seems to 
be a development. Critical naturalism, which metaphysical 
behaviorism in its higher form assumes, represents a decided 
advance over nai!ve naturalism. The former contains also 
idealistic implica.tions upon which a worthy philosophy may 
be built. In a certain sense, logical behaviorism is an 
advance over metaphysical behaviorism. It has all the advan-
t a g es of naturalism. It invokes the prestige of science. It 
rests its case on the method of analysis. But it has wider 
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scope and deeper foundations than materialism. It embraces 
mathematics and logtc as well as physics. It seeks the 
principles tha t govern all the sciences. Both physics and 
psychology are derivative. The physical character of nature 
already presupposes the more fundament a l relation ships of 
mathematics and logic. Whether we consider the sensation 
as in sensati onali am, or the "crude facts" of experiment a lism, 
we are dealing with complex entities which presuppose simpler 
lo gical elements that do not constitute the subject matter 
of experimentation and observation, Thus the logical re a l-
ist pushes analysis beyond the physical and invests being with 
a logical character which reduces the experimental method of 
behaviorism to a particul a r exemplification of the logical 
method. 
Logical behaviorism is a richer philosophy than metaphy-
sical behaviorism. It recognizes that r eal ity is something 
more than mat"ter in motion. It builds upon entiti e s which, 
on the one hand, may be regarded as extra-mental and unknow-
able; wh i le, on the other h and, they may be r e garded as the 
construction of the finite mind. In the first sense, logical 
behaviorism is subject to the strictures of ~ealism. In the 
second, it lends itself to an idealistic construction. For 
if reality is amenable to our ana lysis, it must be what we 
think it to be. Or our analysis is not vali d for reality. 
But the logical r e alist insists that analysis leads to dis-
covery, to a knowledge of reality. Thought must, therefore, 
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somehow parallel the gro oves of reality. And this is a good 
start toward idealism. Negatively, then, we wish to show 
the l i mitat ions of t h e log ical theory; positively, we wish, 
by pushing the inquiry further, to amend the theory in the 
direction of a synopt ic view of reali ty. 
First, from the logical standpoint, we can not expect 
mind ·and matter to issue from "neutral entities" which are 
neith er mind nor matter. Abs tract universals can not generate 
concrete par ticular s. Logical entities, like Plato's ''ideas," 
dwell apart in impressive austerity. They account for no 
specific fact, no definite ·finite occurrence. The "ideas" 
of Pl a to were meaningless until Aristotle insisted upon their 
incarnation. Nominalism and realism made no approach to a 
solution of their problem as long as they held to the ext r emes. 
Whether nominalism conceives its particulars a s material 
granules c all ed atoms, or as menta l globules called sensations, 
it fails to a ccount for a universalizing intelligence. On 
the other hand, as long as the universals hol d themselves 
aloof from the particulars, they are emp ty and powerless. 
~ ew realism, which unites the strength of Plato and Democritus, 
renders the universals inscrutable and the particulars obscure. 
Dissociated from Infinite and finite minds, the "neutral 
entitie~" are emascul a ted subsistents of the "land of shades." 
They occupy a middle realm between "appearance" and "reality" 
holding no communion with either. They are not "existents." 
They certainly are not "ap pearances." They are "subsistents "; 
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there can be no possible sta tus assigned to them. The uni-
vers a l assumes concreteness only a s it is emb odied i n the 
p articul a r. The p a rticul ar g rows signifi c ant as it realizes 
itself in the universal. 
Secondly, it is aski ng too much of us to conceive of 
"subsisten ts" which are unrel a ted to all mind s , e x cept tem-
porarily to the so-c a lled mi nd--th e a ctive organism. In order 
t o make the conception ten able and to est ablish a system, we 
must firs t f ind a substantial home in reality for these "log-
ical" vagrants. Then we must join the "thing s of t h ought" 
and the "thing s of sense." "Log ical" entity can mea n nothing 
ap a rt from a log ical mind. We may rega rd t h e "log ical en-
tities" as the constructions of finite minds. That they 
may possess true objective wo r th, they must b e related to an 
I nfinite Mind. 'fhe cl a i m of t he new r ealist t hat "thing s of 
t h ought '' and " t h ing s of sen se " h a ve equa l ontolog ic a l st a tus 
must be deni Jd~The "th ing s of t h ought" are ontological; the 
"thing s of sense" are phenomena l only. Thing s are n ot wh a t 
the y seem to ''common- s ens e ." They a re not ultima tel y wh a t 
s ci enc e takes them to b e-- e l e ct r onic energies. They a re 
wha t they a re i n their c apacity of being organically r e lated 
to t h e un i v erse as a wh ole. For science, n a ture is a v a st 
system of thing s in itera cti on in accordance with fixed l a ws; 
for philoso phy, it is the conscious activity of Infinite will 
and deed. 
1 New Realis~. p. 35. 
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We are not contending that the logical realist is a 
conscious idea list, but we a r e speaking here of implications 
of his p oint of vi ew. "Logical 11 usuall y h a s some attac hment 
to the menta l, and we can scarcely speak of ''logical" entities 
without in some sense involving mind. Evidently, P rofessor 
Dewey is of the same opinion. He suggests tha t ' ~the 
p r agmatic difference between idealist and re ali s t (of the 
typ e of Mr. Russell) is not very great. F rom necess a ry i d e a l 
constructions to permissible logical constructions involves 
consi derable differ ence in t echnique but no perceptible p racti-
c a l difference. 111 He even calls Russell a Leibnizi a n monadist 
which woul d indicate a profound priva te e xperience with its 
distorti on of a common worl d . While we should not ascribe to 
Russell an ideali sm like that of Leibniz, he p rob ably does 
carry his thought nea rer to the idealistic position than 
any other of the behaviorists. This tendency is to be seen 
i n his anxiety to a do p t the conception of modern physics which 
is "a nti-ma terialistic " a s well as his inclusion of both 
physical and psychic a l data under psychical laws. 
There are many witnesses to attest the "de-materializa-
tion of matter. 11 Matter is no long er thought to be solid, 
impenetrable, and indestructible as Democritus and Lucretius 
t a ught; but it consists of an exceeding l y minute nucleus, 
"charged with posi t ive electricity, around which revolve 
from one (in hydro g en) to n i nety-two (in ura nium) satellites 
1 Essays, p. 410. 
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of negative electricity" moving with "speeds ranging from 
thirteen hundred to one hundred and twenty four thousand miles 
per second." The ac tual amount of matter in a body is a. 
"million-millionth part of its bulk." According to Charles 
Nordmann (Paris Observato r y), "There is, then, no longer a 
material mass. There is nothing but energy in the external 
universe. A strange--in a sense, an almost s p iritual--turn 
1 for modern physics to tal<e." Professor Alfred North Whitehead 
of Harvard University in his Concept of Nature transcends com-
pletely the "trim" materialism. of a generation or 'two ago. 
These expre s sions and kindred ones will indicate that t h e tide 
of crude materialism is on the ebb. When even behaviorists 
dread b eing called materialistic, we see the drift away from 
materialism in the modern world. Russell in his The A BC 
of t h e Atom takes his stand on modern g round. Perry yearns 
for a world of mathematics and morals, even of religion--a 
world that lifts its heart of hope and faith against every 
dark "portent of doom." Dewey's "half-hearted 11 naturalism 
points the way to the saving g r a.ce of idealism. And Singer's 
empirical idealism makes it possible for behaviorism to ac-
knowledge the constructive power of the mi nd, the ide a lity of 
nature., and even a purpose which organizes itself and draws 
the mechanism of matter to its own ends. 
Metaphysics~ behaviorism in its critical form demonstrates 
the anxiety of its chief protagonists to amend nafve realism 
111Religion and Relativity," Sermons of a Chemist: Slosson. 
' 
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or to leave it behind. Logical behaviorism is dissatisfied 
with critical naturalism. Both are advancing in the direction 
of the refinement of their concepts toward a more idealistic 
point of view. It is a gre a t step from the conception of 
matter in the lump to that of ma tter dissipated i n to the finer 
mists of energy; and it is a greater step from critical natur-
alism to logical realism than from the latter to idealism. 
With matter disappearing before our eyes only to re-appear 
as a structure of thought will prepare us to appreciate more 
fully the ideal world tha t b estows a richer faith in life and 
mind and God. 
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I II. SUMMARY 
The conclusions which we have re a ched may be summed up 
as follows: 
1. The history of the pre-behavioristic period from 
Aristotle down to Singer and Watson, who may be said to be 
the creators of behaviorism in its definite, modern form. 
Aristotle provided a number of fundamental conceptions such 
as potentiality, development, and teleology, which the behav-
iorists have appropriated for their own use. Some of the 
prominent pre-behaviorists are Hobb es, Comte, Cattell, Dewey, 
James, Perry, and McDougall. 
2. Contemporaneous behaviorism was considered. Ten 
or eleven varieties of behaviorism were found by grouping 
the behaviorists as to their treatment of consciousness and 
subject matter. They rang ed from the mild, the behaviorist 
who incorporates but little of behaviorism into his convention-
al psycholo gy,to the extreme behaviorism which Watson and 
Singer represent. 
3. Three fundament a l type s of behaviorism were discov-
ered--(1) modified behavi orism, (2) metaphysical behaviorism, 
and (3) logic a l behaviorism. Under modified behaviorism we 
found two subordinate t ypes-- (a) psycho-physical parallelis t ic 
behaviorism and (b) methodological behaviorism. 
4. Modified behaviorism is the mild type comprised of 
a mixture of behavioristic formula and conventional psychol-
ogy . As a rule t h e advoc a tes of this t yp e of behaviorism s c-
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cept the objectiv~ methods of behaviorism. (1) The metaphysi-
cal impli c e. tion of psycho-physic a l pa.ralleli sm is metaphysical 
dualism. (2) Methodological behaviorism favors e piphenomenal-
ism which is a form of materialism. 
5. Metaphysical behaviorism is a far more thorough-
going type. It is repre s ented chiefly by Singer, Watson, 
and Dewey. The metaphysical. implic a tions are materialism, 
critical naturalism, and empiri cal idealism. In its general 
form it is re alism. It is science applied to philosophy. 
It is analytic in method. 
6. The thi rd main type is 1 ogi cal b ehaviorism whi ch 
also stresses the analytic method. It is scientific; yet it 
goes beyond science to logical entitie s which are primitive 
elements that under-lie both mind and matt~r. The metaphysi-
c a l implic a tions naturalism and logi c al r eal ism (Platonic 
Healism). Practically, it lies very close to ide alism. It 
does comprise genuine idealisti c implic a tions. 
?. The maj or chara cte ris tic s of behaviorism taken as 
a whole comprise the following : (1) It reduces mind to the 
activity of the physical organi sm, or to a "cross-se ction" 
of the natural environment selected by the organism, or (as 
in the case of Pe r ry) to a combination of both of t he items 
just mentioned. (2) By ~mplication, there fore, behaviorism 
discards the psychical in the finite and consequently in the 
Infinite. l3) It is strongly monistic seeking to identify 
the i dea and thing , and the organism and other things. ( 4) It 
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makes characteristic assaults on the method of introspection 
holding that psychology, in order to be scientific, must 
employ the scientific method of objective observation and 
experimentation. (5) It is functional, usually of the 
biological type, and repre sents an advance over the atomistic 
associationalisrn of the past, whether of materialistic or the 
id ealis tic type. 
8. Behaviorism is phenomenalistic making behavior its 
exclusive study. It identifies the thing with its quantita-
tive expression. It is a good half-truth, but it should s upple-
ment its partial world mind and spirit in order to realize a 
full-orbed experience. 
2 3? 
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